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“A Beautiful Class an Irresistible Democracy” historicizes the (transnational) 
formation of the middle class in Bogotá, Colombia from the 1950s through the 1960s. 
Specifically, the dissertation asks certain historical actors—architects, dentists, social 
workers, agronomists, rural specialists and accountants—not only cultivated a sense of 
self-understanding as middle class but also campaigned for the materialization of a 
democratic project of hierarchical rule as middle class. Furthermore, it interrogates how 
this complex project was critically constructed within a context of U.S. imperial 
expansion, the advance of international development agencies and foundations, as well as 
the growth of the Colombia state during the consolidation of the political coalition known 
as the National Front. 
The middle class in Latin America, as a historical formation, has rarely been at 
the center of scholars’ attention. The middle class, furthermore, has been taken as a self-
evident reality, an inevitable consequence of modernization and a crystalline 
manifestation of democracy, with scholars (until recently) expecting it to manifest the 
 
same experiences, values, practices and meanings in all times and geographical locations. 
It is as if the language practices of historians and social scientists with respect to the 
middle class preclude—rather than promote—further historical analysis. As a result, 
historical research on political and social relations in modern societies in twentieth 
century Latin America has largely been conceptualized in terms of polar opposites: 
workers and employers, capital and labor, subalterns and elites. By questioning these 
shared scholarly conventions, my dissertation rethinks how power relations have 
historically been understood by explaining the transforming complexities of the 
transnational formation of the middle class in Bogotá throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
Moreover, in our present times when the middle class is again taken as universal standard 
to evaluate democracy throughout the world, my dissertation explains how the middle 
class—as an idea, practice of democratic rule and formation of political identification—
has historically become dominant category to delineate our current definitions of 
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A Valentina, a sus sueños, a su generación.  
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La lengua verdadera se nació junto con los dioses primeros, los que nacieron el mundo. De la primera 
palabra, del fuego primero, otras palabras verdaderas se fueron formando y de ellas se fueron desgranando, 
como el maíz en las manos del campesino, otras palabras. Tres fueron las palabras primeras, tres mil veces 
tres se nacieron otras tres, y de ellas otras y así se llenó el mundo de palabras. Una gran piedra fue 
caminada por todos los pasos de los dioses primeros, los que nacieron el mundo. Con tanta caminadera 
encima, la piedra bien lisita que se quedó, como un espejo. Contra ese espejo aventaron los dioses primeros 
las primeras tres palabras. El espejo no regresaba las mismas palabras que recibía, sino que devolvía otras 
tres veces tres palabras diferentes. Un rato pasaron así los dioses aventando las palabras al espejo para que 
salieran más, hasta que se aburrieron. Entonces tuvieron un gran pensamiento en su cabeza y se dieron en 
su caminadera sobre otra gran piedra y otro gran espejo se pulieron y lo pusieron frente al primer espejo y 
aventaron las primeras tres palabras al primer espejo y ése regresó tres veces tres palabras diferentes que se 
aventaron, con la pura fuerza que traían, contra el segundo espejo y éste regresó, al primer espejo, tres 
veces tres el número de palabras que recibió y así se fueron aventando más y más palabras diferentes que se 
aventaron, con la pura fuerza que traían contra el segundo espejo y éste regresó, al primer espejo, tres veces 
tres el número de palabras que recibió y así se fueron aventando más y más palabras diferentes los dos 
espejos. Así nació la lengua verdadera. De los espejos nació. 
 
Las tres primeras de todas las palabras y de todas las lenguas son democracia, libertad, justicia. 
"Justicia" no es dar castigo, es reponerle a cada cual lo que merece y cada cual merece lo que el espejo le 
devuelve: él mismo. El que dio muerte, miseria, explotación, altivez, soberbia, tiene como merecimiento un 
buen tanto de pena y tristeza para su caminar. El que dio trabajo, vida, lucha, el que fue hermano, tiene 
como merecimiento una lucecita que le alumbre siempre el rostro, el pecho y el andar. 
"Libertad" no es que cada uno haga lo que quiere, es poder escoger cualquier camino que te guste para 
encontrar el espejo, para caminar la palabra verdadera. Pero cualquier camino que no te haga perder el 
espejo. Que no te lleve a traicionarte a tí mismo, a los tuyos, a los otros. 
 
"Democracia" es que los pensamientos lleguen a un buen acuerdo. No que todos piensen igual, sino que 
todos los pensamientos o la mayoría de los pensamientos busquen y lleguen a un acuerdo común, que sea 
bueno para la mayoría sin eliminar a los que son los menos. Que la palabra de mando obedezca la palabra 
de la mayoría, que el bastón de mando tenga palabra colectiva y no una sola voluntad. Que el espejo refleje 
todo, caminantes y camino, y sea, así, motivo de pensamiento para dentro de uno mismo y para afuera del 
mundo. 
 
De estas tres palabras vienen todas las palabras, a estas tres se encadenan las vidas y muertes de los 
hombres y mujeres verdaderos. Esa es la herencia que dieron los dioses primeros, los que nacieron el 
mundo, a los hombres y mujeres verdaderos. Más que herencia es una carga pesada, una carga que hay 
quienes abandonan en mitad del camino y la dejan botada nada más, como si cualquier cosa. Los que 
abandonan esta herencia rompen su espejo y caminan ciegos por siempre, sin saber nunca más lo que son, 
de dónde vienen y a dónde van. Pero hay quienes la llevan siempre la herencia de las tres palabras 
primeras, caminan siempre como encorvados por el peso de la espalda, como cuando el maíz, el café o la 
leña ponen la mirada en el suelo. Pequeños siempre por tanta carga viendo siempre para abajo por tanto 
peso, los hombres y mujeres verdaderos son grandes y miran para arriba. Con dignidad miran y caminan los 
hombres y mujeres verdaderos, dicen. 
 
Pero, para que la lengua verdadera no se perdiera, los dioses primeros, los que nacieron el mundo, dijeron 
que había que cuidar las tres primeras palabras. Los espejos de la lengua podían romperse algún día y 
entonces las palabras que parieron se romperían igual que los espejos y quedaría el mundo sin palabras que 
hablar o callar. Así, antes de morirse para vivir, los dioses primeros entregaron esas tres primeras palabras a 
los hombres y mujeres de maíz para que las cuidaran. Desde entonces, los hombres y mujeres verdaderos 
custodian como herencia esas tres palabras. Para que no se olviden nunca, las caminan, las luchan, las 
viven... 
Hay que seguir soñando. Hay que seguir caminando. 
 





I have been thinking about the middle class for a while now. Little did I know that 
my undergraduate thesis could turn into a major project of historical research. Nor was I 
aware that such a project could indeed shed some lights on what our globalized society 
has become. Although very much still in the making, this project began several years ago 
when I came to the United States for graduate work. Class as a category of historical 
analysis was vanishing from classrooms and campuses—in the halls of the academia,  
class seemed to no longer matter. Yet, at the same time, I sensed around me talk about the 
middle class—in political campaigns, in social studies, in everyday conversation. If only, 
the argument went, Latin America could have developed a middle class like the U.S. 
perhaps I would have had neither the desire nor the need to do my graduate work at North 
American University.  
 To materialize this project has not been an easy. It has forced me to shake up my 
own beliefs—politically and otherwise. I have somehow had to turn away from my 
graduate education in order to pursue the research for and the writing of this dissertation. 
But I am quite aware that without that graduate education I would have been unable to 
begin this rethinking. It became impossible for me to repeat a familiar story about the 
middle class within the framework of identity politics. Now I am convinced that we 
should find both the courage and pleasure to be uncertain about our arguments we begin 
writing and to embrace being unaware of what we have yet to say about the problem at 
hand. How can one find courage and pleasure in writing if it is only to legitimize what is 
already known? At least in my case, the practice of writing compelled me to rethink the 
argument I wanted to put forward. And, no doubt, this rethinking carries with it analytic, 
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political, historiographical and ethical risks, which I fully assume, especially as I am 
uncertain whether I have succeed in such a difficult task.  
This would have not been possible (at least the attempt) without the help of many 
people.  Inevitably, I have accumulated more debts and gratitude than can properly be 
acknowledged in a few words. I would like to thank the protagonists of this story—
middle class professionals who were always willing to talk with me about who they were, 
and wanted to be. The Fernandos—Agudelo, Cortés and Lópera—Clodomiro 
Rodruíguez, German Giraldo and Julio Emilio Echeverry graciously allowed me into 
their home and into their archives. Alicia Perdomo has also willingly discussed with me 
the meanings of being middle class since, as she said, it has been put in “el baúl de los 
recuerdos.” I will be for ever thankful to them all for our eternal disagreements. As will 
become apparent, we sharply disagree about the historical role of the middle class. I have 
tried to tell a story as I see it. Perhaps, I will disappoint them. It is my hope, however, that 
by questioning ourselves at least we increase our awareness about what we have become.  
Alberto Valencia was a very engaging man and did want to see “something in 
writing” in order to (finally) discuss it. I am deeply sad that this will not happen. But I am 
happy to report that our heated discussions will continue to provoke me.  
 Research for this dissertation has been generously supported by grants and 
fellowships from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the American Council of Learned 
Societies as well as from the section on Research on Interdisciplinary Approaches and 
Original Resources of the Library of Congress. The Department of History at the 




I will always be grateful for the support and encouragement extended over the 
past years by my dissertation advisors. Mary Kay Vaughan, Daryle Williams, Brian 
Owensby and Patricio Roberto Korzeniewicz. They have engaged my work quite 
seriously even when they sharply disagree with my arguments. They have been constant 
interlocutors and I hope I will have the privilege to continue working with them. Their 
exemplary scholarship has heavily influenced the arguments that I have tried to put 
forward here.  
 Barbara Weinstein. Barbara es barbara. I have had the privilege and the fortune 
to work with her. Since the very beginning of my time at Maryland, Barbara has engaged 
my work critically. I have learned a lot from her. And I hope to continue having such a 
privilege. As an advisor, I have found in her a scholar, a critic, a radical historian, and, no 
less important, a friend.  My intellectual debt to Barbara, who directed the dissertation, 
will be clear to those who familiar with her work. And this intellectual debt has been the 
product of several years of discussions and disagreements. These disagreements have 
urged us both to take critical positions, to engage in heated and lively discussions, 
argumentats and debates. And it is in this context that she has offered valuable and 
influential criticism of my arguments and ideas. She practices so well what Romand 
Coles has called receptive generosity—that is to say, advising for Barbara means sharing 
a space where both she and her students are receptive to disagreements, and open to being 
convinced by one another, a space through which both critical positions can be mutually 
transformed precisely because of these disagreements. Barbara, eternamente agradecido! 
 I am grateful as well to the many archivists and librarians at the Biblioteca Luis 
Angel Arango, the United States National Archives, the Colombia Presidential Archive, 
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the Columbus Library at the Organization of the American States, the United Nations, the 
now defunct Instituto de Credito Territorial and the Inter-American Center for Housing at 
the Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Juan David Umbarila-Zamora suggested the last 
archive and now I must thank him because his suggestion led to very important changes 
in my archival research and theoretical conceptualization. I also own an immense debt to 
those archivists and librarians who joined me in very disorganized archives in search to 
find material I needed. My special thanks go to Carlos Marin, Giovanni Contreras, 
Claudia Mata, Marta and Gabriel Escalante,  
 At Maryland, I have had the good fortune to make friends. Doing graduate school 
is not easy but these friends have made the experience a little bit less difficult. I offer 
heartfelt thanks to these friends who in several ways have supported my work: Leandro 
Benmergui, Thomas Castillo, Jeff Coster,  Shane Dillingham, Susanne Eineigel, Reid 
Gustafson, Paula Halperin, Thanai Jackson, Mark Kehren, Linda Noel, Shari Orisich, and 
Sarah Sarzynski.  
I also want to offer special thanks to my dear friend Claire Claudia Goldstene. We 
have shared our way in writing our dissertations. After several years of conversations, I 
think we are very well prepared to write a book on how to write a dissertation. Usually in 
graduate school we are trained to write but little is said about how that process take place. 
Claire has been a trusted friend whose collegiality, intellect, and integrity have definitely 
supported me in the process of writing this dissertation. Unspeakably important has also 
been her deep intellectual interest in theory, politics and history. Now I am very happy to 
report to her that she has proven to me that she is not wrong.  
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 I am grateful to scholars too numerous to mention here who have provided 
suggestions and criticisms. Since I started to work as a historian several years ago, 
Mauricio Archila has been an intellectual interlocutor. I have regularly turned to his 
friendship for feedback, guidance, perspective and solidarity. Eduardo Sáenz has taught 
me so much through his engagement with archives; César Ayala through his obsession 
with historical detail. Bernardo Tovar has shared with me his passion for theory since I 
was an undergraduate and I can now understand why he kept saying that theory should 
not be understood as the opposite of historical research. Luz Gabriela Arango has 
influenced my work in so many ways since the very beginning and I want to express my 
thanks for her support. John Green welcomed me into graduate school in the U.S and 
since then has provided encouragement and support. His scholarship on Colombian 
history has inspired me in countless way. Gracias! Also, David Parker and Enrique 
Garguin have been constant interlocutors through discussion about the historical 
formation of the middle class in Latin America.  
 I am grateful as well to Kathryn Litherland. She has worked really hard editing 
my English. I just hope that she has somehow enjoyed the dissertation along the way. Her 
work has improved my argument and my ideas, though of course I fully assume any 
mistakes, of course!  
 There is a group of friends that, despite the distance, have continuously been close 
to my heart. Since the very beginning in the Halls of Manuel Ancizar’s building and the 
student office of Goliardos, we have built a friendships and an intellectual community. I 
want to offer my heartfelt thanks to Oscar Calvo, Marta Saade, Mario Barbosa, Belen 
Pardo, Lida Nuñez, Manuel Ruiz, and Wilson Pabón—camaradas y amigos de vida. 
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There also other friends and scholars who over the years have shown endless support. 
Valeria Coronel and Marta Domíguez, usually in disagreement with my approach to 
understanding the middle class, have provided very important criticism of my work.   
Closer to my immediate community, I want to let some friends know how grateful 
I am for their help and support. Los venenzolanos—Lufan, Orlando, Makerly, Maria 
Fernanda, Tomas, John, Javier, Maribel, and Ginet—have provided me with a powerful 
friendship. We have helped one another in countless ways. With no pressure, they usually 
asked the unaskable question: When are you finishing the dissertation? They will be 
disappointed to hear that the writing never ends as I now embark on the completion of a 
book. But I hope that even with this disappointment we can continue being good friends, 
as well as having dancing and drinking parties. 
My father, Abel I. López, a medievalist, has been a constant inspiration. Several 
years ago, he invited me to enjoy the pleasures of historical research and teaching. I think 
he would not be surprised to learn that it has indeed been an enjoyment. Like every other 
student of his, I have learned so much. Since I took my very first class with him in 
college—in medieval history where and I did just o.k—in college, he has been a true 
maestro. And he has done this with care and love. My mother, Myriam, has been a source 
of support ever since she tried to teach me some English. She has been a political 
inspiration in my life as well. She is very critical of an academia that promises too much 
and at the moment of practice radical beliefs vanished—todo lo sólido se desvance en el 
aire. Teté, Juana and Gerardo have been enormously supportive. They have had an 
unshakable confidence in me; and recently, Teté has been of incomparable support as I 
was trying to finish the dissertation. My in-laws, Matilde, Héctor and Sandra have 
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cheered me on these many years. My profound gratitude to them all for truly sustaining 
me in so many ways during the research and writing of this project.  
Last, but definitely not least, I owe deep thanks to Maria Isabel Cortés-Zamora, 
mi compañera de vida. She is my best critic. I am profoundly grateful for her candor, 
honesty, solidarity, critical thinking, intelligence, creativity and love. She has inspired me 
as I struggled with this project and insightfully assured me that in order to be able to do 
something about the middle class (or, for that matter, to finish the dissertation) I had to 
come to terms with my middle-classness. Her critical stand regarding academia has 
offered me a much needed perspective about what is important in life. Now that she has 
decided to return to the academia, I hope she will remain as critical and creative as she 
has always been. My journey with her has indeed been the pleasure of my life. I hope 
there is no end to it.  
Valentina López-Cortés has taught me so much to help me get through my 
graduate school years. She has also been my best critic, my best friend, and above all, my 
favorite daughter. As is clear to those who are close to me, there is a before and after 
Valentina. She has constantly changed my approach to life. I just hope that through all 
our discussions about the middle class she has empowered herself to be critical of what 
we are and what we could become—how change can indeed happen. It is with a profound 
and unshakable love that I dedicate this dissertation to her and her generation in the hope 
that the history of the present can shed light on envisioning new futures trough which all 
people of different genders, nationalities, religions, ages, beliefs, ethnicities, and classes 
can fully participate in the equal distribution world’s wealth. 
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To be a traitor to one’s regime, a traitor to one’s sex, to one’s class—what other reasons are 
there to write? And to be a traitor to writing itself. 
Gilles Deleuze 
 





 In 1954, Alberto Valencia, an architect working for the Inter-American 
Housing and Planning Center (CINVA) in Bogotá, an office inaugurated by the 
Organization of American States and the U.S. Office for International Technical 
Assistance in 1952, made a short trip to a small town called Anolaima, two hours 
away from the capital city. He was seeking, he wrote in a letter to his mother in 
1955, to find himself in a “remote but attractive place.” He was excited, it seems, 
because “a middle class guy like [him]” could use this trip to find “the reality of 
social life.” After some days in the field, the architect was determined to leave “[his] 
books and city behind…” in order to come back and teach “how to build houses, 
how to live in community… how to live in democracy.” His desire was to “know the 
Colombian peasants in person …their families…their lives…their souls, their 
activities.” Back in his office at CINVA in Bogotá, according to the minutes of 
training discussions in July 1955, Alberto complained that it was “the cultured 
[ilustradas] Colombian elites [who] could afford to continue ignoring” the peasants 
(campesinos) and the working class (obreros or trabajadores). Instead, he, as a 
middle class guy, called upon his fellow professionals to be “committed to work for 
a democratic society…to be fully involved with those who [were] oppressed.” After 
expressing how much he had enjoyed going to “these unknown lands,” Alberto 
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Valencia concluded—or realized—who he really was: a privileged man who had 
been born “in a beautiful class…a class that make democracy irresistible.”1 Alberto’s 
concerns, preoccupations and, above all, realizations raise critical questions about the 
historical formation of the middle class in Bogotá, Colombia, during the late 1950s 
and 1960s. What were the historical circumstances and discursive conditions that 
enabled Alberto to classify himself as a “middle-class guy”? During those very 
political years in the Americas, what did it mean to be middle class? Why did the 
peasants, as well as the working class and the “cultured elites,” play such as 
important role in Alberto’s self-understanding as a middle-class guy? In this crucial 
moment of Colombia’s Cold War history when traditional Liberal and Conservatives 
parties entered into a political coalition for national reconciliation, peace and 
democracy in the late 1950s, why did he find it so important to be committed to 
living in a democratic society? What was his role to play in creating that democratic 
society? And, perhaps more importantly, why did he think that his role as a middle-
class professional would make democracy irresistible? By closely working through 
these questions, using previously unexplored historical sources and weaving a 
theoretical perspective that combines attention to the formative power of politics, 
structure, discourses and subjectivities, this dissertation argues that the formation of 
the middle class was not an inevitable consequence of industrialization, urbanization 
and occupational diversification. Rather, I contend, it was a contested democratic 
project of class-based hierarchical rule and a paradoxical product of 
                                                 
1All the citations come from Apuntes de clase, asignaturas, discusión y entrenamiento, Folder : 
material de trabajo de campo, December, 1954 and July, 1955, Inter-American Center for Housing 
and Planning Archive; Personal letter from Alberto Valencia to his mother, February 1955, Alberto 
Personal Archive.  
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imperial/transnational encounters between Colombia and the United States during 
the 1950s and 1960s.  
 Looking at Bogotá as my case study, I argue that the transnational/imperial 
formation of the middle class profoundly altered the shape democracy would take 
during the Cold War in the Americas. Specifically, I ask how certain historical 
actors—architects, dentists, social workers, agronomists, rural specialists and 
accountants—not only cultivated a sense of self-understanding as middle class but 
also campaigned for the materialization of a democratic project of hierarchical rule 
as middle class. Furthermore, I interrogate how this complex project was critically 
constructed within a context of U.S. imperial expansion, the advance of international 
development agencies and foundations, as well as the growth of the Colombia state 
during the consolidation of the political coalition known as the National Front. In so 
doing, I demonstrate how middle-class professionals, while working for democracy, 
attempted to sediment a hierarchical society in which they could not only be 
distinguished from other social groups, as most of the recent studies on the middle 
class would have it, but also, and more importantly, be hierarchically located above 









The Middle Class and the Predicament of Democracy 
 Historians and social scientists alike have long understood the middle class as 
originating first in Europe and the United States, then radiating to—and 
influencing—the rest of the globe. This universalized story has routinely perpetuated 
a teleological narrative of an exclusively Western democracy—usually associated 
with North Atlantic societies—through which other regions of the world are quickly 
compared to the so-called universal models and always found wanting. Indeed, the 
universalization of these experiences has perpetuated the notion that divergent 
historical experiences can only be understood as deviations, as failures or, at best, as 
derivative.2 Recent studies of the middle class in Latin American and other Global 
South geographical locations have sought to dispute these arguments by historicizing 
what it is still considered the local experiences of the middle class.3 Although this 
dissertation is very much part of this cohort of historical studies, I contend that this 
                                                 
2 See, among others, Jurgen Kocka “The Middle Class in Europe,” The Journal of Modern History 67 
(December 1995): 783-810. For a critical perspective on eurocentrism, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
Provincializing Europe : Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000). For a very provocative critique of Chakrabarty’s argument, see Carlota 
Dietze, “Toward a History on Equal Terms: A Discussion of Provincializing Europe,” History and 
Theory 47 (February 2008), 69-84. Even recent studies in Latin American history that seek to 
challenge the universalizing tendencies of postcolonial theory, the Latin American middle classes 
appear as “hybrid”—that is, presumably, modern and traditional—in comparison to North Atlantic 
societies, where the middle class is seen as fully modern. See Mark Thurner and Andres Guerrero, 
eds., After Spanish Rule: Postcolonial Predicaments of the Americas (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2003). Finally, recent theoretical explorations of the relationship between what is conceived as 
the local (i.e., Latin America) and the global (i.e., North Atlantic societies) have privileged an 
ahistorical homogenization of class differentiation, erasing any role for the middle class. Implicitly, 
these studies subsume what is conceived as the local into a kind of “subaltern authenticity” that 
misses so much of how a middle-class formation was crucial in the making of national postcolonial 
states. See, specifically, Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, 
and Border Thinking (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); see also Néstor García Canclini, 
Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1995).  
 
3 For a truly historiographical/comparative analysis of the middle class, see Sanjay Joshi, Fractured 





recent research on the middle class has left unquestioned the putative universal 
relationship between democracy and the formation of the middle class precisely 
because the analysis has been limited to how Latin American middle-class 
experiences were different from—or similar to—those in other parts of the world.4  
 These studies have worked under a shared assumption that poses a sharp 
distinction between an ideal middle-class modernity/democracy and what is 
understood as the reality of being middle class. Thus, they generally offer a 
dialectical critique through which the reality of middle-class practices bring into 
question what is conceived to be the universal ideal, indeed the abstraction, of the 
middle class, an ideal that is usually located outside of Latin America. Brian 
Owensby, for instance, argues that the “we cannot think about the middle class 
except by considering its relationship to the idea of the middle class originating 
outside Latin America. Latin Americans helped imposed the category upon 
themselves.”5 The ironies, incongruities, dissonances and contradictions are put at 
the very center of the historical formation of the middle class precisely because those 
                                                 
4 My critical view of these works is only possible because I have had the privilege to write after these 
authors who, with pathbreaking historical analyses, have strongly influenced my arguments about the 
middle class in Colombia.  
 
5 See Brian Owensby, Intimate Ironies: Modernity and the Making of Middle-Class Lives in Brazil 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 256, 8, my emphasis; D. S. Parker, The Idea of the 
Middle Class; White-Collar Workers and Peruvian Society (College Station: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1998); José Pablo Silva, “White-Collar Revolutionaries: Middle Class Unions and 
the Rise of the Chilean Left, 1918-1938 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 2000); Michael 
Ervin, “The Arts of the Possible: Agronomists, Agrarian Reform and Middle Politics of the Mexican 
revolution” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2004); Michael Ervin, “The 1930s Agrarian 
Census in Mexico: Agronomists, Middle Politics and the Negotiation of Data Collection, Hispanic 
American Historical Review 87:3 (August 2007), 537-570; Patrick Barr-Melej, Reforming Chile: 
Culture, Politics, Nationalism and the Rise of the Middle Class (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001); Maureen O’Dougherty, Consumption Intensified: the Politics of Middle-Class 
Daily Life in Brazil (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002); Dennis Gilbert, Mexico’s Middle Class 




historical actors who defined themselves as middle class were constantly 
struggling—“and could never quite live up to”—or fully experience the ideal of 
being middle class. Then, presumably, either for North Atlantic societies or 
geographical spaces in the Global South, the ideal of the middle class is criticized 
only by its incompleteness in practice and everyday experience. 6  
 The interpretation offered in this dissertation goes against these historical 
arguments. The dissent is certainly partial; I do not want to dismiss these very 
important works that, in various moments throughout my historical analysis, I rely 
on. The problem is that these approaches leave the very ideal association of 
modernity/democracy and middle class unquestioned, precisely because modernity, 
                                                 
6 Owensby, 8. Similar arguments have been made for other geographical locations outside the North 
Atlantic societies. Sanjay Joshi, for instance, argues that the “point is not to claim that middle classes 
across the world were identical, but to point to the similarities in the nature of middle-class 
modernities constructed in different parts of the world; to point to the extent to which all such politics 
deviated from the ideal type usually attributed to a hyper real Europe.” In other words, even in Europe 
the middle class was not able to live up to the ideal of modernity. I would argue that these arguments 
somehow reproduce an ideal universality that is seen as nonhierarchical and universally inclusive—
only if the middle class would have been able to live up to those ideals, could the middle class have 
been completely modern—then modernity, however defined, is unquestioned. See Sanjay Joshi, 
Fractured Modernity: The Making of a Middle Class in Colonial North India (Oxford University 
Press, 2003) 181. O’Dougherty, for instance, argues that the main historical conclusions about the 
middle class have been based upon North Atlantic societies. What happens, she asks, with these 
conclusions when we study a location outside the “first world” where “among other differences, the 
middle class is a minority rather than a sizable demographic group? This questions summarizes, I 
would argue, how the tendency to particularize the history of the middle class has, by extension, 
reproduced the universalization of the North Atlantic experience—What are the criteria, historically 
speaking to categorize the middle class in Latin America as a “minority? Certainly, the experiences of 
the “first world.” In a recent review of some books about the middle-class in Latin America, a 
historian concludes that “the ‘nonexistent’ Latin American middle class seems to be going through 
another phase of rediscovery…and recently historians have discovered how the middle class is also 
important in the third world.” Review of O’Maureen Dougherty’s Consumption Intensified by 
Andrew Kirkendall in Politics and Society (Summer 2003) 45:2, 145. See also Keith David 
Watenpaugh, who argues that the formation of the middle class in the Arab Middle East during the 
first decades of the 20th century could not complete the project of modernity precisely because the 
means by which modernity spread in Eastern Mediterranean society did not always—by comparison 
to “metropolitan areas”—lead to the creation of secular, democratic and rational institutions. Rather, 
he argues, its local variations cemented distance, alienation and cultural impoverishment. In so doing, 
Watenpaugh reproduces the very universalization of the middle class precisely because what is 
conceived as the local is always read as failure or deviation. See Keith David Watenpaugh, Being 
Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism and the Arab Middle Class 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 303-308.  
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however defined, is criticized by pointing to its supposed incongruities and 
dissonances in practice. If the ideal could have been fully—that is, universally—
experienced, then no dissonance, no particular hierarchies and no contradictions 
could have ever existed. This argumentation serves to protect the reliability of a 
supposedly ideal form of democracy/modernity that is immune to class hierarchies, 
contradictions and gender distinctions, thus obscuring their intimate constitutive 
nature.  
 In contrast, by looking specifically at the crucial juncture of Colombia’s Cold 
War history when the National Front sought to end La Violencia by implementing 
systematic social and economic reforms, I seek to historicize how the very 
relationship between democracy and middle class—what is putatively seen as an 
ideal—came to play a paramount role in shaping new forms, rationalities and 
methodologies of U.S. imperial/transnational rule. The local projects of middle-class 
rule, I argue, have historically had a bearing on a larger imperial terrain, and I 
contend that these projects cannot fruitfully be examined as mere local/practical 
detail in contrast with a purported ideal located outside Latin America—although, as 
will become clear, such detail must surely form the basis of any significant historical 
account. The formation of a democratic middle class during the late 1950s and early 
1960s, I conclude, was neither the result of purely local/practical circumstances that 
were incongruent with ideal models, nor a simple imposition of what can be 
(mis)construed as an ideal or universal model from outside Latin America, but rather 




 Similarly, I question recent historical analyses that repeatedly underscore the 
post-World War II historical process through which the United States tried to push 
societies toward a liberal, democratic and capitalist modernity by promoting the 
creation of a stable, prosperous middle class inoculated against communism in the 
Americas. These historical narratives, I contend, have operated under a shared 
assumption about an ideal domestic “American way of life”—explicitly or implicitly 
embodied in the so-called middle-class nation—that was transparently ready to be 
exported to the rest of the Western Hemisphere.7 If the whole process failed, some 
argue, it was because, due to certain political and social conditions, Latin America 
was not ready for a middle-class democracy. Others argue that, despite the noble 
intentions of some U.S. policymakers to forge a middle class, U.S. foreign policy 
during the Cold War ended up weakening the democratic processes in the region as it 
“fortified illiberal forces, militarized societies” and limited the social definitions of 
democracy.8  
                                                 
7 As Paul Kramer has recently argued, this historiography of “export or projection” assumes that the 
U.S. simply injected what they considered domestic formations into foreign terrains. Paul Kramer, 
The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006). Stephen C. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: 
John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press 1999); Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science 
and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); 
David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham, eds., Staging Growth: 
Modernization, Development and the Global Cold War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 
2003); Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Julio Moreno, Yankee Don't Go Home! Mexican 
Nationalism, American Business Culture, and the Shaping of Modern Mexico, 1920-1950 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).  
 
8 See Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre. Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 2004), xiv. I do not wish to argue that the United States did not play this 
role; however, my concern here is the historical relation between democracy and the formation of a 
middle class in the consolidation of U.S. empire. Recent studies on empire have been useful in this 
regard. See, among others, Ann Laura Stoler, ed., Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in 
North American History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. 
LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History 
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 Perhaps as a result of these narratives, historians and social scientists alike, 
since the 1950s, have organized their inquiries by asking whether the middle class 
could potentially become a democratic force. In 1958, for example, John J. Johnson 
described how the middle-class sectors could potentially play a democratic role by 
promoting economic nationalism, state-sponsored development, and the expansion of 
public education and the professionalization of politics. He envisioned a middle class 
as the vanguard of progress in Latin American and as a democratic force capable of 
balancing the extremes of Right and Left.9 And yet, soon after the publication of his 
book Johnson came under attack precisely because, several authors argued, the 
middle class in Latin American did not represent a dynamic, modernizing group that 
could, in practice, forge democracy. During the late 1960s and 1970s, the 
dependentistas argued that the middle class did not play a democratic role precisely 
because it supported military dictatorships throughout Latin America.10 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                 
of U.S.-Latin American Relations (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); Ann Laura Stoler, Carole 
McGranahan and Peter C Perdue, eds., Imperial Formations (Santa Fe: School for Advance Research 
Press, 2007); Paul A Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the 
Philippines ( Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2006); See also Seth Fein, “New 
Empire into Old: Making Mexican Newsreels the Cold War Way,” Diplomatic History, 28, 5 
(November 2004): 703-747.  
  
9 John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); See also Luis López de Mesa, Tres estudios sobre la 
clase media en Colombia (Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1952); Theo R. Crevenna, Materiales para 
el estudio de la clase media en América Latina (Washington: Pan-American Union, 1951); Victor 
Alba “The Middle-Class Revolution,” New Politics (Winter, 1962): 63-73; Robert Alexander, 
Communism in Latin America (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1961); Gabriel Salazar, “Para 
una historia de la clase media en Chile,” Documento de trabajo no 60 (Santiago: Sur Profesionales 
Ltda, 1986).  
 
10 Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1979); See also Magdalena León de Leal, “La clase media y la 
dependencia externa en Colombia: esquema para su estudio,” Razón y Fabula 23 (Jan/Feb, 1971):58-
73; José Nun, “A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle-Class Military Coup,” in James Petras 
and Maurice Zeitlin, eds., Latin America: Reform or Revolution? A Reader (Greenwich: Fawcett, 
1968); Tulio Halperín Donghi, The Contemporary History of Latin America (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1993); Nicolas Buenaventura, La proletarización de los profesionales y los sectores 
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these authors argued, in order for the middle class to be truly democratic, it would 
need to disappear by a gradual process of proletarianization into the subjugated 
masses. At the same time, the dependentistas argued that if the middle class 
underwent a process of incorporation into the elites, this would be the clearest 
manifestation of its anti-democratic role and practices. More recently, several 
authors have documented how the middle class in Latin America was democratic 
and anti-democratic at the same time, depending on historical periodization. It was 
democratic, the argument goes, because it joined forces with the laboring classes to 
make concrete material and political demands. Yet it was anti-democratic precisely 
because it sought to distance itself from manual labor and saw in the elites an 
unavoidable reference point in its historical self-definition.11 For over a half century, 
therefore, in both academic and foreign-policy studies, the strength of the middle 
class has always been regarded as the barometer of modern democracies.12  
                                                                                                                                                 
medios (Bogotá: Ediciones Suramericana, CEIS, 1985); Rocio Londoño, Sindicalismo y política 
económica (Bogotá: FEDESARROLLO-CEREC, 1986). See also César Germaná, “The Middle Strata 
and the Problem of the Class Alliances,” translated by Peggy Westwell, Latin American Perspectives 
10, No. 2-3 (1983): 171-184 ; Carlos Figueroa, Estratificación y movilidad ocupacional en America 
Latina (Santiago de Chile: Cuadernos de la CEPAL, No. 39, 1981), 6-64; Antonio García, “Las clases 
medias en América Latina: Hacia una teoría de la ambigüedad social,” Cuadernos Americanos 60 
(September-December 1968). 
  
11 Parker, The Idea of the Middle Class, 240. Other recent studies on the middle class have deemed it 
wiser to overlook entirely the very historical relation between the middle class and democracy. 
Owensby, for instance, argues that the interpretation offered in his work on Brazilian middle classes is 
directed toward a “mid-range conceptualization.” The main approach, he writes, is the question of 
class “from the perspective of the people who lived it. Thus, I am not concerned except incidentally 
with the more broadly interpretive, historical sociological questions of whether the middle class was 
or was not an agent of capitalist development and democratic government.” As will become evident, I 
argue that this historical relationship cannot overlooked when talking about the middle class precisely 
because the very formation of the middle class as a class was so inseparable from discussions of 
democracy and appropriate government. 
 
12 For a historiographical essay on the middle class in Latin America, see Michael Jimenez, “The 
Elision of the Middle Class and Beyond: History, Politics and Development Studies in Latin 
America’s ‘Short Twentieth Century, ’” in Colonial Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin 
America History (London: Routledge, 1999), 207-228. For a similar argument about the middle class 
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 Although this dissertation has been profoundly influenced by these recent 
works, I seek to historicize the very association between middle class and the 
practices of democracy. Rather than turning to a transhistorical ideal of democracy to 
read the experiences of the middle class or proclaiming whether the middle class was 
or was not democratic, I interrogate the practices, conceptions, rationalities, forms, 
and meanings of democracy by looking at the historical/transnational formation of 
the middle class in Bogotá during the 1950s and early 1960s.13 This approach brings 
into question the shared analytical framework that posits class hierarchies and 
democratic rule as opposed to and irreconcilable to each other. Study after study (and 
certainly this is not limited to historical works on the middle class) takes for granted 
                                                                                                                                                 
in other parts of the world, see Oliver Zunz, Leonard Schopppa and Nobuhiro Hiwatari, eds., Social 
Contracts under Stress: The Middle Classes of America, Europe, and Japan at the Turn of the 
Century (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002); Burton J. Bledstein and Robert D. Johnston, 
ed., The Middling Sorts: Exploration in the History of the American Middle Class (New York: 
Routledge, 2001). As it should be evident in the last three footnotes, there has been a vast 
historiographical production about the middle class. Although it is impossible to elaborate in this 
dissertation, it is crucial to mention that we need to go beyond the “elision hypothesis.” Recent works 
have legitimized their historical inquiries by arguing that, in contrast to North Atlantic societies, Latin 
American middle class has been elided from historian’s agenda. I would argue that this has not been 
the case—we have indeed talked about the middle class. The task, I would contend, is to read this vast 
historiographical production, along with travel accounts, statistical handbooks, novels, sociological 
and political studies, magazines and films, as a part of a larger transnational/imperial dialogue that 
critically contributed to the global hegemony—or what I call the transnational totemization—of the 
ideal of the middle class as the vital foundations of modern democracies. This is important not only 
because these discussions were translated into policies but also because these ideas were manipulated 
and reworked by some historical actors in the very process of becoming middle class.  
 
13 This dissertation also seeks to contribute to a small but growing body of scholarship that intends to 
expand the study of democratization to include realms beyond the formal political arena. As David 
Nugent has recently argued, “most studies of democracy restrict their field of vision to procedural 
democracy—to the institutions and activities surrounding competitive elections, the secret ballot, 
universal suffrage, the rights of citizenship, the accountability of public officials to the electorate, the 
rule of law and the subordination of the military to civilian authority …few have devoted attention to 
wholly different conceptions or forms of democracy.” See David Nugent, “Alternative Democracies: 
The Evolution of the Public Sphere in 20th Century Peru,” PoLAR 25, No. 1, 20002, 152. See also his 
forthcoming book Alternative Democracies: Discipline, Dissent and State Formation in Northern 
Peru; James Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Fernando Coronil, The Magical State: Nature, Money, 




the meanings and practices of democracy and, by explicit implication, argues that 
any historical instances of class hierarchy and gender distinction are evidence of the 
failure to achieve a purified ideal of democracy, or of its distortion in local practice. 
Therefore, better, more or real democracy is then treated as the purification of the 
gendered and classed hierarchical rule itself. In the process, each side stands opposed 
to the other in a closed economy whereby more class hierarchies and gender 
distinctions imply less democracy, and more democracy implies fewer hierarchies. 
Instead, I invite us to rethink the meanings, workings, political rationalities and 
technologies of hierarchical rule continually at work in the histories of democracy, 
rather than assuming their transhistorically good or bad qualities.14 
Mapping the Dissertation 
 This dissertations looks specifically at the crucial juncture of the late 1950s 
and 1960s in Colombia, when the consolidation of the National Front—a bipartisan 
coalition—sought to usher in a new era of political reconciliation, democracy and 
peace by systematically implementing a series of social, political and economic 
programs. Rather than ask whether these policies and programs succeeded in 
resolving the political conflicts known as La Violencia, the question posed by a 
number of Colombian historians, I instead explore how middle-class professionals 
                                                 
14 This argument has been influenced by recent studies on the anthropology of democracy. See Julia 
Paley, “Toward an Anthropology of Democracy,” Annual Review of Anthropology 2002 31: 469-496; 
See also Julia Paley, ed., Anthropology of Democracy (Santa Fe: School of Advanced Research Press, 
forthcoming); see also, Daniel Walkowitz, Working With Class: Social Workers and the Politics of 
Middle-Class Identity (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Lucia Michelutti, “The 
Vernacularization of Democracy: Political Participation and Popular Politics in North India,” Journal 
of the Anthropological Royal Institute, 13:3 (2007), 639-656; Kimberly Coles, Democratic Designs: 
International Intervention and Electoral Practices in Postwar Bosnia Herzegovina (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2007); Dipesh Chakrabarty “‘In the Name of Politics’: Democracy and 




became embedded in a new form of democratic rule in the context of U.S. imperial 
expansion.15 Chapter 1 seeks to engage with, extend, and tentatively question recent 
historical interpretations of U.S. Empire. At some risk of simplification, one can say 
that these recent works have revised historical accounts of U.S. imperialism as a 
totalizing, unified force based on one-sided imposition and domination. This 
scholarship has rightly called our attention to how “subaltern agency,” contestation, 
negotiation, and encounters were at the very center of how imperial rule has operated 
historically. These historical analyses have, furthermore, explained the range of 
networks, exchanges, borrowings, behaviors, discourses whereby the external 
become internalized in Latin America, as well as how the United States has been 
influenced by Latin America. And yet, I would argue, we are reaching a point where 
criticism is giving way to method. In our zeal to provide only accounts of authentic 
experiences happening “on the ground,” we forget too quickly, it seems to me, the 
very historical constitution of vertically exercised imperial power. I argue that it is 
through this hierarchy that an imperial state reaches down to influence or negotiate 
with those historical actors who are rooted on the ground.16 While profoundly 
                                                 
15 This dissertation also invites Colombian historians to move away at least a little bit from their focus 
on La Violencia. The task is neither to ignore nor to fail to account for the variety of state and elite 
violence as a form of rule in the 1950s and 1960s. Rather, it is to stress the possibility of seeing how 
that form of domination was accompanied by the emergence of new modalities of rule that usually 
worked under the name of peace and democracy. See Medófilo Medina and Efraín Sánchez, Tiempos 
de Paz: Acuerdos en Colombia, 1902-1994 (Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2003). See also 
Cesar Augusto Ayala, La historia política hoy: sus métodos y las ciencias sociales (Bogotá: 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2005). 
 
16 See Joseph et al., Close Encounters of Empire, 13-15. See also Michel Gobat, Confronting the 
American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); 
Harvey R Neptune, Caliban and the Yankees: Trinidad and the United States Occupation (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, In From the 
Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). I 
have found Julian Go’s analysis very inspirational for understanding the role of the middle-class 
professional in the consolidation of U.S. rule during the late 1950s and 1960s. By comparing U.S. 
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influenced by these historiographical changes and pathbreaking historical analyses 
(indeed, my arguments are heavily indebted to these historical explanations of U.S. 
imperialism), Chapter 1 is guided by a conviction that it is also crucial to explain, 
historically, the different hierarchical imperial organizations through which those 
places of contestation and struggle were put into place. Rather than simply assuming 
asymmetry within those encounters, we need to explain how these hierarchies came 
into being as crucial elements of new practices of U.S. imperial rule. I do not wish to 
dismiss out of hand the very important recent literature nor to return to a privileging 
of the U.S. imperial autobiography. Rather, what I want to offer is a critical 
interrogation of the circumstances through which what has been called a “close 
encounter of empire” became historically possible in the first place: that is, to ask for 
the historical conditions through which different historical actors were able to play a 
gendered and classed role in that imperial encounter.17 With this concern in mind, in 
the first chapter I seek to elucidate how these middle-class professionals became 
intimately embedded in new practices of U.S. imperial/transnational rule during the 
                                                                                                                                                 
control of the Philippines and Puerto Rico at the turn of the twentieth century, he argues that U.S. 
officials aimed political lessons of self-government and democracy at the elites in both places. In 
contrast to that historical moment, I argue that during the 1950s and 1960s U.S. policymakers, along 
with several transnational institutions, also aimed at educating the middle-class professional in order 
to create a democratic government. Julian Go, American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite 
Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico during US Colonialism (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2008). I have also found Sandhya Shukla and Heidi Tinsman’s argument quite 
compelling to understand the transnational formation of the middle class. I remain unclear, however, 
what is the difference between using an “imperial framework” and a “transnational” one. See their 
edited volume Imagining Our Americas: Toward a Transnational Frame (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2008). 
 
17 See James Ferguson, “Decomposing Modernity: History and Hierarchy after Development,” in 
Ania Loomba, Suvir Kaul, Matti Bunzl, Antoinette Burton and Jed Esty, Postcolonial Studies and 
Beyond (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); See also David Scott, “The Social Construction of 
Postcolonial Studies,” in Postcolonial Studies and Beyond; and his Conscripts of Modernity: The 




1950s and early 1960s. Furthermore, I consider how a wide range of forces—U.S. 
foreign policymakers and advisors, Colombian state officials and intellectuals, 
private capital organizations, and some elite sectors, as well as “experts” associated 
with transnational institutions—positioned middle-class professionals as the best 
democratic governors: as those who would be able to train both the laboring classes 
and the oligarchs in how to live in peace and democracy, and in doing so, overcome 
the “confrontational style of politics” that had produced La Violencia in Colombia 
beginning in the late 1940s.  
 The second and third chapters move the analysis into a discussion of how 
these hierarchical constitutions of the middle class were collectively experienced—
and constantly put into question—through an astonishing variety of political 
discourses, practices, and actions that were reworked in order to forge a (new) 
democratic project. Recent historical studies of Colombia and other countries in 
Latin America have recognized middle-class professionals as actors who have played 
important roles in state expansion. In these recent works, which study political and 
social relations from the antagonistic extremes, middle-class historical actors appear 
only fleetingly as translators, mediators and emissaries.18 Furthermore, these 
historical accounts tell us how middle-class professionals could, at times, ally with 
                                                 
18 Nancy Stepan, The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender and Nation in Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991); Susan Besse, Restructuring Patriarchy: The Modernization of Gender 
Inequality in Brazil (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Barbara Weinstein, For 
Social Peace in Brazil: Industrialists and the Reworking of the Working Class, 1920-1964 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Javier Zaenz, Mirar la Infancia; Mary Kay Vaughan, 
Culture Politics in Revolution: Teachers, Peasants and Schools in Mexico, 1930-1940 (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1997); Thomas Klubock, Contested Communities; Karin Rosemblatt, 
Gendered Compromises: Political Cultures and the State in Chile, 1920-1950 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Katherine Bliss, Compromised Positions: Prostitution, 
Public Health and Gender Politics in Revolutionary Mexico (State College: Pennsylvania State 
University, 2001); Heidi Tinsman, Partners in Conflict: The Politics of Gender, Sexuality, and Labor 
in the Chilean Agrarian Reform, 1950-1973 ( Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). 
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the working classes to negotiate with the state, and at other times reproduced state 
discourses in negotiating with the lower class. A historical picture emerges of a 
middle-class professional with predetermined political interests and in which the 
middle-class actors continue to be conceptualized as having no political horizon of 
their own. In stark contrast, the second chapter of this dissertation endeavors to 
problematize how these professionals reworked their hierarchical positions as best 
governors by attempting to materialize a professional democracy. In so doing, I 
argue, these professional men and women attempted to prepare both the elites and 
the laboring classes, as Alberto Valencia suggested in the opening lines of this 
introduction, to live in democracy and peace. More specifically, the chapter shows 
how in the materialization of this professional democracy, these men and women, in 
their effort to see themselves as middle class, tried to sediment a hierarchical society 
in which they could not only position themselves at the center of the society and 
distinct from other social groups, as most recent studies on the middle class would 
have it, but also and more importantly, to be oppositionally located above the 
laboring classes, the peasantry and the elites in order to govern them.  
 Despite a recent surge of interest in studying the middle class, power 
relations during the 20th century are still largely understood in terms of binary 
opposites: rich and poor, the bourgeoisie and the proletarian, those above and those 
below. And although recent literature has incorporated both the heterogeneity of 
“subject positions” and more nuanced perspectives that integrate elites and 
subalterns, such analyses continue to emphasize an underlying narrative that 
excludes the middle. Chapter 3 seeks to offer a historical argument not only for 
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putting the middle class back onto the scholarly agenda, but also and more 
importantly, for understanding power relationships and methodologies of democratic 
rule from the middle.  
 The final chapter questions the persistent historical assumption that the 
middle class has had little, if any, political associative life by historicizing a broad 
repertoire of political actions, demands and practices. By merely asking whether 
middle-class actors supported larger political movements, we have limited ourselves 
to evaluating how some putatively middle-class interests can be found in larger 
political movements. As a result, most studies have concluded that the middle class 
was politically inconsequential precisely because it was not able to galvanize a broad 
and lasting middle-class political party or movement.19 With no political collective 
action of their own, these middle-class actors supposedly became politically 
available for cooptation and manipulation by diverse political movement and 
politicians that did not necessarily speak on their behalf. 20 Likewise, we have the 
tendency to assign class membership to certain groups seen as middle class and then 
from there conclude that whatever they say, write and do can be taken as evidence of 
middle-class participation.21 In doing so, I would argue, we have considered the 
                                                 
19 Brian Owensby, Intimate Ironies, 240.  
 
20 Mauricio Archila, Idas y venidas. Vueltas y revueltas: Protestas sociales en Colombia, 1958-1990. 
(Bogotá: CINEP, 2004), 346-347. Daniel Pécaut, Crónica de dos décadas de política colombiana 
1968-1988 (Bogotá: CEREC, 1989); Jonathan Hartlyn, La política del régimen de coalición. La 
experiencia del Frente Nacional en Colombia (Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes, 1993); Marco Palacios, 
Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002 (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2006). 
 
21 Although I’m very much in agreement with the claim that during the Cold War in Latin America 
there was a politicization and internationalization of everyday life, and that the hard-fought battles 
happened on the ground, it is difficult to discern the role of the middle class in recent work. Proposing 
a dichotomy between revolution and counter revolution, Grandin argues that the fight against 
Guatemala’s burgeoning revolutionary movement was directed by “middle-class ideologues.” Then, 
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different changes in the historical context, but we have failed to consider how those 
very changes have altered the very meanings and practices of being middle class—
that is to say, to decipher the historical formation of the middle class as a political 
project of class rule.  
 To be sure, my purpose is not to pile up counter-examples of the political 
agency of the middle class. Nor is it my aim to see if middle-class actors supported 
certain political movements. Instead, by looking specifically at the first years of the 
National Front as a vital moment of Colombia’s Cold War history, I demonstrate 
how these professionals organized themselves in meaningful collective action as a 
class to structure what they usually referred to as a middle-class democracy.22 In 
doing so, I endeavor to interrogate how they challenged their (transnational) role as 
best governors by structuring an alternative democracy that worked through—rather 
than against or in favor of—the consolidation of a new hierarchical class rule. These 
                                                                                                                                                 
by implication, these middle-class ideologues would be placed on the side of the counter-revolution. 
Certainly, I have no doubt that these anti-communist Catholic students played such a role. Indeed, as 
Grandin argues, they were responsible for the worst acts of counterinsurgency. My question is, then, 
how that political task became part of a project of middle-class rule? We too quickly assume these 
were middle-class members at expense of a more complicated historical analysis about the political 
formation of the middle class as a class. If we are able to historically connect those “reactionary” 
political activities as part of a larger political movement as a middle class, we would be in very good 
position, as I hope it become clear in this dissertation, to criticize the discourses and practices of 
democracy. Also, Grandin’s generalizations on the Cold War in Latin America are based upon the 
rather thin example of the Guatemalan case. My point is not to argue against this specific historical 
case—he, in fact, demonstrates quite well how the Guatemalan case initiated a reworking of practices 
of U.S. intervention that sought to kill (literally) new definitions of social democracy. I would say that 
his conclusion that the Cold War in Latin America was mainly characterized by a sharp dichotomic 
distinction between revolution and counterrevolution may elide class struggles and gender-based 
political movements against U.S. domination that did not necessarily fall into any of these 
categories—or for that matter were reactionary and revolutionary at the very same time. Greg 
Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre; See also Joseph and Spenser, Latin America’s New Encounter 
with the Cold War, 24.  
 
22 For this reading, see Anne Enke, Finding the Movement: Sexuality, Contested Space and Feminist 
Activism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); See also Gyan Prakash and Kevin M Kruse, The 
Space of the Modern City: Imaginaries, Politics and Everyday Life (Princeton: Princeton University 




professionals campaigned to become not the center of attraction between laboring 
classes and elites, but rather, and I would argue quite emphatically, the “head of the 
society.” In this political campaign of class politics, I contend, professionals engaged 
with U.S. imperial projects struggled with the oligarchs and the laboring classes to, 
as they constantly argued, bring about a revolution to transform an “undemocratic, 
antiquated and traditional society of classes” into a “democratic and modern middle-
class society.” This represented a new democratic political campaign that questioned 
as much as it rigidified class-based hierarchical rule; a political democratic 
movement that disturbed as much as it reinforced gender distinctions. 
 As a whole, I seek here to question those ahistorical arguments that see 
democracy as a purified universal ideal that is immune to contamination by class or 
gender hierarchies. Historians still widely reproduce a teleology of democratic rule 
that presents a linear history describing a stage marked by particularistic and 
undemocratic class and gender hierarchies that then evolves into a politics that has 
moved beyond class-based rule and gender distinctions. This dissertation attempts to 
disrupts these long-standing assumptions by moving the historical analysis from 
fixed and purified preconceptions of the relationship between the middle class and 
democracy to a historicized understanding of how that very relationship was possible 
at all and to understand the different practices of rule and the meanings associated 
with it. In so doing, I argue that democracy—as an idea and as political practice—
was imbricated with new imperial forms of hierarchical rule emerging during the 
1950s and 1960s. Indeed, I contend that Colombian professionals, in the very process 
of constituting themselves as middle class, challenged this imperial hierarchical rule 
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by creating a new and alternative democracy that also worked through the structuring 
of a class-based hierarchical rule.  
Sources and Methodology—Along the Archival Grain 
The transformation of archival activity is the point of departure and the condition of a new 
history.23 
 
 I am able to put forward several of these arguments due to my good fortune 
in uncovering numerous archival collections. I have relied on an eclectic array of 
archives and sources—from transnational/imperial archives such as the U.S. National 
Archives, those of the Organization of American States, and the United Nations, 
those of Colombian state agencies and middle-class political organizations, as well 
as professionals’ private collections. The discovery of these new sources, however, 
also required, as de Certeau suggests, a new critical approach in order to read them. 
If we were to summarize, as Ann Stoler has recently argued, what has informed the 
critical understanding of the archival material over the last ten years or so, it would 
be fair to say that historians and social scientists alike have developed sophisticated 
critical perspectives to read those archival documents “against the grain.”24 As part 
of a larger scholarly project to uncover the crucial participation of subaltern groups 
in the formation of colonial and postcolonial hegemonic processes in different 
                                                 
23 Michael de Certeau, The Writing of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 75.  
 
24 Ann Laura Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,” Archival Science 2 (2002), 87-
109. Stoler argues, for instance, that “however we frame it, the issues turn on readings of the archives 
based on what we take to be evidence and what we expect to find…how can we brush against the 
grain without prior sense of their texture and granularity.” 100. In a similar vein, Antoinette Burton 
has recently argued that despite the central importance of the archive in historical inquiries, historians 
have paid little attention to the archives as an ethnographic site of rule. See Antoinette Burton, ed., 
Archive Stories, Facts, Fictions and the Writing of History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); 
Natalie Zenon Davis, Fictions in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteen-Century 
France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987); Roberto Gonzalez Echeverria, Myth and Archive: 
A Theory of Latin American Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Carolyn 
Hamilton, Verne Harris, eds., Refiguring the Archive (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002). 
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historical moments and geographical locations, Latin Americanists have attempted to 
read against the grain of official government and what are conceived as elite sources 
as a means to shed light on the ways in which subalterns interpellated their 
perspectives in historical documents and thus left traces, gestures and language of 
their practices and consciousness—evidence that documented how those subaltern 
groups were able to resist, appropriate and negotiate systems of domination. 
Although very influenced by these works, this dissertation has a more sustained 
engagement with those archives as historical productions, as taxonomies of class 
hierarchical rule in the making and as an ethnographic site of disparate notions and 
conceptions of what constituted democratic practices. Furthermore, rather than just 
continuing to brush against the archive’s received categories, we also need to 
decipher how those categories came into being—their regularities, logic, forms, 
contents, narratives as the very process along and through which class rule became 
possible. In short, as Stoler has provocatively argued, we need to read along the 
archival grain. In so doing, the dissertation proposes to see archival activity not only 
as an extractive process of documentation but also as an ethnographic one. In chapter 
1, I work through and along the production and the content of policy papers, reports, 
letters of recommendation, job evaluations and teaching materials in Colombia and 
the United States as a means to decipher how an idea of the middle-class 
professional became inserted into a methodology of imperial/transnational rule. For 
the second chapter, I read the different class narratives put forward in teaching 
materials, field notes, social reports and unpublished papers to see how these sources 
were not merely the evidence of what these professionals were doing, but rather the 
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very ground through which these women and men could forge their project of 
middle-class hierarchical rule. Likewise, for the final chapter I critically read the 
content and the form of political petitions, letters, radio speeches, manifestos, and 
professional publications to see how those were produced in form and content to 
shape the very language and practice of the constitution of a middle-class democracy 
during the 1950s and 1960s.  
Some Reflections 
 It is by no means an accident that with the most recent U.S. imperial enterprise in 
place, numerous U.S. government officials and representatives of international 
organizations, along with experts, intellectuals, politicians, and scholars across the 
political spectrum have once again called for the consolidation of a “middle-class 
consensus” as a fundamental way to secure prosperity and political stability 
throughout the world.25 By resurrecting and reworking some of the major arguments 
of 1950s modernization theory, these recent studies argue that this “global middle 
class” will overcome social inequalities, political “evils” and unequal economic 
distribution. That is, once “every society across the world” promotes the creation of 
the middle class, the desirability of the neoliberal and global social order will be 
                                                 
25 See, among others, Mead and Schwenniger, eds., The Bridge to a Global Middle Class: 
Development. Trade and International Finance (New York: Council of Foreign Relations/ Milken 
Institute Series on Financial Innovation and Economic Growth, 2003); Diane Davis, Discipline and 
Development: Middle Class and Prosperity in South Asia and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004); Jacob S Hacker, The Great Risk Shift: The Assault on American Jobs, 
Families, Health Care, and Retirement and How You Can Fight Back (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006); Thom Hartmann, Screwed: The Undeclared War Against the Middle Class (San 
Francisco: Berret-Koeheler Publishers, 2006); Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York; Cambridge University Press, 2005). For 
Colombia, see, among others, Juan Alfredo Pinto Saavedra, La Hora de la Clase Media. Bases para 
la movilización política de los grupos intermedios en Colombia (Bogotá; Artepel Impresores, 2006); 
Robak M Glassman. The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective (New York: St. 




“beyond question.”26 This “global middle class,” furthermore, would counter 
globalization by, on the one hand, regulating national economies, and, on the other, 
disciplining democratic development worldwide. Furthermore, it is argued, the 
promulgation of a global middle class could save the United States from itself—that 
is, from its imperial practices—precisely because this middle class is putatively 
assumed as the requirement for the consolidation of democracy across the world. 27  
 Throughout this dissertation I contend that the crucial task is to offer a kind 
of critical refusal to be seduced and immobilized by the facile normalization of a 
“global middle class” that appears as a transcendental political foundation for 
creating a postclass global society. I argue that we need to go beyond a futile 
discussion of whether these policies or political promises can become reality, or 
whether or not a global middle class can in fact create democratic societies. Instead, 
this dissertation subjects to historical critique the very question to which the middle 
class—both as a collective idea and as a practice of rule—has been offered as a 
                                                 
26 There have been several “policy papers” and studies arguing for the creation of a global middle 
class, a middle-class consensus or a middle-class-oriented development. See, among many others, the 
Inter-American Bank recent initiative Building Opportunity for the Majority. As Luis Alberto 
Moreno, president of this international institution, put it recently in the opening conference for the 
aforementioned initiative: “The middle class is the pillar of healthy economies and stable 
democracies.” 
http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/articledetail.cfm?Language=En&parid=&artType=SP&artid=3124. 
(November 6, 2006.)  
  
27 Michael Lind, American Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Here the American way of strategy is to create an American 
way of life—that is, a middle class—abroad. Only then could the U.S. be saved from (i.e., forego) its 
imperial practices. In a similar vein, Walter Russell Mead argues in his forthcoming book that the 
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“middle-class development.” See his American Foreign Policy and the Global Middle Class, 
forthcoming. Also, Sherle R. Schwenninger has recently argued that “dedicating U.S. foreign policy 
to a rapid rise of a global middle class and to a new international ‘community of power’ would do far 
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America to Africa to the Middle East to the Pacific—in a way that an agenda of fighting Islamic 
jihadism does not. See his article “Reconnecting to the World,” The Nation, June 29, 2005; and 
“Democratizing Capital,” The Nation, March 20, 2008.  
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transcendental (democratic) political response. I ask what were the historical 
conditions that allowed the very association between the expansion of U.S. rule in 
the Americas, the consolidation of new forms of democratic rule, and the formation 
of a professional middle class during the late 1950s and early 1960s? In wrestling 
with this question, the dissertation seeks to offer a history of the present by 
denaturalizing the historical association between democracy and the middle class. In 
doing so, I hope, the analysis can shed some light on futures we might not otherwise 
have been able to envision. It seeks to offer a historical critique to understand why 
the middle class as an idea and as practice of collective rule is yet again implicated in 
the current definitions of democracy, modernity, neoliberalism and globalization. If 
we continue to assume—rather than historically explain—the very relationship 
between democratic rule and the formation of the middle class, our historical 
inquiries into how power relationships are exercised will remain incomplete. If 
historians and social scientists alike continue to treat democracy as a transhistorical 
ideal detached from the constitution of power relationships, our opportunities to 
understand and question the globalized neoliberal order will remain limited. This 
dissertation seeks to provide a historical understanding, however provisional, of how 
democratic hierarchical rule operated during the late 1950s and 1960s, in the hope 
that, in doing so, it opens some doors to imagine new political language and new 
political practices to all of us who are longing to resist and challenge the exploitation 





Chapter 1: Conscripts of U.S. Empire. The Historical Formation of a 
Professional Middle Class in Bogotá during the 1950s and early 1960s 
One of the most arresting facts facing the entire free and democratic world in this second half of the 20th 
century is that the conditions of the society have become such as to make the introduction and 
development of a democratic middle class essential and urgent…how are we going to achieve 
democracy, development and progress without a middle class? 28 
 
Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all others, that its circumstances are 
special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilize, bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only 
as a last resort29 
 
Within the modern that has come into being, changes have taken place as the effect of dominant political 
power by which new possibilities are constructed and old ones destroyed. The changes do not reflect a 
simple expansion of the range of individual choice, but the creation of conditions in which only new (i.e., 
modern) choices can be made. The reason for this is that the changes involve the re-formation of 
subjectivities and the re-organization of social spaces in which subjects act and are acted upon. The 
modern state—imperial-colonial-post-colonial—has been crucial to these processes of 
construction/destruction. 30 
 
 Recent studies repeatedly underline the post–World War II historical process 
through which the United States tried to push societies toward a liberal, democratic and 
capitalist modernity by promoting the creation of a stable, prosperous middle class 
inoculated against communism in the Americas. These historical narratives have operated 
under the shared assumption that a domestic “American way of life”—explicitly or 
implicitly embodied in the so-called middle-class nation—was transparently ready to be 
exported to the rest of the Western hemisphere.31 If the whole process failed, some argue, 
                                                 
28 Letter from Richard W. Poston to Alberto Lleras Camargo, 12 December, 1960, Despacho Señor 
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29 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 2003), xxi. 
 
30 Talal Asad, “Conscripts of Western Civilization,” in Civilization in Crisis: Anthropological Perspectives, 
edited by Christine Ward Gailey (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1992), 337.  
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it was because, due to certain political and social conditions, Latin America was not 
ready for a democracy built around a middle class. Other argue that, despite the noble 
intentions of some U.S. policymakers to forge a middle class, U.S. foreign policy during 
the Cold War ended up weakening the democratic processes in the region as it “fortified 
illiberal forces, militarized societies” and limited the social definitions of democracy.32 In 
light of these narratives, historians and social scientists alike have organized their 
historical inquiries by asking whether the Latin American middle class could potentially 
become a democratic force. In scholarly works, as well as foreign-policy studies, the 
strength of the middle class has always been regarded as the barometer of modern 
democracies.  
 Consequently, some scholars have argued quite strongly for the democratic role 
historically played by the middle class, while others have explained equally robustly how 
the middle class has been an antidemocratic historical force in Latin America. Still others 
have argued that the middle class has, indeed, been both in different contexts.33 As I 
argued in the introduction, these scholarly debates have left the historical definitions and 
practices of democracy largely unquestioned precisely because we take for granted the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and 
Michael E. Latham, eds., Staging Growth: Modernization, Development and the Global Cold War 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2003) Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization 
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32 See Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre. Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago: University of 
Chicago press 2004), xiv. I do not wish to argue that the United States did not play this role; however, my 
concern in this chapter is the very historical relation between democracy and the formation of a 
professional middle class in the consolidation of U.S. empire. 
 
33 For a historiographical essay on the middle class in Latin America, see Michael Jimenez, “The Elision of 
the Middle Class and Beyond: History, Politics and Development Studies in Latin America’s ‘Short 
Twentieth Century, ’” in Colonial Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History (London: 
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very historical relationship between these practices and meanings and the political 
consolidation of a middle class.34 
 In this chapter I argue that the power of this ideal of a middle class fundamentally 
associated with the workings of democracy cannot be diminished merely by presenting 
counter-narratives of what it meant to be middle class in Latin America that challenge a 
political model associated with the United States or Europe. By looking at the formation 
of a professional middle class in Bogotá during the 1950s and 1960s, this chapter seeks to 
shift the register of the historical analysis away from questions about where, whether or 
to what extent a middle class has been an obstacle to or a promoter of democracy. 
Instead, I attempt to offer a critical interrogation of the historical practices and political 
rationalities through which a professional middle class became inserted in U.S. imperial 
rule after World War II: why, as suggested by the opening epigraph of this chapter, did it 
become so important to create a middle class as a political requirement for achieving 
progress and democracy? In doing so it is important not to lose sight of the concreteness 
of the historical meanings of being middle class; rather we might think about historical 
processes as conditions through which people like Alberto Valencia were conscripted to 
live, class-ify and indeed to guide themselves as members of a “governing” democratic 
middle class.  
  
 
                                                 
34 This argument has been influenced by recent studies on the anthropology of democracy. See Julia Paley 
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Toward an Imperial Humanist Governance 
 During the late 1940s and early 1950s, a new geopolitical order was emerging, 
characterized by conflicting camps aligned with the United States and the Soviet Union, 
as well as by renewed challenges to the legitimacy of European colonial rule. New 
political questions, answers, forms and methods entered into the conceptualization of 
how rule should be accomplished. In 1939, the United States government set up its first 
organized and systematic technical cooperation program with Latin America as a part of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy. The new program sought to give 
technical advice, on request, to the government of any American nation. With the 
potential involvement of the nations of the Western Hemisphere in World War II in mind, 
an executive order from President Roosevelt established the Office of the Coordinator of 
Inter-American Affairs. Nelson Rockefeller was appointed to this position and shortly 
thereafter constituted the Institute for Inter-American Affairs, a government-owned 
corporation that was authorized to carry out cooperative programs with Latin America 
governments to promote public health, housing, economic development, public 
administration and agricultural development. In 1944, a similar corporation, the Inter-
American Educational Foundation, was organized to provide similar hemispheric 
cooperation in support of elementary and secondary schools. These Latin American 
experiences prepared the United States to undertake the Point IV program of technical 
cooperation on a transnational basis, which, following Truman’s inaugural presidential 
address of 1949, initiated a major program to promote technical assistance, modern 
technology, knowledge exchange and capital investment. The International Development 
Act, approved by the U.S. Congress in 1950, supplied financial assistance to carry out 
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many technical cooperation programs. In the same year, the Office of Technical 
Cooperation Administration was founded as part of the Department of State. 
Simultaneously, several recently established international and transnational institutions—
including the Organization of the American States, the United Nations, and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—inaugurated an integrated set 
of liberal economic development policies, technical assistance plans, social welfare 
activities, population improvement programs and cultural management agendas.35  
 These reforms, technical programs and social policies constituted a 
reconfiguration and re-conceptualization of the legitimate forms and methods through 
which to exercise imperial rule. More specifically, policymakers, institutional “experts,” 
consultants, intellectuals and politicians engaged themselves in a debate about how to 
overcome what Harry Truman called, in 1949, “the old imperialism.”36 Economic 
insecurity and fear of colonial unrest, as well as real and imagined concerns for the 
spread of communism provoked or accelerated debates regarding how imperial rule 
should be accomplished and made it a central political question. 37 Intellectuals, 
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policymakers in Colombia and the United States, experts asked: What were the most 
effective ways to govern? What were the adequate methods to do so? Who was able to be 
effective in the arts of governing? Who should govern whom? What were the training 
technologies needed to produce effective governments? What governance methodologies 
were most productive in ruling social and political relationships in society?  
 According to many documents from this era, the “old imperialism” was no longer 
an adequate basis for overseas expansion and influence. The new U.S. political agenda in 
the world was, in contrast to unnamed European colonial rule, to promote democracy, 
spread freedom and invite those people in underdeveloped areas into a process of self-
governance. As Truman put it in the formalization of the Point Four program at the end 
of the 1950s,  
The old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our plans. What 
we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair 
dealing…. Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can 
the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people. 
Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the world into 
triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but also against their 
ancient enemies—hunger, misery and despair…Slowly but surely we are weaving a 
world fabric of international and growing prosperity….We are aided by all who desire 
self-government and a voice in their own affairs. We are aided by all who long for 
economic security—for the security and abundance that men in free societies can 
enjoy. We are aided by all who desire freedom of speech, freedom of religion and 
freedom to live their own lives for useful ends.38  
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 William W Beatty, an educational consultant for community development 
programs went further. In 1958 he wrote an extensive letter to the United Nations 
Technical Assistant program in community development in Colombia insisting on the 
need for different practices when “approaching the underdeveloped world.”39 History, he 
wrote, had not allowed the United States to have a period of preparation before its 
assumption of “international leadership responsibility,” as it had Britain and Europe. And 
precisely because it was unprepared, the United States had made “terrible mistakes” in its 
foreign relations with the rest of the world.  
 It was this very same history, however, that would indeed prepare the United 
States to assume a “leadership role in the world affairs.” By drawing a specific parallel 
between the American War of Independence and the mid-twentieth century 
decolonization process, for instance, a U.S. agency report in 1954 portrayed the United 
States as the model to emulate in what was considered a universal struggle against 
tyranny. As the first colony liberated through democratic revolution and industrial 
capitalism, this report went on, the United States could instinctively relate to the 
historical situation of “dependent and colonial peoples.” As a result, the United States 
could potentially be ready to help, rather than hinder, the spread of democracy and 
liberty. History, the report concluded, would be the background to sponsor the 
development of political independence across the world.40 
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  History, however, was not enough. It was necessary to depart from what was 
considered the practices of “old imperialism.” If Truman believed that U.S. involvement 
in the region, because of its lack of interest in foreign profit, could be distinguished from 
European colonial rule, several policymakers argued otherwise. Ward Hunt Goodenough, 
a professor of anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania and an active writer on 
programs for community development, contended in 1957 that U.S. foreign programs in 
the first half of the twentieth century had primarily been geared to what he called 
“economicism.” 41 Like former European colonizers, Goodenough argued, the United 
States had only been concerned to offer, at worst, bread and roads, and, at best, 
agricultural technology.42 Furthermore, this old imperialism, several U.S. policymakers 
argued, was based upon practices of “domination, imposition and subjugation.” These 
practices assumed that that those people in the underdeveloped countries were, first of all, 
passive recipients of economic aid, second, victims of their own situations and, third, 
unable to “think…act…feel and desire by themselves.”43 In contrast to both European 
colonial rule and earlier U.S. economicism, America now would use “more imagination 
and implement multiform approaches” when exercising its so called “new leadership 
role.” If old imperialism—and its inherent economicism—was a manifestation of 
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domination, America would now develop an international role which would depend upon 
“negotiation …engagements… social contracts, compromises, exchanges of interests, 
meaningful encounters, and understandings.” If old imperialism, furthermore, was based 
on imposition, the United States would approach other regions “by being sensitive” to 
their “cultural differences.” And if old imperialism worked by subjugating and 
marginalizating the people of the underdeveloped world, the United States’ self-
designated leadership role would rely on inquiring as to what the people wanted, desired 
and thought. Furthermore, America would fight subjugation by restoring the people’s 
participation, giving them a voice and promoting “the real possibility that 
underdeveloped countries [had] interests… [and] autonomy to shape their own destiny.”44 
Above all, Beatty argued, the United States would seek to develop a role that could break 
from previous practices and understandings of an old imperialism in which 
underdeveloped countries were only able to do what “powerful countries commanded” 
them to do, and instead foster the “active participation” and “constant consultation and 
representation” of the underdeveloped countries. In doing so, the United States would be 
promoting the “development [of ] human welfare.”45  
 This concern for human welfare, University of Chicago professor Nelson B. 
Henry argued, was at the very center of American democracy—one that had been built 
upon the proposition that each “human being in himself is significant.” As a nation, 
Henry continued, the United States was being challenged to develop the maturity to 
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conceive a large “democratic plan” with other nations which, he said, were actuated by 
the desire to help meets the needs of people in communities everywhere because “human 
beings are involved.”46 
 These discussions should not be dismissed as merely meant to mystify, mask, 
dissimulate or even rationalize imperial relations.47 Nor were they a search for hegemonic 
consent; rather, and most fundamentally, they constituted the formation of a new 
problematic of rule—a new process of governmentality through which an imperial 
project could become central to the formation of the U.S. nation. 48  
 It is very tempting to understand or dismiss these imperial discourses as a false 
ideology intended to obscure the Realpolitik of empire or as a denial of U.S. imperialism 
or as the manifestation of U.S. imperial exceptionalism. Indeed, I am not attempting to 
argue that the United States was promoting “democratic practices” at the same time that it 
was promoting “anti-democratic practices” by invigorating Latin American militaries, 
orchestrating military interventions, and supporting centralized intelligence agencies.49 In 
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fact, I concur with the findings of recent studies that show how the U.S. funded, 
sponsored and trained Latin American domestic intelligence agencies throughout the 
Americas that then executed and tortured thousands of Latin Americans who were putting 
different definitions of democracy into practice. Colombia was certainly not an 
exception.50 However, I wish here to critically interrogate one practice of rule—I would 
argue, a very important one that has not received critical assessment—in the large 
inventory of U.S. practices of rule during the second half of the twentieth century.  
 It may seem obvious that my arguments thus far are substantially influenced by 
Michael Foucault’s writings on the arts of government and political rationalities of rule. 
Although governmentality has been understood in multiple ways, I understand it as the 
integrated process of the historical formation of two components of rule: on the one 
hand, political rationalities (the plural logics of rule a state produces in order to be seen as 
a state and work accordingly) and, on the other, technologies and methodologies of rule 
(how rule should be fashioned and accomplished).51 This integrated process, government 
and mentality, Foucault argued, assembles institutions, produces knowledge, consolidates 
contradictory strategies, promotes paradoxical methodologies of rule and generates 
specific social relations so that conduct—the capacity of social groups, collectivities and 
individuals to act upon themselves and others—can be shaped, guided and orchestrated.52 
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 Building on these understandings, I argue that the U.S. government, along with 
several international institutions, would set in motion new practices of governance, as 
well as a new political rationality underlying them, during the 1950s and 1960s. One of 
the major specific effects of these practices was the consolidation of community 
development programs in different parts of the world.53 Despite the discourse critiquing 
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old imperialism, the very first attempts at community development drew heavily on the 
experiences of the British colonial administration with rural social projects in India, as 
well as community-based organizing prototypes in Mexico, Bolivia and the Tennessee 
Valley during the first half of the twentieth century.54 Significantly, the early versions of 
these programs appeared in Puerto Rico and the Philippines during the late 1940s. By the 
early 1950s, the U.S. government, together with international institutions, was 
consolidating a variety of community development programs. In doing so, and in seeking 
to distinguish themselves from an imagined old imperialism, these programs were shaped 
by a political rationality—simultaneously mediated by the production of knowledge in 
social sciences, cultural anthropology, psychology, rural sociology and other social 
sciences—that promoted rule through the capacities and productivities of the human 
being. Older social programs, it was argued, were centered only on, at best, financial and 
technical problems, and at worst, “coercively imposing, destroying or disempowering and 
marginalizing people’s participation.”55 These new community development programs 
would incorporate, in contrast, a “cultural and socially sensitive approach” that would 
take into account how people in the underdeveloped areas of the world were “socially and 
                                                 
54 Murray G Ross, Community Organization: Theory, Principles and Practice (New York: Harper & Row, 
1955); Ernest B Harer and Arthur Dunham, ed., Community Organization in Action (New York: 
Association Press, 1959); British Information Services, Community Development: The British Contribution 
(London: Stationary Office, 1962); James Dahir, Region Building: Community Development Lessons from 
Tennessee Valley (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955.) Team number II, Report on Community 
Development Programs in Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Bolivia and Peru (Washington, DC: International 
Cooperation Administration, 1 November 1955); For Colombia see Orlando Fals Borda “Acción Comunal 
en una vereda colombiana” in Monografias Sociológicas (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 
1960). 
 
55 Consideraciones de la importancia de los programas de desarrollo de la comunidad en varios países de 
America Latina, 1956/ Informe del Grupo de Expertos sobre la Planificación del Desarrollo Económico y 
Social de America Latina. Documents attached to Minutes of Inter-America Economic and Social Council 
of the Organization of the American States (Reuniones Extraordinarias), 1 may, 1958, X 1 V1, documentos 




culturally embedded human subjects.” In so doing, it was argued, the United States’ 
“leadership role” would depend upon constant encounters leading to “social 
arrangements” to make the communities of the underdeveloped world, through proper 
guidance, “best utilize the human capital and natural resources available in promoting the 
interests of their own communities.”56 
 Imperial governance, then, was to take place neither by coercively imposing, 
destroying or marginalizing people’s participation nor by educating consent, but, most 
basically, through a process of conducting, schooling, guiding, and encouraging proper 
forms of self-government, self-discipline, and self-guidance that targeted “people’s 
talents…human abilities, people’s actions, human aspirations, interests, desires, feelings, 
and beliefs.” In a word, a new imperial project was to target what policymakers, 
intellectuals and politicians constantly came to refer to as human capital. A letter from 
the United Nations Assistance Program for Latin America to the office of foreign 
assistance of the U.S. Point Four program, for instance, argued that the objective of 
community development was to consolidate community’s “natural democratic political 
potential” by guiding them into the “participatory process.”57 According to several Inter-
American conferences sponsored by the Organization of American States, U.S. Technical 
Assistance Programs and the United Nations, the task was to “give the people of 
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underdeveloped countries a political power …[to] recognize their active role” in the 
development and the progress of their nations.58  
 In the process of guiding this human capital, the political task was to create a new 
sense of the self, a transparent self-owning subject who could think and feel about his or 
herself with enormous capabilities, and who had the properties to act upon that self and 
upon others. Indeed, the individuals in question would be autonomous and self-contained 
subjects who would be able to exercise “agency” by organizing their life, by knowing 
who they were, by deciding how to improve their situation and by participating in the 
solution of the different problems created by underdevelopment. They would be 
“free…virtuous, self-disciplined,” democratic and conscious subjects who could be 
guided in how to evaluate, motivate and criticize themselves so as to help themselves to 
“desire progress and democracy.”59 As Gabriel Kaplan, an expert in community 
development who worked in several programs throughout the world put it in 1956,  
[Community development] is a process of releasing, through effective 
leadership, the enormous potential that resides within people who discover 
through their own efforts they can improve the usefulness of their own lives…a 
democratic process to use democratic potential…make people truly free and 
democratic.60  
 
 Again, although several authors would quickly see these programs at best as a 
dissimulating rhetoric masking the Realpolitik of U.S. imperialism, I want to argue that 
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by critically looking at these discourses and practices on community development, it is 
possible to offer a different historical reading of the methodology of U.S. imperial rule 
and transnational governmentality. I want to put discourses, practices and experiences 
of what soon came to be called community development at the very center of the U.S. 
Empire. Furthermore, I submit, these programs of development set in motion an 
imperial project of rule working within a transnational framework every bit as powerful 
as the better-known programs of U.S. military and economic imperialism. Although in 
operation since the aftermath of World War II, these community development programs 
were consolidated during the 1950s and more forcefully implemented with the 
launching of the Alliance for Progress in 1961. These programs activated a political 
rationality that usually was oriented toward several mutually inclusive projects of 
economic development, human welfare and proper political preparation to live in what 
policymakers and experts constantly referred to as modern democracy.  
 In putting these community development programs at the very center of U.S. 
policies, these transnational projects sought to engage those most affected by poverty to 
improve the economic, cultural, and political conditions of their “own societies.” In 
doing so, “poor populations of the world” could “learn to understand their own current 
situation, the disastrous effects of poverty for them, their families, and their 
countries.”61 Furthermore, this “new mentality” would enable the emergence of a 
“society [where] human beings” would be able to “take care of themselves and others.” 
Indeed, it would mean a consolidation of what I want to call a society of governors 
where the poor could be guided according to their own social interests so they would 
                                                 




politically govern themselves by first contributing to their own economic progress and 
development, and, second, and perhaps more importantly, by living “in freedom and 
democracy.”62  
 This transnational society of governors would be possible if, and perhaps only if, 
the social, political and economic agency of the people of the underdeveloped world 
could be reshaped.63 For so long, those who conceptualized these programs argued, an 
“authoritative approach” had merely used a “top-down” relationship to deposit ideas and 
knowledge on passive recipients who had no active role in shaping their society. In stark 
contrast, it was argued, the (new) community development paradigm would work within 
a “democratic framework.” They would promote “bottom-up social approaches” to create 
“truly participatory and democratic space[s]” where the people would be able to develop 
their own ideas, their own cultures, enhance their own capabilities, become aware of their 
own problems, evaluate their own conditions and, above all, understand what goals they 
are able to reach.64 By stimulating, comprehending, and adapting to the ideas, activities, 
cultural limitations, social conditions and sentiments of the poor, furthermore, 
community development programs would transform passive subjects into active ones—
indeed, they would alter “submissive socially constrained” subjects into “fully self-
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determined” selves capable of acting according to their own self-interest so they will do 
as they ought in a democratic environment.65  
 By gaining a voice and participating in their own betterment, the poor people of 
the Third World countries would become conscious of their oppressed position. And 
precisely for this reason, it was imperative to know how to guide the energies, political 
capital, and human potential of the poor in their “imminent awakening.” A human being 
had to be democratically trained—by letting them speak, by taking care of them, by 
promoting their participation—so that they, in the process of political awakening, could 
be guided into knowing how to become governors of themselves. Only then, it was 
argued, would the people of the Third World be able to exercise their “power of decision, 
intelligence, their freedom and their autonomy” to enter into a society of self-governors, 
where they would be “responsible, complete and free” to recognize, understand and, 
above all, resolve their own problems. As Caroline Ware, a professor at Howard 
University, put it in one of the several studies sponsored by the Organization of American 
States during the 1950s,  
[Community development programs] will lead to a sense of social human 
solidarity…a concept of conscious, willful and enthusiastic participation of the 
underdeveloped people. The programs assume the recognition of the natural 
existence of the latent potential of the community, of the human dignity. It 
recognizes the people’s power of decision, their autonomy and their 
freedom…restores their active role in society…It is a timely restitution of the 
responsibility of the community to face and plan consciously and rationally the 
solution of their most felt problems. Community development programs will not 
frustrate, as several [have done so] in the past, the authentic interest of the 
communities. It is based on the real belief that people are able to live in 
democracies…exercise their role in shaping societies. 66  
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  This process yields a consolidation of a new form of rule—a governmentality—
that I will refer to as imperial humanist government. During the 1950s and 1960s, this 
govern-mentality was based on a political rationality that promoted human welfare, 
economic development, and political training so that the people of the underdeveloped 
world could participate profitably and democratically in the process of their own rule. 
This mentality worked in an integrated relationship with new technologies of 
government that sought not to subjugate or impose but rather guide and negotiate those 
human capabilities and productivities, thus enabling social actors to become self-
governing. In short, this imperial humanist governance was constantly seeking to make 
the Third World a society of governors—that is to say, to become capable of governing 
themselves.   
The Role of the Middle Class in the Imperial Humanist Project 
 Central to this imperial humanist project was the formation of a professional 
middle class. If it was crucial to engage the people of Latin America in the process of 
improving their own human welfare, economic development and political training, the 
simultaneous, and perhaps contradictory, process of schooling and guiding a professional 
middle class was imperative. Furthermore, imperial humanist governance was to take 
place not against or in favor of, but rather through democratic middle-class professionals 
who would be properly conducted, educated and oriented toward transforming the 
democratic relations between different social groups. That is, the conduct of the 
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professional middle class had to be guided so they could become competent and capable 
of organizing, distributing, stimulating, and creating the necessary human capital for 
“national democracies to emerge.”67 
  This democratic middle-class professional, conceived as an agent of 
transformation and a social catalyst, was to labor not only by helping the poor but, more 
importantly, helping the people to help themselves. The democratic middle-class 
professional was to create new “attitudes…desires…feelings, [and] social climates.” 
Indeed, they would develop new paths for the poor to follow, new lights for the people to 
see, new aspirations for the underdeveloped people to experience and new ways of life 
for the people to understand. They would be professionals skilled in the art of stimulating 
and helping people at the local level, in guiding them along a path of “planned progress” 
for change, friends and brothers of the community who could bring democracy in specific 
ways to the peasants, so the people would be able—through the professional guidance—
to become self-governors.  
 Policymakers, intellectuals and experts in the Americas spent quite some time 
crafting and producing knowledge about the importance of this “democratic middle 
class.” According to several studies carried out by the United Nations, the Organization 
of American States as well as the Rockefeller Foundation, it was necessary to rationalize 
the tasks of national states by training these middle-class professionals, without whom, it 
was said, no governmental system could really function in any effective way. For 
democracy to work, it was urgent to have “intelligent [and] prestigious professionals” 
who would give themselves—that is, their minds, bodies and souls—to the tasks of the 
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state and the national ideals of “justice, freedom, progress, social change, democracy and 
community development.”68 Furthermore, the mission was to create a “human [and] 
democratic middle class” by putting to work a (new) class of political professionals who 
would develop the human capacities to relate to “all social classes in society” and to 
“freely” recognize the “value [and] worth of another social group,” and set up the 
conditions of “self-understanding.”69  
 Those middle-class professionals would work for the state by teaching the poor 
how to fight “ignorance, ill-health, and low productivity,” how to be aware of their 
“qualities and conditions,” and above all, how to think by—and certainly of—themselves 
so they were able to participate in democracy. As the minutes of the Inter-American 
Socio Economic Council of the Organization of the American States in Washington D.C. 
repeatedly argued in 1955,  
A society that is full of middle-class professionals promoting the use of 
intelligence and the capabilities of the American man for the benefit, interests 
and aspirations of the American community…A professional who can break the 
inertia and put the essence of the poor in action.… A professional who could 
develop communities within themselves [and change] the social climate of 
receptivity and desires for democracy.…professional that can fight the social 
isolation of the elites…They would put a human face to capitalism.70 
 
 And it is in this process that the formation of the middle class became inserted in 
a new methodology of democratic rule. This specific process of middle-class 
professionals became so integrated with explicit technologies of democratic government 
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precisely because of a political rationality that promoted the creation of a society of 
governors who could develop themselves into “autonomous selves, capable of actively 
acting,” in the process of democracy according to their own “desires.” The new practices 
of rule had to be based upon the formation of a class of professionals working for 
national states and who could guide the desires, interests and, above all, the human 
capital of the different social groups in society—in contrast to an imagined “class of 
experts” who “forced upon individuals and groups what they [knew] was good.”71 
 Thus this imperial humanist governance created a hierarchical redistribution of 
tasks in which democratically “capable” professionals were able to guide certain 
“inherent responsibilities and obligations” of those who were not initially able to do so by 
themselves. For democracy to work effectively required a distinction between—yet close 
relation with—those who were “competent” to discover the “poor’s human capital” and 
those who needed such democratic professionals to discover their own human capital and 
political potential for progress and development. This assumed, furthermore, an 
asymmetrical relationship between those who were able to guide the poor to activate 
certain “latent democratic desires,” and those who needed guidance in order to use those 
desires on their own. This methodology of governance was to take place through a 
hierarchical allocation of specific roles that divided those who were “intelligent” enough 
to teach others how to think by themselves and those who needed somebody else to teach 
them how to think by themselves. It was a hierarchical division between those who had 
the capability to awaken the “dormant attitudes, democratic potential…and sentiments for 
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change” of the society as a whole and those who needed the knowledge/sentiments of 
others to become aware of their own potential, sentiments and attitudes. 
 In sum, the United States, along with several international institutions, promoted a 
form of democratic rule to be achieved by constructing a class rule that rested on 
hierarchical distinctions between those who were guided to govern others and those who 
were expected to be governed by others. In the process, I would argue, this new form of 
imperial rule produced an ongoing need to define and redefine who could become the 
best governors in a society of governors. This ongoing need, furthermore, provoked 
endless transnational discussions on how to select and guide these professionals who, it 
was argued, would not only make “harmonious societies” but also, and equally important, 
create “national democratic states.”  
The Middle Class as a “Center of Attraction”  
 These transnational programs and activities for community development, and 
their concomitant middle-class labor force, were further consolidated in 1961 when the 
U.S. launched the Alliance for Progress. As a clear response to the Cuban Revolution of 
1959, the Kennedy administration intensified, multiplied, and expanded already existing 
programs of community development that the U.S. hoped would deter the rise of 
communist insurgencies elsewhere in Latin America. Perhaps the most important episode 
precipitating the introduction of community development programs in Colombia was the 
spurt of the Violence (La Violencia) during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Erupting a 
full decade prior to the Cuban Revolution, this process greatly concerned the U.S. 
government, which had come to see ongoing social unrest in Latin America as a 
potentially “serious problem.” As one U.S. observer commented in the late 1950s,  
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No single event since the World War II has so violently revealed the 
revolutionary potential of our neighbors to the South as the aborted revolution 
of the past 9th of April in Colombia and the subsequent emergence of the 
Violence.72 
 
       These programs and policies on community development, however, went well 
beyond the concern with communist containment. Rather, these new initiatives were 
part of a transnational preoccupation to create a new form of democratic rule. Although 
in motion during the latter years of the dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the 
National Front administrations actively participated in the promotion of these 
community development programs as a way to overcome La Violencia. The National 
Front was a Liberal and Conservative power sharing arrangement that formally endured 
for sixteen years. Alberto Lleras Camargo and Guillermo León Valencia, the two first 
presidents of this power sharing arrangement constantly argued for a 
professionalization of the social relationship in order to overcome Colombia’s turbulent 
recent past—that is to say, to avoid the return to La Violencia and create the conditions 
for democracy and peace to emerge. Specifically, the Technical Cooperation 
Administration developed as part of the Point Four program and USAID sponsored 
under the Alliance for Progress, not only provided funding to different programs but 
also coordinated several activities sponsored by other international institutions. And 
working within an inter-American framework, the United States Foreign Assistance 
began to send economic commissions to the so-called Third World as part of the 
process of formulating a program of development for Latin American countries. These 
offices, along with different international development institutions and U.S. private 
organizations, founded or sponsored technical centers, vocational schools, training 
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centers, universities and institutions to train professionals in different areas of technical 
knowledge and social sciences during the 1950s and 1960s.73 Soon after the enactment 
of the Point Four program by President Truman in 1949, and specifically after the U.S.-
sponsored programs Colombia IV and Colombia XXV programs were formalized 
during the mid-1950s, the government of President Mariano Ospina (1946-1950) 
invited a mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development to visit Colombia. It was the very first mission of this kind the bank sent 
to Latin America. Formulating a general development program for the country, the 
mission included discussion about foreign exchange, transportation, industry, service 
sectors, health and welfare. The final report issued by the mission repeatedly insisted on 
the “vital import” of the “assessment of middle class values and middle class 
participation in development” and the “training of talented professionals” as a crucial 
part of the renewal of the Colombian state.74 The government of Laureano Gómez 
would embrace these policies by supporting the creation of the Colombian Social 
Security Institute (Instituto Colombiano de Seguros Sociales) as well as the Colombian 
Institute for Technical Education (Instituto Colombiano para la Educación Técnica en 
el Exterior) during the early 1950s.75 The following administration, of Gustavo Rojas 
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Pinilla, sponsored additional social programs that were expanded during the caretaker 
military regime that held power for fifteen months after Rojas’s overthrow. During the 
first years in office of the liberal-conservative party coalition, Alberto Lleras 
Camargo’s administration would consolidate these programs and initiate systematic 
development programs.76 His government constantly extolled the community 
development programs as a “state policy” and officially founded the Division of 
Community Action in 1959. And with the formalization of the Alliance for Progress, 
several more programs were launched through national private organizations (mainly 
FEDECAFE [Federación Nacional de Cafeteros]), together with international 
institutions such as the United Nations, the Organization of the American States and the 
World Health Organization, CARE [Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere], 
which promoted or sponsored educational institutions, training centers and universities 
in Colombia. During the 1950s and early 1960s, both state and private agencies worked 
together in founding rural schools (such as the Escuela de Servicio Rural) training 
centers (Inter-American Housing and Planning Center [CINVA]), agronomy schools, 
the Colombian-American Public Health Program (SCISP). This period also saw the 
expansion of the School of Social Work, the emergence of the Colombian- American 
Agricultural Technical Service (STACA) as well as the Advanced School for Public 
Administration (ESAP), the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCORA), and the 
Institute to Promote Industry (IFI). 
 Although it is tempting to argue that these institutions were merely a mask for 
imperial power, I would like to argue instead that the proliferation of these fragmented 
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governing entities worked to expand everyday practices of state rule. As part of its 
effort to create the conditions in which democracy and peace could flourish, the 
National Front administrations were actively consolidating a form of rule through 
which the state could become concerned with the promotion of a “new meaningful 
community life.” The purpose, furthermore, was to guide Colombia to “reach social 
peace and economic justice, physical well-being and democracy.” In order to do so, 
said President Alberto Lleras Camargo, it was necessary to “create a new Colombian 
state …a new Colombian nation …fervently developing its resources and enriching the 
lives of its people where the great bulk of its population and where development really 
counts most: the local community. A local community with hope and ready for self-
determination.” As Gerardo Tamayo Peña, chair of the division of the community 
action, put it in 1959,  
It is an attempt to enable all members of the community to share, if they will, in 
the determination of their own joint destiny in freedom, democracy and dignity. 
Unquestionably, many communities most in need of this encouragement are 
plagued by deep uncertainties and massive problems. They may be eager to see 
their living conditions improved but lack confidence in their own agency 
[protagonismo] to do anything about them. Others lack the inner will, the desire, 
or the ambition to work for their own improvement. Many are not aware how to 
go about helping themselves even when they do feel such a desire. Ancient 
customs, attitudes, suspicions toward strangers and government agents and the 
inheritance of an unenviable social structure frequently make progress impossible 
or at best extremely difficult. 77 
 
 As part of a national process of pacification and rehabilitation during the late 
1950s and early 1960s, these ideas and practices of community action would work in 
tandem with the recent interest in the so-called Violencia, which was increasingly 
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becoming an epistemological object of contemplation. In response, not only were 
Colombian experts, governmental institutions and policymakers pondering (new) 
containment policies informed by sentiments concerning the real and imagined 
communist threat but also, and perhaps more importantly, they were confronting how rule 
should be accomplished—that is, as President Lleras Camargo put it in 1959, how “to 
make social relations right.”78  
 A year before the launching of the Alliance for Progress, for example, the 
international agency CARE signed a contract with the Colombian government to provide 
support, training and advice in community development. As part of this program, the 
Colombian government sent several “experts” to get involved in the U.S.-sponsored 
programs on community development in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. After these 
trips, Southern Illinois University professor Richard W. Poston—a prominent writer on 
community development and special consultant in Colombia on behalf on the U.S. 
government and CARE—wrote several letters to President Lleras Camargo describing the 
major problems Colombia was now facing, as well the “very first changes” that needed to 
be implemented in order to “enter into [a] meaningful democracy.” According to Poston, 
the problem was not the absence of a middle class in Colombia, but rather the persistence 
of one characterized by what Poston called an “anti-human consciousness.” To wit: a 
middle class, on the one hand, “set off from the lower classes…expressing disdain for the 
peasants and the working classes” and, on the other, preoccupied, or constantly aspiring, 
“to copy the way of life of the elites.” This anti-humanistic middle class, Poston 
continued, did not have a “productive relationship” with either the elites or with the poor. 
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And precisely because Colombia was facing “new challenges and changes,” it was 
necessary to redefine those “specific roles in society.” In order for a “democratic 
relationship to happen,” Poston proclaimed, what was needed was a 
…new intelligent and feeling middle class. … A responsible middle class … a 
human middle class … a middle class who would care for others. Agents of change 
to diffuse developmental ideals throughout the society … put to work the necessary 
knowledge to achieve happiness. A truly professional middle class whose members 
become the pivot of development, democracy, peace and social justice.79 
  
 In a quick reply, Lleras Camargo acknowledged that in Colombia “there [had] not 
been a middle ground between the upper and the lower classes,” but he said he was 
certain a “democratic middle class [was] needed.” Drawing on ideas of community 
development, Lleras Camargo contended that a “democratic horizon…beyond violence” 
could become a reality as long as “social relations” pivoted around the middle class—that 
is to say, if Colombia became a society in which a democratic middle class was 
constantly “the center of attraction.”80 Middle-class professionals would become, Lleras 
Camargo argued, a “humanistic force” to create “lasting relationships [relaciones 
duraderas] among different groups in society.” This humanistic class would help the 
elites to undergo a process of “self-renewal,” and above all, “transform their own social 
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principles.”81 Furthermore, a professional middle class—by developing a solid 
knowledge of those “at the bottom of the society”—could “make the elites aware of 
[their] role in society,” could “place new social concerns” for the well-being of others at 
the very center of an “elite ethos,” and, perhaps most importantly, train the elites in the 
process of “sympathiz[ing]” with “the problems of poverty.”  
 On the other hand, the professional middle class, as a humanistic force, would 
also “channel the energies, capacities and capabilities of the poor.” In doing so, this 
democratic middle class would prepare the people to be able to “develop stronger 
relationships with the elites.” In a context in which the people had become aware of the 
oppressive role of the elite and their tendency to isolate themselves from society, place 
their well-being above that of other groups, and manifest neither interest nor sympathy 
for Colombia’s social problems, continued Lleras Camargo, middle-class professionals 
could be the path to a democratic horizon by “go[ing] down to the level of the peasants 
… or workers” to be “sympathizers” while at the same time they could “travel” to the 
“upper classes” to become “well-informed [and] knowledgeable counselors [consejero] 
for the elites.”82 
 What was at stake in this discussion was a political question about how to create 
and allocate new social subjects with which a democratic state rule could be 
accomplished. As a sympathizer with the lower classes and as a counselor of the elites, 
democratic middle-class professionals could be hierarchically ordered as a “center of 
attraction” so they would be able to govern social relations in a society where peace and 
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democracy were needed. The professional middle class became associated with the 
possibility of abandoning a confrontational style of politics and warding off communist 
practices. A middle class could put Colombian society above and beyond La Violencia by 
creating the conditions of social harmony and political peace.  
 In a fluid transnational dialogue, these concerns to create a middle class as a 
center of attraction were appropriated by several advisors from the Kennedy 
administration and the Alliance for Progress. Closely replicating the discussion between 
Lleras Camargo and Richard Poston, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Harvard historian and White 
House adviser, wrote to Kennedy that, above all, the Alliance should engineer  
a middle class revolution where the processes of economic modernization carry the 
new urban middle class into power and produce, along with it, such necessities of 
modern technical society as a constitutional government, honest public 
administration, a responsible party system.83 
  
 It is important to emphasize that these political conceptualizations did not merely 
seek to establish a distinction between the middle class in relationship to the elite or 
lower classes.84 Nor was it envisioned that the elites and the popular sectors would 
eventually become part of an ever-expanding middle class by appropriating certain values 
assigned to the middle class, as a requirement for social harmony. Instead, as is clear in 
these transnational dialogues, at issue was a reformulation of a hierarchical class rule to 
guide and conduct social relations democratically in the hope of overcoming La 
Violencia.  
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Selecting Middle-Class Professionals 
 Recent years have seen a new level of scholarly interest in the formation of the 
modern state. New approaches have convincingly demonstrated both how state 
practices shaped local communities, as well as how those local communities shaped the 
practices of the state. An important thread running through the arguments of this new 
historical and anthropological literature is that the state is not a monolithic, all-powerful 
entity or homogenous and efficient manipulator of subaltern groups, but rather a set of 
culturally and politically heterogeneous productions: that is to say, states are historical 
formations that are made socially effective through negotiations and contestation 
between state and society about state projects and practices.85 In this very important 
historical work, middle-class professionals appear as representatives of the state 
through which local communities and subaltern groups were able to experience and 
negotiate the heterogeneous political and cultural practices of the state. Although I have 
been greatly influenced by this recent literature, I would nonetheless argue that these 
historical approaches have naturalized the very relationship between state rule and the 
role of professionals. By looking at the Colombian case, I interrogate the process 
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through which these professionals became imagined as part of the workings of state 
rule. By no means do I maintain that these professionals were not representatives of the 
state. Rather, I want to decipher the historical process through which the Colombian 
state became classed and gendered as a result of a detailed process of selection/training 
in the methodologies and practices of rule. In doing so, I think we can de-naturalize the 
taken-for-granted “vertical encompassment” of the state by examining the hierarchical 
placement of those professionals who were to work as representatives and governors of 




Figure 1 Source: Adminstrative and Fiscal Statistics (National Department of Statistics),1956-1965. 
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  Figure 2 Source:  State payrolls, 1956-1965 located at Personnel Offices in Institutio de Crédito 
Territorial, Caja de Vivinda Popular, Minister of Agriculture, Instituto de Fomento Industrial, Office of 





Figure 3 Records of Personnel Offices in Institutio de Crédito Territorial, Caja de Vivienda Popular, 
Minister of Agriculture, Instituto de Fomento Industrial, Office of Civil Service, 1956-1965.87  
 
 As shown in figure one, two and three, women and men wanted to work as 
professionals for the state agencies located in Bogotá and Cundinamarca, with state 
employees in the department of Cundinamarca approaching 70,000 by 1965. More 
importantly, during the late 1950s and 1960s, with the consolidation of the National Front 
and its policies, state offices along with private organizations endeavored to establish 
what they considered was a more democratic system of rule. This interest in developing a 
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more adequate system of rule was productively engaged with constituting the very 
subjectivities of those professionals as part of a democratic middle-class working for the 
state.  In the process, I would argue, these putatively abstract discussions of how—and 
who was—to rule were often precisely what was at stake in middle class professionals’ 
daily lives.  
    In response to a number of United Nations missions to Colombia during the late 
1950s, for instance, the first National Front administration founded the National Civil 
Service Office in 1958. The main task of this state agency—working closely with major 
international and national private capital such as FEDECAFE and CARE as well as with 
the technical support of U.S. universities and the United Nations—was, above all, to put 
in place a “democratic state for a democratic society.” To do so, it was necessary to 
implement what was considered an impartial, democratic, rational and scientific system 
of recruitment, selection and training for those who potentially would be working for the 
state.88 In 1959, for example, Seamus Gaffney, director of the United Nations Mission on 
Public Administration in Colombia, wrote an extensive letter to Bruno Leuschner, 
director of the Technical Assistance Bureau of the United Nations. According to Gaffney, 
the future of a democratic state would depend in large measure upon the selection of the 
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“most valuable members of the society.”89 Gaffney mentioned repeatedly in the letter that 
the selection process would have to discover “apolitical professionals”—that is to say 
professionals who could transcend the political party rivalries that had caused La 
Violencia, professionals who could place themselves above the Liberal-Conservative 
divide—with specific qualities, attributes, features, traits and characteristics so they could 
guide “national human capital…resources and ethos embracing different social groups in 
society.” Furthermore, it was necessary to identify these “most valuable” middle-class 
professionals who embodied certain “capabilities, abilities, potentialities, sensibilities, 
beliefs, sentiments, cultural competences [and] knowledge”—above all “democratic 
senses, attitudes and wills.”90 The characteristics and traits necessary to govern the poor 
as well as the elites were thought to be part of the “nature of the [middle class] bodies” 
who only needed to be schooled so that a “truly competent [and] capable” professional 
could “emerge.”   
 The detailed process of selection taking place in several state institutions and private 
organizations during the late 1950s and early 1960s—mediated through letters of 
recommendation, curriculum vitae, interviews, written personal essays, evaluations, 
exams, tests, questions—speak to the never ending search for the right democratic 
governor to work for the state.  Indeed, the detailed process of selection structured—as 
much as it was constituted by—the constant need to define who could be classified as 
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governors and those who could be categorized as governed. Rafael Samper, the director 
of the Socio-Economic Division at the FEDECAFE who also worked with CARE and the 
Rockefeller Foundation during the 1950s and 1960s, continually emphasized the need to 
recognize that, contrary to common wisdom, not all human beings were “cut out for the 
same type of person, work, obligation or profession.”91 Indeed, in order to be practical, it 
was “naïve” to think that the “future professional workers” were “made.” Quite the 
contrary, he argued, professional workers were “born.” Because these professionals could 
be found naturally, Simper proposed a careful and meticulously implemented program of 
recruitment to “discover” those “necessary, indefinable, and indescribable”—and, above 
all, “intangible”—aptitudes, democratic attitudes, personal interests, wills, feelings, 
desires, wants, beliefs, and physical traits that the professional needed to manifest when 
exercising the arts of governance.92 These selection processes would be sufficiently 
effective, he claimed, to reveal a clear idea of what Samper suggestively called the 
anatomy of qualities.93 This anatomy of qualities would hierarchically arrange certain 
innate democratic dispositions within professional middle class bodies, a constellation of 
political orientations, gendered distinctions, and class categories that would ensure the 
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professional in question would be capable of appropriate self-conduct in governing other 
social groups.94  
    Although assumed to be inherent characteristics, these qualities still needed to be 
carefully trained, schooled and cultivated—that is, according to Samper, the professional 
middle class was not only “born” but also “made.” Only then, he argued, would these 
qualities truly become an essential part of the “[professional’s] habitual nature.”95 The 
training would make these natural inner gifts, talents, qualities, “extraordinary 
capabilities” dispositions, traits, “naturally” self-developable characteristics for the 
professional to embody. In doing so, those self-developable characteristics would create  
“truly middle class professionals, incomparable agents of change, and distinguished 
social catalysts of transformation.”96   
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profesionales (1957-1959), sección: departamento de personal, serie: gabinete del subgerente general, 
fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA. The process of training and guidance is beyond the scope of this article. 






Figures 4 and 5 Source: Records of Personnel Offices in Institutio de Crédito Territorial, Caja de Vivinda 
Popular, Minister of Agriculture, Instituto de Fomento Industrial, Office of Civil Service, 1956-1965. On 




 To obtain a preliminary view of the professional candidate, it was necessary to look 
carefully at the curriculum vitae as well as the letters of recommendation.97 CVs were 
read as a way to find out the level of schooling or litereacy. In fact, in most of these CVs 
state office personel in different agencies highlighted the type of education as a first 
requirement to be considered as a candidate to work for the state. Interestingly, as it is 
shown in figure four and five, most of the candidates had to have at least secondary 
education.98 For  applicant women, however, it was required that they had scholling 
beyond secondary education in order to be considered for the job whereas for male 
candidates, it seems, they could compete for the job with only some secondary education. 
Regardless, and as a part of larger process, state offices, it seems, demanded that in order 
to work for the state it was necessary to purse studies beyond the secondary education.99  
 
 
                                                 
97 In most of the cases, there were red marks highlighting the level of scholling on the CVs. This suggests 
that it was crucial for state office of personnel to see the level of education. As I will argue below, this 
assumption worked closely with the rest of the detailed process of selection.   
 
98 Although it is very difficult to trace wether some applications were rejected for the level of schooling, it 
is clear state offices privileged women with professional preparation beyond secondary education.  
 
99 With the growth of private and public institutions (universities and what it was called Institutos 
Superiores), enrollment in higher education increased 309% during the 1950s and early 1960s. By the late 
1950s, Colombians in general were flocking to several institutions of higher education. By 1964, 84 % of 
all school children were in class. And illiteracy began to decline, failing behind during the 1950s and to 
27% during the 1960s. James Henderson, Modernization in Colombia, 342; See Aline Helg, La Educacion 
en Colombia: Una Historia Social, Económica y Política, 1918-1957 (Bogotá: CEREC, 1986).  Fernán 
González Educación y Estado, 110-111. Those nurses, social workers, architects, agronomists, rural 
specialists, accountants and other professionals who applied for a job to work for the state were coming 
from the following institutions: Escuela Nacional de Contaduria, Colegio Mayor de Cundinamarca, 
Instututo Gran Colombiano, Escuela de Enfermeria de la Cruz Roja (Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del 
Rosario), Instituto Nacional Pedagógico, Escuela Nacional de Comercio, Normal Sor Josefa del Castillo 
(Chiquinquira), Fundación Universidad de America, Indesco, Fundación Universitaria de Bogotá “Jorge 
Tadeo Lozano,” Universidad la Gran Colombia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Escuela Superior de 
Orientación Rural (Usaquén), Normal Femenina, Escuela Normal Superior Industrial de Zipaquirá). As I 
will explain in the last chapter, this produced not only a process of professionalization but also a class 




 These CVs representing the formal education of the candidates, however, were 
not read in isolation. Quite the contrary, they were used as evidence and proof to be read 
along—and against—those needed qualities of the individual who would work as a 
professional in a range of state social programs. More specifically, the letters of 
recommendation, usually written by those considered prestigious members of society, 
narrated personal properties, habits and attributes the professional should possess and 
were imagined as necessary to work for the state. Letters of recommendation were 
carefully read to find evidence of professional productivity, composure, intelligence, 
trustworthiness and reserve. At the same time, those letters were expected to speak of the 
professional’s passion for the “welfare of society.”100 Candidates needed to possess a 
natural tendency for constant human interaction with all social classes. Armed with a 
careful balance between idealism and realism—that is, an equilibrium between the belief 
in progress and the knowledge of the “limitations of reality”—these professional men 
were ready to exercise their “obligations and duties with the society at large.” Confident, 
passionate, and responsible for resolving social problems, these men would be able to 
create lasting relations with the poor. Indeed, the poor themselves would be able to 
appreciate those personal attributes when “getting close to them.”101 And yet, precisely 
because these men were uniquely aware of their role in society, they could 
                                                 
100 Selección de personal/cartas de recomendación (f43) 1956-1959, Sección: departamento de personal, 
Serie: gabinete del subgerente general, Fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA. 
 
101 Selección de personal/cartas de recomendación (f43) 1956-1959, Sección: departamento de personal, 
Serie: gabinete del subgerente general, Fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA. See also, Selección de personal, 




simultaneously be humble about their “intelligence, culture, education, feelings and 
professional preparation.”102 
 A comparison of two letters of recommendation clearly illustrates the hierarchical 
evaluation of dispositions, the unequal indexing of properties and the asymmetrical 
fragmentation of attributes thought of as necessary in order to work as middle-class 
professionals. In a 1956 letter written by an influential member of the Bogotá society to 
the personnel office of the Instituto de Crédito Territorial on behalf Manuel Mora, Jaime 
Sánchez narrated how Mora, a “hard worker,” would fit nicely into a professional 
position.103 Sánchez argued that not only was Mora a very intelligent, cultured and 
educated young man but also, and according to Sánchez more importantly, he had the 
disposition to “learn from others.”104 This attribute, Sánchez remarked, was not easy “to 
find in every other professional.”105 The hiring report from the office of personnel at the 
ICT expressed excitement at the possibility of contracting somebody like Manuel 
Mora.106 Compared to the “common professionals [profesionales del común],” the hiring 
report argued, Mora was different, since he was intelligent as well as strong-minded 
                                                 
102 Selección de personal/cartas de recomendación (f25) 1956- 1958, Sección: departamento de personal, 
Serie: gabinete del subgerente general, Fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA.  
103Selección de personal/cartas de recomendación, contenido: cartas de recomendación y evaluación de 
Manuel Mora. (f43) 1956-1958, Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del subgerente general, 
Fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA.  
 
104 Selección de personal/cartas de recomendación, contenido: cartas de recomendación y evaluación de 
Manuel Mora. (f43) 1956-1958, Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del subgerente general, 
Sondo: subgerencia general, ICTA. In the letter, the paragraph appears accompanied by an exclamation 
mark written by hand. I assume the office of personnel did this.  
 
105 Selección de personal/cartas de recomendación, contenido: cartas de recomendación y evaluación de 
Manuel Mora. (f43) 1956-1958, Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del subgerente general, 
Sondo: subgerencia general, ICTA.  
 
106 Informes de selección de personal, reportes y evaluaciones de procesos de selección de personal 
profesional, evaluación de solicitud de trabajo de Manuel Mora 1956-1958 (f73) 1956-1958, Sección: 




[dispuesto] and in a constant process of self-education by interacting with others. Mora 
was a man who was “intelligent enough” to recognize the partiality and the limitations of 
his knowledge. These limitations and partialities, however, would be surpassed by his 
eagerness to learn.107 And precisely because of this disposition, Manuel Mora could 
develop the quality, under proper training and education, of believing that “no one 
completely lacks intelligence.”108 The possibility of instilling this attribute was 
significant, the hiring report argued, because it would eventually be valuable when 
Manual Mora came in contact with “poor people who [were] not remotely as intelligent 
as [he was].”109 
 We see an illuminating contrast in the letter submitted in 1955 by Alfonso 
Guevara, the director of the office of social programs in a municipal company, in behalf 
of Miguel Pérez, applicant for a position at the ICT. According to Guevara, Pérez was an 
outstanding professional who possessed innumerable personal qualities. Like Manual 
Mora, this applicant was confident and a conscious man. He was a well-educated 
individual ready to work “for a better society.”110 Indeed, Pérez was very aware of his 
“unparalleled [inigualables] qualities,” was convinced of his “incomparable knowledge,” 
and “unmatched intelligence.”111 Alfredo Guevara, who wrote the letter of 
                                                 
107 Informes de selección de personal, reportes y evaluaciones de procesos de selección de personal 
profesional, evaluación de solicitud de trabajo de Manuel Mora 1956-1958 (f73) 1956-1958, Sección: 






110 Informes de selección de personal, contenido: reportes y evaluaciones de procesos de selección de 
personal profesional, evaluación de solicitud de trabajo de Miguel Pérez 1955-1957 (f43) 1956-1958, 






recommendation, argued that Pérez could also be very productive even if the 
“environment around [him]” might not be very favorable. He was a committed man who 
would be able to focus on his professional obligations, and if necessary, get the work 
done all by himself.112 Contrary to what Guevara expected, the report issued by the office 
of personnel argued that, despite outstanding qualities and attributes, the letter of 
recommendation revealed the “lack [of] essential” traits to work as a professional. The 
problem was, it seems, that Pérez came across as lacking the “modest nature” such 
“prestigious… professionals” needed to possess.113 The evaluation argued, furthermore, 
that the letter of recommendation gave the impression that Pérez was a “profesional del 
montón”—those who, because they had formal education, “think they know 
everything.”114 It was an evident problem, the report elaborated further, precisely because 
Pérez would have a clear tendency to assume that he had “nothing to learn from anybody 
else.”115 This tendency would have not posed a problem if, the report claimed, Pérez were 
to work with “people like [himself].”116 For the particular position in question, however, 
it was a liability because he was expected to be in close contact with poor people who 
would lack “any intellectual [or] cultural preparation,” and their “intellectual differences” 
would be “too evident” when he came “face to face [with] poor people.”117 In this vein, 
state personnel offices and similar hiring venues produced statements, evaluations and 
















reports encouraging and celebrating those who were categorized as “gifted men” and 
were willing to take risks in life to “change things,” prestigious professionals eager to 
sacrifice “any privilege [they] might have” to be in “genuine engagement” with the 
“society around [them].” Indeed, as true men, they should embody “unbreakable 
integrity” and “clear moral judgment”118  
 The letter of recommendation was also mined for evidence of the social background 
of the candidates. It was necessary; it seems, to be generally aware of “social origins and 
background” that the potential professionals came from.119 This social background, 
furthermore, was constantly associated with—or evaluated against—“necessary virtues 
[and] incomparable traits” that professionals would need when exercising and performing 
the arts of government for the Colombian state. In 1956, for instance, Alfonso Ortiz 
wrote a letter of recommendation in behalf of Juan Granados to work as a professional in 
the joint housing project between the Popular Housing Fund (Caja de Vivienda Popular) 
and the ICT.120 Granados, noted Ortiz, was an admirable example of achievement and 
advancement.121 Under very difficult social constraints, Ortiz explained, Granados 
overcame his social background and had been able to acquire an education in order to “be 
                                                 
118 Informes y evaluaciones de procesos de selección de personal profesional y solicitudes de trabajo (f125) 
1956-1958; (1955-1957), Folder: cartas y reportes de personal, Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: 
gabinete del subgerente general, Fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA.  
119 Informes de personal, evaluación y sugerencias (f111) 1954-1959, Sección: departamento de personal, 
Serie gabinete del subgerente general, Fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA.  
 
120 Evaluación de solicitud de trabajo de Juan Grandos, 1956 (f48) 1955-1957, Folder: reportes de selección 
de personal, informes y evaluaciones de procesos de selección de personal profesional, Sección: 
departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del subgerente general, fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA. In the 
letter of recommendation does not specify who Alfonso Ortiz was. Presumably, Ortiz held a high position 






somebody in life.”122 If only for that, argued Ortiz in the letter of recommendation, 
Granados could be a fine example a prestigious professional man who possessed 
“perseverance, humility, awareness of life [and] concern for social problems.”123 
 The evaluation of this recommendation, however, explicitly explained the association 
of the so-called social background and the qualities, sentiments and attachments 
professionals should embody and enact. The evaluation issued by the office of personnel 
at the Popular Housing Fund initially responded positively to Ortiz’s recommendation on 
behalf of Granados. There was no doubt, stated the report, that Granados would be an 
excellent professional who would show perseverance, confidence, determination and 
enthusiasm when working with his professional colleagues in different “social aspects” of 
the housing programs being implemented in Bogotá during the 1950s.124 At the same 
time, however, the evaluation stated that Granados’s social background could potentially 
become a problem given the type of work he would perform.125 Since Granados would 
work “in an environment of poverty,” his social background could “conflict” with—
indeed it could be an “obstacle” for—his achievements as a “prestigious professional.” 
Precisely because he came from the same social environment, it was virtually assumed 
that he would have trouble doing his job. Although the difference in social origins, it was 
argued, might not be noticeable among his professional colleagues, it was suspected that 
                                                 
122 Ibid.  
 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. See also cartas de recomendación evaluaciones y sugerencias (f11) (1956-1958), Folder: Selección 
de personal/cartas de recomendación, Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del subgerente 
general, Fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA.  
 
125 Cartas de recomendación y evaluaciones de trabajo de Juan Granados (1956-1951) (f58) Folder: 
selección de personal/cartas de recomendación, 8, Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del 




when working with poor people he might lack the “necessary distance and objectivity.” 
According to the report, an extraordinary characteristic for the professional was to 
embody “[a] capacity to tell the truth about themselves and the others around them.”126 
And in order to do so, the professional should “show strong attachment toward the poor.” 
Granados’ social background, however, would make him too close to “the people 
themselves,” and thus he might not differentiate—that is, “tell the truth”—about what he 
has become and about his former class collective self. He could not, furthermore, develop 
a “strong social attachment” to—and, more specifically, a bond toward—the poor 
precisely because his social constraints had shaped him as necessarily belonging to “the 
poor.” Neither too close to belong to the poor, nor too distant to be detached toward 
them, the professional was expected to embody a balance, a disposition to “objectivity,” 
as well as a hierarchical “sentiment of closeness” so they could dedicate themselves to 
speaking, again, “the truth about themselves and others around them.”127 That is to say, in 
order to rule it was necessary to calibrate not only social distinctions/differentiations but 
also establish hierarchical and perhaps even fragmentary bonds between those who were 
supposed to be guided to rule and those who were supposed to be governed. 
 
  
                                                 
126 Cartas de recomendación y evaluaciones de trabajo de Juan Granados (1956-1951) (f58) Folder: 
selección de personal/cartas de recomendación, 8, Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del 
subgerente general, Fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA. 
 





Figure 6 and 7 Records of Personnel Offices in Institutio de Crédito Territorial, Caja de Vivinda Popular, 
Minister of Agriculture, Instituto de Fomento Industrial, Office of Civil Service, 1956-1965. On method 




   As it is shown in figure 6 and figure 7 state agencies along with private organizations 
were looking for (married) men in the belief that they would be “politically quiet” when 
working for the state. Married men, it was argued, would, on the one hand, avoid 
“improper” politics since it was family what worried them the most, and on the other, be 
more responsible when working for the state, since they could set up an example for to 
those peasents and workers who did not yet know how to be “true fathers.” More 
importantly, these men could own a power of decision, inner determination—professional 
men who were “strong enough” to contribute to the resolution of Colombia’s social 
problems. Indeed, letters of recommendation and evaluations regarded these powers as an 
integral part of the masculine task of governing. A “true man” would neither be 
“weak”—like “the man from a poor social background”—nor “arrogant” like “elitist 
men” who were driven only by appearances and professional status. As stated in a hiring 
report that echoed many such letters and personnel evaluations from the 1950s and early 
1960s, 
[A Middle class professional] does not live by appearances. He is elegant, humble, 
sencillo, neat and attractive. He spreads healthiness to those who are around 
him…He is not from a bad class[mala clase]. …He is of middle class background, 
he does not fear change…he possesses intellectual equilibrium…[a] personal touch 
and people skills [don de gentes]. With a constructive attitude toward his 
professional tasks… he knows what it means to work hard and personify an infinite 
patience to understand social problems.  
 
And the hiring report stated,  
[This letter] allows us to see an honest, tolerant, patient, understanding man [who] 
reflects good manners, good oral expression, a man with character, will and 
decisiveness… with a sense of progress who does not lack professional status…he 
knows how to overcome social obstacles.  He has a spirit of dedication… spirit of 
sacrifice, spirit of infinite patience. He is not driven by social appearances. He is 
well-educated. He has reached an emotional and intellectual equilibrium as well as 
maturity. He has a touch of humanity. A constructive attitude and possesses the 
qualities of humility and always pursues a mission in life with discretion, 
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honorability, decency high emotional standards… internal comportment… 
integrity… reason… moral virtues, harmonious dispositions, intelligence, strong 
sense of self-denial, diligence, temperance, self-control, calm, generosity, humanity 
reserve, maturity in judgment, good sentiments and trustworthiness.128  
  
 And yet, after discussing, evaluating and pondering the letters of recommendation, 
different selection committees in state offices, transnational private organizations and 
various training institutions worked together to argue that these narratives were too 
superficial and did not allow them to develop a more “elaborated concept” of the middle 
class professional.  Moreover, it was said, these letters merely offered a narrow window 
on who was a “truly democratic professional.”129 During the late 1950s and 1960s, and 
informed by discourses and political knowledge on social psychology, cultural 
anthropology, rural sociology, human relations and scientific management, these 
institutions began elaborating entrance exams, job orientations, evaluations, interviews, 
hiring reports and training sessions to carefully discover—and guide—what was 
understood as the “professional’s second nature and habits.”130  
 Interviews were thought to make it possible to go further into the discovery of the 
anatomy of qualities of democratic middle class “governors.” By working with four 
interlocking narrative forms—questions about social background, cultural descriptions, 
                                                 
128 Cartas de recomendación e informes de evaluación de Luis Torres  (f56) 1955-1958, comites de 
selección de personal, Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del subgerente general, Fondo: 
subgerencia general, ICTA.  
 
129 Comite de selección de personal/ solicitudes y respuestas, 1957-1959, Sección:  políticas de personal y 
adiestramiento, 1958-1960, sección: departamento de personal, serie: gabinte del subgerente general, 
Fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA; See also Actas, fondo secretaria general, ICTA;  CINVAR, talleres  y 
selección de professionales, November 1955 and Julio 1958, talleres  y selección de professionals, talleres 
de entrenamiento, clases and asignaturas, CINVAR. 
 
130 Comite de selección de personal/ solicitudes y respuestas, 1957-1959, Sección:  políticas de personal y 
adiestramiento, 1958-1960, sección: departamento de personal, serie: gabinte del subgerente general, 
Fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA  
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family biographical anecdotes, and accounts of personal advancement—the interviews 
sought to elicit a very clear perspective on the context in which the professional candidate 
had been immersed and had developed. It was imperative to discern the “social view of 
the individual”—that is, the complex combination of values, desires, beliefs, sensibilities, 
convictions, aspirations, preoccupations, interests and, all the factors that go into the 
essential “social composition [and] makeup of the professional.”131 In a word, it was 
necessary to discover what was called the “human ecology of the professional.”132 
 In 1955, Ruben Forero, along with several others who were applying for jobs as 
professionals in state offices or private companies, was interviewed to work as an 
architect in the ICT’s housing projects. The report issued by the committee and the office 
of personnel a few weeks after he was interviewed argued that Ruben’s responses, among 
other things, had “faithfully” shown his “commitment as a true professional man.”133 By 
closely connecting his self-evident “middle class background [antecedents de clase 
media] …outstanding family biography…exceptional cultural environment and 
noticeable personal achievement,” the evaluation report asserted that these factors and 
conditions reflected how Ruben Forero had the innate capacity to develop the skills to 
work with different social groups and embody “democratic attitudes” when creating 
“close relationships with the poor.” Forero’s father, said the report, was an accountant 
                                                 
131 Políticas de personal y adiestramiento, 1958-1960, Serie: actas, folder: Fondo: secretaría general, ICTA. 
See also Políticas de personal. (f54) 1956-1958, serie: gabinete de sub-gerente general, fondo: subgerencia 
general, ICTA  
 
132 Políticas de personal y adiestramiento, 1958-1960, Serie: actas, folder: fondo: secretaría general, ICTA. 
 
133 Informes de personal, (f23) (1955-1957), Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del sub-




while his mother was a housewife.134 His parents had been married for many years, and 
their marriage was, said the report of the interview, “ideal and harmonious.”135  This 
meant, the report argued, that Forero had grown up in a family environment that valued 
sincerity, dialogue, calm, self-control and honesty.136  
 More importantly, his gendered family biography had immersed—and shaped—
him in a social context and cultural environment that was concerned with “service, 
knowledge, education, and cultural development.”137 Specifically, the report of the 
interview argued that Forero amply appreciated the privilege of having a stay-at-home 
mother. Because of this condition, it was concluded, Forero had developed a “democratic 
sense of himself.” That is, he had been able to learn “to be sensitive” toward social 
problems, to be concerned for the complicated situations of others, and to look beyond 
his own personal interests. Indeed, his mother had “transmitted … a legacy in service 
[legado en servicio].”138 Forero could consequently embody this “democratic sense,” 
“feeling of freedom,” and “legacy in service” because his mother had always created an 
“integrated family environment… a sentiment of sacrifice and unselfishness service” that 
                                                 
134Informes de personal, (f23) (1955-1957), Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del sub-
gerente general, Fondo: secretaría general, ICTA. See also, informes de personal contratado, (1955-1957), 
sección: departamento de personal, serie: gabinete del sub-gerente general, fondo: subgerencia general, 
ICTA. 
 
135Informes de personal, (f23) (1955-1957), Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del sub-
gerente general, Fondo: secretaría general, ICTA. See also, evaluaciones de personal activo, (1955-1957), 
sección: departamento de personal, serie: gabinete del sub-gerente general, fondo: subgerencia general, 
ICTA;  see also, Políticas de contratación, (1958-1961), sección de personal,  División de extension Rural, 
Colombia IV y Colombia XXV, Convenio-Colombiano Americano de Agricultura, Ministerio de 
Agricultura, STACA.  
 
136 Informes de personal, (f23) (1955-1957), Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del sub-
gerente general, Fondo: secretaría general, ICTA. 
 
137 Informes de personal, (f23) (1955-1957), Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del sub-
gerente general, Fondo: secretaría general, ICTA. 
 
138Informes de personal, (f23) (1955-1957), Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del sub-
gerente general, Fondo: secretaría general, ICTA. 
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had put no social constraints on the development of Forero’s brighter future. Above all, 
Forero’s mother had set an incomparable example of “service” by making anonymous 
sacrifices: in doing so, his mother had passed on to him an “inborn interest” in helping 
others.139  
 Conversely, Forero’s father had taught him “the important things in life” and had 
been an example of “professionalism, personal commitment in life, perseverance and 
cultural improvement.” Indeed, his father had passed on to Forero a concern for the 
problems of society, as well as an interest in education and knowledge. This interest, 
argued the report, had been the most valuable legacy for Forero since he was shaped to 
believe that education and knowledge could be found within himself .140 
   During the late 1950s and 1960s, state agencies and private capital organization 
assumed that what the professional could be and do was the result of their “cultural 
immersion” in a hierarchically understood social background and/or cultural 
environments, with particular family biographies and personal development. By 
essentially indexing, categorizing and classifying these social backgrounds in gender, and 
class terms, these agencies tried to constitute democratic middle class professionals to 
work for the state. When women applied for jobs, especially as social workers, for 
instance, the interview was equally concerned with the “social influences [and] the social 
milieu” to which women had been exposed. In 1958, for example, Celmira Burgos, a 
recent graduate of the School of Social Work, was being interviewed for an ICT 
                                                 
139 Informes de personal, (f23) (1955-1957), Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del sub-
gerente general, Fondo: secretaría general, ICTA. 
 
140 Informes de personal, (f23) (1955-1957), Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del sub-




community development program being carried out in a Bogotá neighborhood called 
Quiroga. The report of this interview elaborated extensively on how Burgo’s family 
biography, social background, cultural descriptions and personal development gave the 
impression that she had grown up “within a proper social environment.”141 The family 
was considered as coming from a middle class background: the family life was composed 
of professional parents and student siblings.  In contrast to the evaluation of Rubén 
Forero’s interview, which discussed both parents, Celmira’s interview focused mainly on 
her mother’s role. Celmira’s mother, Amparo, had been working as a secretary in a 
private firm, and the report disclosed how Celmira had been influenced by these social 
conditions. Celmira had been immersed in a context of family support and had been 
educated in the “necessities and sacrifices.” Amparo had taught Celmira the “most 
important things” as a woman. Indeed, the report contended that Celmira was very aware 
of the “feminine tasks.” Contrary to someone “driven by interest” to work in order to 
achieve “material satisfaction,” Celmira had been inculcated to view work as a means to 
find a “larger social meaning.” Furthermore, Celmira was coming from a balanced 
environment that allowed her to develop a “sentiment” to help others. For her—and this 
was assumed to be a consequence of her social background and family biography—to 
work meant to resonate with the suffering of others, to be concerned with the misery of 
the poor, to promote the welfare of the people.142  This “larger meaning” would help 
                                                 
141 Informes de personal y evaluaciones de personal activo (1955-1957), Sección: departamento de 
personal, Serie: gabinete del sub-gerente general,  Fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA; See also, Comité de 
personal/Celmira Burgos, (1955-1957), Sección: departamento de personal, Serie: gabinete del sub-gerente 
general, Fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA; Actas de proyecto Barrio Quiroga, (1955-1958), Sección: 
secretaria general, Serie: gabinete de gerencia general, Fondo: Gerencia General; And Material de 
entrenamiento para el personal del Instituto de Crédito Territorial, (1957-1959), Notas de clase, asignatura 
y entrenamiento, CINVAR. 
142 Informes de personal y evaluaciones de personal activo, (1955-1957), Sección: departamento de 
personal, Serie: gabinete del sub-gerente general, Fondo: subgerencia general, ICTA; Comité de 
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Celmira to engage with the poor, deliver trustworthiness to them, understand the social 
situation of those “unprivileged women” and, no less important, to instill in others the 
desire to “improve themselves.”143  
 Although there are comparatively few reports or evaluations on those who were 
rejected, there are elaborations on the reasons why certain professional candidates could 
present some difficulties in working as professionals. Unlike Ruben Forero or Celmira 
Burgos, for example, the reports and evaluations of less successful interviews argued that 
the candidate’s family environment was characterized by a tendency to have “numerous 
members, consensual unions, violence, disharmony, [and] disintegration.”144 
Furthermore, troubled families with complicated social backgrounds and serious “social 
constraints,” several reports argued, translated into cultural environments devoid of 
proper parenting—with single mothers, at best, and in some cases lacking parental 
guidance entirely.  These families had been influenced by cultural conditions in which 
“abandonment of women and children by men was normal routine.” On the one hand, 
these “wrong cultural conditions” and social constraints would inherently shape women 
into those with “few feminine tendencies,” no interest other than “material satisfaction,” 
no “maternal sentiment” to help others, and a “strong self-interest” to remain in the “poor 
social position” where they “found themselves.” On the other hand, these same cultural 
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conditions would form innately “weak men” who were hostile, weak willed, unmotivated, 
aggressive and insecure and who expressed “contempt and rejection toward others” as 
well as “hateful and pessimistic sentiments [about] life.”145     
 We can compare the evaluations of two interviews in 1959 that, although brief, 
explained how problematic two male candidates could be as potential middle class 
democratic governors. According to the report of the ICT office of personnel, Roberto 
Bonilla’s interview began with no “good signs.” He was, the report recounted, poorly 
dressed—Bonilla was not attired in a suit, did not have a tie, showed up at the interview 
unshaven, and, overall, his presentation “left much to be desired about who he really 
[was].” These problems clearly reflected his lack of motivation to work as a “true 
professional.”146 These first impressions, furthermore, were corroborated by an 
evaluation of Bonilla’s cultural environment, social background and family biography. 
There was an association between the “poor social background” from which Bonilla 
came, the cultural environment in which he had been “immersed,” and the effects of these 
previous conditions and social constraints on his family. Bonilla grew up in a context of 
no “proper fathering.”147 Bonilla’s father had abandoned his mother and his two siblings 
several years prior, and the applicant had grown up without paternal guidance. Bonilla 
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thus did not become tutored in the “masculine aspirations” for knowledge, culture and 
education. The lack of proper fathering, furthermore, had some real effects on Bonilla’s 
inner self; like others who were categorized as “people from a bad class [personas de 
mala clase], ” he could not develop or possess either the masculine spirit of competition 
or the capacity to take risks to improve who he was. And if this was not enough for 
Bonilla, said the evaluation, his mother Beatriz also failed to set a good example for him 
and his siblings precisely because she had “always been of the same social background.” 
There was nothing to emulate/aspire to, nothing to be educated in.148 In all, it was his 
gendered cultural environment and social background, and more importantly, the inherent 
characteristics of the Bonilla’s family biography that produced a “weak man…afraid of 
change… with no aspirations for education [or] knowledge… no desire to better 
himself.” In other words, the evaluation tersely argued, it was “difficult to see” Bonilla 
working for the state as a true professional man. 149 As a report by the office of rural 
extension of the Minister of Agriculture concluded in 1960,  
What can we expect of these men who are the result of this troubled social background 
and difficult cultural environment? Needless to say, these would be aggressive 
professionals. Aggressive because when they see the same problems they have lived, 
they would react negatively. They would become hostile toward others, socially 
resentful …they would be angry at society because of their situation. What model can 
these professionals give to others if in their social development they have received 
none? They have been raised in a social and cultural environment where single 
motherhood [madre soldetirsmo], parental irresponsibility and family disintegration 
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may seem normal. In them, it is impossible to find the security, the model, the 
motivation, the energy, the attitudes those working and peasant classes really need. 150 
 
 Gabriel Colmenares, a lawyer who gave an interview for a job as a professional in 
social programs in the ICT in 1959, provides an interesting contrast. The report argued 
that his privileged social background and complicated family biography had affected who 
he was. Coming from a social background of “extensive economic means,” the report 
noted, Gabriel had not had any experience with the real problems of life. The cultural 
environment in which he had been “immersed” had produced a “weak man” who only 
manifested “improper aspirations” because he was not inclined to form attachments 
toward the poor, and instead, would be satisfied merely with his own “professional 
status.” 151 Since he had not had to struggle in life, social problems were neither in his 
mind nor in his interests. More importantly, he was not conscious of the poverty of 
Colombia—he did not possess a cultivated awareness about the role a professional could 
play in helping people to help themselves. Since he was from “old money [La plata bajo 
la almohada]” no personal development had taken place, only a preoccupation with self-
interested knowledge.152  He had, it was argued, everything in life. Given this privileged 
family biography, the report of the interview asked, how would he be able to face the 
social problems and “rough social situations” when working closely with the poor? 
Predictably, the report argued, his social atmosphere, cultural environment, and the 
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family biography had specific effects within Gabriel himself. He was a “weak man” who 
would easily get scared not only of the reality of life but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, of the people themselves. 153 Indeed, these cultural and social conditions 
provoked an innate and “peculiar absence” of feelings, sympathies and attachments 
toward the poor. As a weak man, he could not “develop” a “quality of adaptability” to 
different “social [and] cultural contexts.”154 The report repeatedly warned how, if 
selected, he would demonstrate to the people his lack of interest by either “look[ing] 
away”—or “excusing” himself—from the “situation of the poor.”  It was inconceivable, 
the report concluded, that this privileged man with neither experience with the poor nor 
“appreciation/understanding” for the “problems of society,” could produce any “needed 
changes” in the “people who suffer the most.” 155  
 This meticulous process of evaluation was paramount to the constitution of 
democratic middle-class professionals and their association to state rule. Those selected 
would be neither from what was considered a poor social background nor from what was 
conceived as extensive economics means. The detailed process of selection constantly 
constituted the middle-class professionals as those who would be able to embody state 
rule by, on the one hand, calibrating social distinctions/differentiations, and on the other, 
establishing hierarchical—if fragmentary—bonds between those who were supposed to 
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be representative and governors of state rule and those who were supposed to be 
governed. In the process, there was an eternal need to hierarchically define and classify 
who could potentially become the best governors to work for the state.   
 
Democracy Is You156 
 Along with this detailed process of selection, these professionals were also 
subjected to a training regimen on how, as gendered and classed representatives of the 
state, to exercise the practices of rule. It is difficult to trace the different transnational 
institutions, state organizations, U.S. offices for foreign assistance and U.S. and 
Colombian universities involved in this meticulous training of professionals to work as 
governors. In dire need of creating a professional who could be democratic by 
transcending the partisan rivalry that had cause La Violencia, a hybrid set of private, 
public and transnational organizations began, during the late 1950s and 1960s, to train 
middle-class professionals on how exercise state rule.  
 United States offices of foreign assistance played quite a role in shaping the 
training and educational process. Through workshops, classes, conferences, lectures, 
job orientation sessions, written essays and discussions, U.S. professors and consultants 
affiliated with the Organization of American States and the United Nations, as well as 
with private transnational organizations, advised Colombian “experts” on how to 
cultivate what was perceived as the necessary democratic dispositions and capacities to 
exercise state rule. The Social Security Institute, the National Confederation of Coffee 
Growers, the Federal Housing Institute, the Inter-American Center for Housing and 
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Planning, the Institute of Industrial Growth, the National Institute for Agrarian Reform 
and the different social, political and cultural centers sponsored by the Organization of 
American States engaged in ongoing dialogue about the urgent need to prepare these 
professionals to work democratically. As Sam Shulman, a U.S. sociologist affiliated 
with the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation for Agriculture under the auspice of 
the Alliance for Progress, put it in a 1963 letter to President Guillermo León Valencia,  
And these are the professionals usually of a middle-class background who should 
learn how to approach the peasants…the workers…these are the professionals 
who should be more sensitive to, given their middle-class background, those who 
understandably are in a different environment…an educational program is needed 
if we are to assign the tasks of progress to these professionals who, after all, 
would have to be in contact with the national laboring classes… these 
professionals need to overcome those anti-democratic practices that have 
characterized them in the past…They need to be more open minded to what is 
different given the different environment where they have grown up…they have 
to leave political passions and the thirst for professional authority. They need to 
be [above all] democratic.157 
 
 These professionals were subjected to an intense process of training to become 
democratic governors for state rule. Usually, these workshops, lectures, conferences, 
fieldtrips and classes were required as part of the “job description.” Although it was a 
subject of constant discussion, national and international experts seem to have 
privileged certain discourses in schooling these professionals to become democratically 
engaged with their “national role.” Continuously citing ideas of community 
development, these experts used stories, examples of real life and field trips to persuade 
those professionals working for state institutions to understand their “role in a different 
light, from a different perspective…and with a different approach.” The task was, it 
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seems, to get these professionals to grasp how privileged they were in working for the 
state, precisely because “not too many people [were] capable of performing a 
democratic job for the benefit of national development.” In one workshop that took 
place at ICT in 1960, Orlando Fals-Borda, a very influential Colombian sociologist 
trained at the University of Florida during the 1950s, invited some professionals to 
think for a moment about how important their job was for “the society as a whole.” And 
yet not all professionals were fit to work for the state precisely because some of them 
were having a hard time understanding that 
the future of the nation depends on the democratic professional of 
today…engaged with the social problems of the nation… the future of peace in 
Colombia depends on professionals who care about what happens with those 
who also live in the nation… The future of Colombian democracy depends on 
professionals who are willing to use their knowledge and privileges for the 
advancement of society into progress.158  
 
 Therefore, professionals needed to assess how they could become truly 
privileged by performing as democratic professionals. And in order to do so, it seems, 
national and international experts explained that there were three “types” of 
professional men. The first was a traditional and autocratic one, who, reproducing a 
“legacy of the past,” boasted only a “capacity for bossing.”159 That is to say, this was a 
professional who performed his job by merely demanding the obedience of the people. 
Caroline Ware, a very active consultant the Alliance for Progress through the 
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Organization of American States who gave several lectures and workshops during the 
late 1950s and 1960s, gave a talk at the CINVA to an audience of professionals 
working for several state institutions. Following the typical pattern of the time, Ware 
narrated stories of imagined yet specific lives of professionals performing their jobs. 
She particularly appealed to her experience working in Puerto Rico by citing “frustrated 
cases” where she could easily detect an autocratic professional.160 This professional, 
Ware lectured, would not allow the people to express their opinions about social 
problems they faced in their own communities. It was his obligation, Ware said, to 
make decisions, assume responsibilities and, above all, know what was good for the 
people.161 By acting in an “authoritarian way,” he inevitably ignored and even sought to 
elide the poor’s interests and conditions. More importantly, this authoritarian 
professional not only improperly intimidated people to participate in democratic 
processes but also produced “fears, resistance and rejection” from the people toward 
progress. And when he faced these rejections, he had no option but to order the people 
to obey what he had thought their interests should be. He was satisfied with his 
professional performance, even though people would only follow him as a result of 
“fear, obedience and submission.”162 
 The consequences of these imagined autocratic professionals, furthermore, were 
“devastating,” since they could not effectively produce or develop the necessary 
conditions for the peasants and workers to change. By citing and drawing on examples 
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of community development throughout the world (especially the Philippines and Puerto 
Rico), several professors schooled the professional middle class in Colombia on the 
dangers of being “authoritarian.”163 
 In 1962, Carmen Sofia Torres, a rural specialist with a master’s degree from a 
U.S. university who worked in a joint program between the STACA and the ICT, gave 
a workshop for Cafeteros and CINVA. In her lecture, Carmen Torres narrated stories of 
an imagined authoritarian professional working in community development. Carlos 
Jiménez, argued the story cited by Carmen Torres, was an “outstanding [and] 
knowledgeable professional.”164 He was assigned to work with a group of people from 
a popular neighborhood. After arriving in this rough area, the story went, he assumed 
he knew what the poor people wanted and, with no “careful criteria,” quickly assigned 
specific tasks to different members of the community. Even worse, this authoritarian 
professional cared neither for people’s reactions, opinions and expertise nor for their 
intelligence, experiences and needs. Moreover, he did not trust the people and thought 
they merely needed his “tutelage.”165 Indeed, during meetings with the community, the 
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imagined professional only evaluated the performance of the assigned tasks and, worse, 
constantly felt obligated to tell the people what to do.166 Neither listening to what 
people had to say nor opening spaces for discussion, the authoritarian professional was 
happy because everyone was busy working for the community.  
  After depicting Carlos Jiménez as an authoritarian professional, Carmen Torres 
carefully explained to those professionals at the workshop how this story was a 
“faithful expression” of several authoritarian attitudes: that is to say, the specific ways 
professionals sometimes act toward the laboring classes. For Torres, the major problem 
was that Carlos Jiménez did not trust the people.167 By believing only in his own 
knowledge, argued Torres, Jiménez thought that he had to be evaluating, assigning 
tasks and giving the poor orders about what to do. Although he believed himself a 
success, Carmen went on to argue, Carlos was an ignorant professional precisely 
because he did not know or trust that the people could develop an awareness of their 
own problems. Because of his ignorance and distrust of the people, their participation in 
democracy was inevitably bound to last “only hours.” As a result, Torres continued, 
this authoritarian professional went to these rough areas and only encountered 
“rejection, resistance and apathy.” Above all, argued Torres, the people themselves 
would hardly “desire [or] want” this authoritarian professional or anybody associated 
with him.168 
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 Then there was the second type. In training workshops, national and 
international consultants detailed how, along with the authoritarian professional, there 
was also the paternalist. Unlike the former, who was easily to detect, the latter could be 
difficult to discern precisely because of his pretensions to be democratic. With the best 
intentions, he would quickly seek to please the people without pondering what were the 
real “felt needs” of peasants and workers.169 He was willing to work with the people, it 
was argued, but he was usually confused precisely because this paternalistic 
professional would like to think for, rather than think as, the peasants. As a 
consequence of this confusion, this professional could get sporadically interested in 
people’s lives as long as he could “always keep the [real] authority in his hands.” And 
the people themselves, the lecturers claimed, would not develop the awareness of their 
own problems because they would expect the professional to make the decisions for 
them. This paternalistic relationship would just create dependent, unaware people who 
would just go for the short-term and immediate material benefits without becoming 
conscious of their own social situation. All in all, he would not be able to “change 
things a bit.” Neither interested in profound transformations nor able to “inculcate 
desires for change and democracy,” the paternalistic professional was bound to be 
quickly forgotten. Indeed, the people could easily forget him precisely because they had 
experienced no change as a result of his presence.170  
                                                 
169 ICTA, fondo: subgerencia general, serie: gabinete del sub-gerente general, sección: departamento de 
personal, carpeta: apuntes de adiestramiento, 1955-1957; 1957-1959. ICTA fondo: subgerencia general, 
serie: gabinete del sub-gerente general, sección: departamento de personal, carpeta: apuntes de 
adiestramiento enviados por la división socio-económica de la Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de 
Colombia 1957-1959. 
 




  In stark contrast to these two types of professionals, consultants and national 
experts offered the third type as the appropriate model. In order to distance themselves 
from paternalistic and autocratic behaviors, professionals needed to be schooled in 
democratic dispositions, aspirations, desires and attitudes to become, above all, the 
“true professional man.” Roberto Vélez, a consultant for CINVA who on several 
occasions gave workshops and job orientations for ICT and the Caja de Vivienda 
Popular, began a training session in April 1959 by designing a sign to be posted at the 
entrance of the room where the training would take place.171 The sign, Vélez argued, 
was intended to generate within the professional a consciousness of the role he needed 
to play in society. Written over a map of Colombia, the sign read: 
We are professionals. We believe in progress and we are not here just to make 
material improvements but to build democracy. Democracy is you!172  
 
 As is eloquently shown in this sign, professionals were continuously subjected 
to lessons on how to conduct themselves democratically when “working with the 
people.” In contrast to autocratic and paternalistic men, these new professionals would 
act by exercising a democratic capacity to know how to work with and alongside the 
people. That is, the democratic professional was competent in helping the people 
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discover and become aware of their own talents, potentials and innate desires, 
according to the appropriate social and cultural norms of the peasants and workers 
themselves. While the authoritarian professional would silence the poor by imposing 
the “high cultural ethos” of his social condition on the people, the democratic man 
would cultivate the “poor’s specific virtues,” so they, the peasants and the workers, 
would realize by themselves how to live in democratic communities. And precisely 
because people themselves would not initially recognize their own potential to become 
aware of their own problems and social situation, the democratic professional would be 
capable of harmonizing “people’s interests,” coordinating their “felt and unfelt needs” 
and awakening their “dormant desires for change.”173 In all, he was capable of 
embodying democratic attitudes, the capacity to talk about—and with—the people 
because he was able to know what the hierarchically marked we needed to feel, have 
and think to live in democracy. As training materials from a state office put it, there 
was “no need for authoritarian elite transmitters of knowledge,” but rather  
a democratic professional who can put his knowledge at the service of those who 
really need it…A professional who truly understands that democracy is the process 
through which the people become aware of their place in society, their roles to play 
[in it], their interests, their felt needs, desires and problems. A democratic 
professional who knows that every democracy begins with the people…a democratic 
professional who uses knowledge, prestige, expertise to comprehend who the people 
really are…a democratic professional who makes the best use of people’s intellect 
within their reach…a democratic professional in whom the people can see a friend. In 
all, a professional who does not impose or force….but rathers guides… negotiates 
and helps people to help themselves in becoming aware of how to live in democracy. 
A democratic professional who knows the people’s needs, consciousness of their 
responsibilities and roles in democracy.174 
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 In 1961, for example, Virginia Gutierrez, a very influential anthropologist who 
worked as a consultant at CINVA, and Gabriel Kaplan, a U.S. consultant at 
FEDECAFE, gave lectures to professional workers from several different state 
agencies. Although speaking in different places, they similarly elaborated on how a true 
professional would be able to create the necessary democratic environment for the 
people to experience development and progress.175 According to them, the democratic 
role to be played by the middle-class professional was to guide the people to become 
aware of their own latent and innate potentials so they, the peasants and workers, 
“could discover democracy [by] themselves.”176 Indeed, the middle-class professional 
needed to foster the conditions under and through which the people were able to 
become aware of their “own interests, needs…[and] social situations” and, in doing so, 
to set out “their own goals.” In stark contrast to the authoritarian and paternalistic 
professional behaviors, the democratic professional would be capable of recognizing 
the latent existence of these innate desires for democracy. As a democratic professional, 
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furthermore, he would also be competent to discern how often the people were 
unconscious of their own potential, capacities and desires to become aware themselves 
and, on the other, “their own social agency [protagonismo social].” And yet, and unlike 
the authoritarian and paternalistic professional, who would merely “blame the people 
themselves,” the democratic professional was able to know all too well that, if the 
people were unaware or did not recognize their democratic potential, it was precisely 
because of how the poor themselves had been shaped by a “peculiar ethos,” specific 
social forces, social constraints and particular cultural conditions.177 Thus, for the 
people to be able to recognize their democratic potential, they needed to change “their 
own ethos.” And in order to change their own ethos,” the people would have to become 
aware and recognize their democratic potential.178  
 In constantly rehearsing this tautology, the democratic professional was 
paradoxically constituted as the crowning figure in a hierarchical/class (re)distribution 
of tasks. He would be able to explicate what the people—“peasants, working class…the 
underprivileged”—could not recognize, or become aware of, by themselves. Indeed, the 
democratic professional would be able to understand the “cultural and social 
conditions” to be overcome by the people so they can become aware of their “own 
desires for change and potential for democracy.”179 Contrary to the authoritarian 
professional, who would be pleased with imposing a “foreign ethos” to which the 
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people themselves could not adapt, the democratic professional would be competent to 
help people help themselves to the full extent of their own “human resources, mental 
capacities, felt-needs and common interests.”180 [getting too repetitious]  
 Furthermore, the professional was democratic enough to descend hierarchically 
from his own “cultural environment” into the distinct culturally and socially determined 
ethos to guide people to recognize their own conditions and limitations. By appreciating 
and understanding, and above all, respecting their own specific values and ways of 
thinking, he would conduct the people in helping themselves—that is, in “liv[ing] 
democratically in their own way.” The professional would be “democratically 
competent” in hierarchically adjusting knowledge, abstractions, explanation, teachings 
and expertise from his “cultural environment” to the “limited” one he was reaching out 
to. In so doing, he was not to desire the people to be like him, but rather to conduct, that 
is act upon, the poor according to their own place in society so they, the poor, could 
become capable of governing themselves.181 Driven only by the necessity to be 
democratic, these professionals would do their job by allowing the peasants and 
workers to know their limited place in society—and more importantly, would teach 
them how to live democratically according to that social position and cultural condition.  
  He, unlike the authoritarian who would not take the “conditions [and] the 
interests of the poor” into consideration, would be capable of knowing exactly the 
extent to which people’s ways of being allow them to learn to live in democracy. And 
when facing “resistance, apathy…indifference and disagreement,” he would know how 
“to negotiate and compromise” according to “people’s social location, behaviors, 
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idioms, motivations, local traditions, beliefs and cultural conditions.” Indeed, by 
cultivating a profound knowledge of the poor, he would be competent to get along quite 
well with them, to the point where he could work quietly, even imperceptibly, among 
the people themselves. And yet he would be a democratic professional precisely 
because, even being among and getting along with the people, he would not be in 
danger of losing his “self autonomy” and the “sense of who he really was.” That is to 
say, a professional who, first, would be capable of moving throughout society to adapt 
his knowledge according to different social settings and, second, transfer himself from 
one setting to another mentally and physically, without loosing his hierarchical 
democratic self. And in so doing, this democratic professional could set limits on the 
types of knowledge the people would be able to learn, adjudicating the variety of 
activities the poor would be able to engage with, and, above all, defining the kind of 
participation “the people [would be] ready” to pursue to live in democracy.182  
 Thus, the historical intelligibility and the very existence of the democratic 
professional working for state rule depended upon a hierarchical constitution of the 
peasants and workers as the “other” in dire need of being understood, taught, guided 
and above all, governed, on how to live in democracy according to their particular 
“social conditions.” During the consolidation of the National Front and its policies to 
create the conditions to secure peace and democracy, state rule was to take place 
through the process of a hierarchical fragmentation, categorization and classification 
between those who were supposed to rule in the service of the state and those who were 
supposed to be ruled by those who were categorized as democratic professionals. 
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Neither too proximate nor too distant, the middle-class professional could achieve his 
democratic role insofar as he could govern and maintain the very hierarchies, 
distinctions, and categorizations that made the poor stay in their own socially specific 
place minding, as several sources argued, “their own business.”183  
 Such democratic professionals, furthermore, had to be carefully guided on how 
to produce new “anti-racist thinking and feelings” as well as “novel attitudes—that is, 
“fresh” ways to act upon who “were the poor and suffer the most.” In several training 
workshops, CINVA classes, lectures and evaluations during the late 1950s and early 
1960s, middle-class professionals repeatedly were told to think of, and feel about, the 
people in a “different way.” Professors, consultants and other “experts” usually began 
discussions by arguing that the political disruption of La Violencia since the late 1940s 
had been a product of “classist thoughts and feelings.” In order to overcome those 
conditions, and reach peace and democracy, these professionals had to understand that 
the peasants were not a “homogenous group.”184 The teaching materials suggest, 
moreover, that the main objective of these lectures was that professionals needed to 
take the active role in creating the conditions for peace, progress and democracy. 
Deploying transnational discourses of the importance of the middle class for democratic 
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rule, these experts encouraged professionals to cultivate in themselves a “new mindset 
and sentiments” toward “the people’s ways of being.”185 
 For too long, the democratic professionals were constantly told, some of their 
colleagues had understood the poor merely as a “homogenous mass of ignorant and 
miserable people deserving their hopeless destiny of violence and poverty.”186 There 
were too many professionals, furthermore, who still maintained a colonial attitude when 
thinking about and acting upon the peasants and the workers: that is to say, an “elitist” 
disposition that provoked an understanding of the people as only composed of 
“biologically inferior human beings.”187 Indeed, the professionals were specifically told 
not to think of the poor as “native, primitive, savage, Indian or inhuman,” because these 
descriptions could only constitute social prejudices.188 These prejudices and attitudes 
would have to be excluded from the actions, thoughts and feelings of a democratic 
professional. Emphatically and repetitively, these trainees were tutored to never regard 
the poor as “fundamentally and biologically inferior beings” but rather as “peasants, 
(campesinos) and working people, (gente trabajadora), the dispossessed 
(desposeidos).” These characterizations, it was explained, would illustrate the real 
social situation of those who “suffered from material and economic deprivation.” 
Furthermore, against “elitist…irrational and anti-democratic” understandings of the 
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poor, the democratic professional would think of and develop an attitude toward the 
poor based on real experiences about who “they really [were.]”189  
 It was, therefore, the democratic task of the middle-class professional to develop 
a complex understanding of the society. Contrary to the “elitist attitude” that constantly 
portrayed the poor as “ignorant” because of their “innate biological characteristics,” the 
democratic professional should know how these depictions were merely “myths,” far 
from reality. He, as a democratic professional, would be able to understand that “the 
social circumstances of the peasants and working people” were the effects of specific 
“cultural immersion and different social forces.” The “democratic attitude” within the 
professional would lead him to believe that the “peasants and working people” were not 
“ignorant” but rather, merely “unaware” of their own social situation.190  
 
 Profesionales queridos. 
 Much of the historical scholarship on developmentalism and technical 
knowledge in recent years has worked from the shared assumption that the mastery of 
reason and rationality were at the center of how modernization and discourses on 
development operated historically.191 As a result, historians and social scientists alike 
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tend to make a sharp distinction—a Cartesian division—between what they consider 
the reasons and the sentiments behind economic reform, population management, 
training agencies and social programs throughout the 1950s and 1960s in the Americas. 
In contrast, I argue that the policies implemented by the National Front were 
profoundly shaped by a concern to educate sentiments, aspirations and attachments 
imagined as required for state rule in a society seeking to overcome La Violencia and 
secure a lasting peace. In so doing, it was argued, a truly democratic middle-class 
professional would emerge to prepare all members of society to experience social 
harmony, political stability and economic progress. 192 Thus, it was not, as we tend to 
assume, that these preoccupations were a smokescreen for the real policies of the 
National Front. Rather, I maintain, these processes of sentimental schooling of middle-
class professionals were crucial for the National Front to legitimize its political 
invitation for a national reconciliation.  
 During the late 1950s, one of the major objectives of this class preparation was 
to shape professional sensibilities toward the poor. The content as well as the form of 
the archives—teaching outlines, discussion, stories and lecture minutes—present the 
discourses on community development as a process for discovering “the felt-needs of 
the poor” so that “social progress and democracy” could be achieved. Those felt needs 
were not to be identified by imposing “foreign ideas” on the popular environment, or by 
producing knowledge about the poor from a distance. Rather, it was necessary to 
structure a hierarchical relation of fondness and intimacy between these democratic 
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professionals and those who needed them the most: “peasants, working people…and 
[those] economically deprived.” In doing so, it was argued, the professional would 
become likeable, desirable and trusted sources of identification and inspiration for the 
people themselves.193 As countless private consultants, state officials and transnational 
experts continuously advised professionals who would soon be working with the poor 
during the 1950s and 1960s, 
Those professionals with no feelings are a matter of the past…[there is] no need 
for the dispassionate professional with no sentiments for the poor…no need for 
professionals who feel ashamed of themselves [when] working with the 
poor…no need for professionals who do not wish to be loved [querido] by the 
poor. [In contrast, what is needed is] professionals committed to the social 
problems of their own countries. Professionals who are conscious of their social 
role…professionals who feel strong attachment [un apego muy fuerte] toward 
those who need them the most…professionals who feel proud of working with 
the poor…a true professional who will do everything possible to inspire 
fondness [cariño], love, in the poor’s feelings toward the professionals…a 
professional who is loved/wanted/desired by the people themselves.194 
 
 It is clear in this eloquent statement how professionals needed to exercise state 
rule by embodying the active masculine role to win the love and admiration of the poor. 
In workplaces, conferences, classes and workshops, experts and consultants pondered 
what kind of attachment the middle-class professional should cultivate when working 
with the people. In 1958, for instance, Rafael Samper, the director of the Social 
Economic Affairs for Cafeteros and consultant for CARE, began his training workshop 
at ICT by considering the “major social obstacle to achieving democracy and peace in 
Colombian society.” Although well equipped for cultivating awareness about poverty, 
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Samper lectured, professionals, with a few rare exceptions, “lack feelings” toward the 
poor. These professionals were an obstacle precisely because they were a “type of man” 
who did not “feel any feelings” for the destiny of development and progress. Interested 
mostly in material rewards, these professionals, Samper was sad to report, were aware 
of  poverty but remained insensitive toward it. Furthermore, such professionals knew 
all too well the conditions, reasons and consequences of poverty. They could even, 
Samper said repeatedly, become experts in writing theoretical treatises about the poor. 
Yet, Samper cautioned, such professional would write those treatises without any 
“feeling… attachment…sensibility [or] sympathy for whom the people really [were]. 
Samper went as far as to conclude that unless “these feelings were awakened” within 
such professionals, their “democratic role” was necessarily bound to fail.195 
 These real feelings, sympathies and sensibilities should be, therefore, at the very 
center of the hierarchical relations between those professionals and those who were 
supposed to be ruled. In a job orientation in 1962, for example, Roberto Vélez, a 
consultant working for the CINVA, narrated a fictional story to illustrate how 
professionals should behave when encountering the poor. The purpose of the exercise 
was twofold. On the one hand, it was necessary to convey an idea of what kind of 
sentiments the professionals should manifest toward the poor, and, on the other, to truly 
sensitize the professionals toward “those who need them the most.” According to 
Vélez, the story depicted the normal social situation of a poor community near the 
capital city. Although it was possible to recognize in the members of the community 
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their latent potential, talent, forces and eagerness for change, “social constraints and 
cultural legacies” had “limite[d]” and stunted the “active participation” of the 
“peasants” in promoting “social progress.” In this fictional but realistic environment of 
poverty, the members of the community were constantly frustrated because they were 
unable to do anything about the “unlivable housing conditions, constant context of 
violence ... irresponsible mothers, drunk fathers, lack of culture … apathy … passivity 
… individualism … and community disorganization.”196 
 Although the teaching outlines written by Roberto Vélez were rather limited and 
there is no record of responses by those professionals attending the job orientation, we 
can grasp some notion of the discussion that took place after presenting this fictional 
story. It seems that the main question addressed to the participants in the job orientation 
was how to understand the situation of the poor. According to Vélez, some 
professionals showed neither empathy nor emotion for the social situation of the poor. 
Furthermore, it seems, some professionals exhibited a “sentiment of strangeness 
[extrañeza]” toward the poor.197 On the one hand, they demonstrated their profound 
ignorance about the real conditions under which the people lived. On the other hand, 
and perhaps more worrying for Vélez, they made evident a deep elitist feeling of 
disdain precisely because of a lack of concern for the social situation of the poor. Hence 
these professionals, said Vélez, were only able to produce a desire to blame “the poor 
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for their own poverty.” Showing neither connection toward, nor empathy for, the 
people, these professionals ended up feeling that poverty was a well-deserved 
condition. And precisely because of that, the poor should be uplifted without “car[ing] ” 
what they had to say. Even worse, concluded Vélez, the people were to be taught with 
neither affection nor respect for what they thought.198  
 Conversely, Vélez presented some sketchy notes on the teaching outlines that 
lauded the reactions and contributions of unnamed professionals. Specifically, Vélez 
noted that some “true professionals” responded positively. That is, they were showing 
what he called “democratic emotions” and “sentimental concerns” for the difficult 
cultural conditions and social situations of the people. Indeed, these professionals, 
noted Vélez, could find gratification, satisfaction and enjoyment in feeling an 
“attachment [apego]” toward the poor. These true middle-class professionals, 
moreover, were willing to get their “hands dirty” and get into these rough places to 
listen to peoples’ voices and to understand and sympathize with their wants and 
needs.199 Equally important, these democratic professionals would seek to feel the 
people’s problems, show affection for their situation, touch who they really were and 
develop a social sensibility for how they lived.200 As Vélez put it by citing—and this is 
the only citation provided in the teaching notes—an unnamed professional who reacted 
to the discussion of the fictional story:  
I am moved by the situation of the poor…it is necessary to understand the 
situation they are going through…I can imagine how they feel…I can imagine 
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myself feeling [their] problems…I can feel what they are experiencing…[only 
then] could I know the complexities of the communities…what they want, how 
they live, how they think…their needs and wants.201 
 
 By truly feeling and experiencing the conditions of the poor, democratic 
middle-class professionals would be able to produce the needed social “catalyst.” 
Indeed, these middle-class professionals would be able to build up a democratic and 
“intimate” rapport with the poor. Only then, it was argued, could the poor—“peasants, 
working people and the economically deprived”—be understood, because that 
understanding of the poor would not be intangible or abstract any longer, but, rather, 
incomparably “enjoyably,” keenly “felt,” and profoundly desired.202  
 Although some scholars would see these discourses at worst as empty rhetoric 
and at best as a smokescreen for the real agenda of the National Front, I would argue 
that these processes of education, habituation and guidance of the proper proportions of 
feelings and desires produced a vertical encompassment of rule.203 This vertical 
structure, furthermore, was pivotal in creating a middle-class state professional who had 
to be constantly recognized as masculine and democratic by actively desiring and 
having feelings for the poor. Indeed, middle-class professionals were to be 
democratically guided in, first, deriving pleasure from identifying themselves with the 
poor, and second, finding gratification and enjoyment working “along with” the 
peasants, working people and the economically dispossessed. Thus, in order to be 
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recognized as a democratic professional—and possess the proper affection and 
desires—it was necessary to govern the people as the “other” to be hierarchically 
respected according to their own position. If the professional were to belong to, rather 
than have an attachment for, the people, the democratic recognition could not take place 
precisely because there would be no vertical hierarchical relationship: there would be 
no peasant to be attached to, nor workers to have feelings for, nor laboring classes to be 
identified with. Indeed, there would not be a subject who could provide fascination, 
satisfaction and pleasure—crucial desires and sentiments imagined as requirements to 
be a middle class democratic professional working for the state. To meet those 
requirements, the professional would have “strong feelings of respect,” for the people 
and “their own social position, culture and situation” and show “sentiments of 
affection, understanding, and trust for [the people’s] agency [protagonismo] in shaping 
society. ”204  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have sought to offer a historical interrogation of the political 
rationalities and methodologies of rule through which a professional middle class became 
intelligible as a foundational democratic force after World War II. This professional middle 
class was not just a transparent, transplanted product of the United States that other parts of 
the world would either import or reject. Rather, I have endeavored to offer a critical 
interrogation—however provisional—to explain how the very constitution of the 
professional middle class became intelligible as a historical formation embedded into a 




(new) form of U.S. imperial rule.205 The consolidation of a democratic middle class, I 
would conclude, was crucial in this new imperial rule precisely because professionals were 
hierarchically constituted as the best governors who would be able to guide, revive, 
activate, vitalize, and organize “every human capacity of society.”206 In the Colombian 
context, the National Front administrations appropriated these transnational discourses by 
selecting and training middle-class professionals as a democratic requirement to overcome 
La Violencia and, more importantly, to establish peace. These middle-class professionals, 
furthermore, would become the representatives of state rule and thus obliged to educate and 
prepare both the elites and the laboring classes on how to live harmoniously and peacefully. 
In order to do so, transnational consultants, university professors (both from Colombia and 
the U.S.), policymakers and experts argued that neither the elites nor the laboring classes 
should practice state rule. Rather, a middle-class professional was imagined as the 
quintessential and necessary figure to exercise democratic state rule. This imperial 
constitution of a transnational professional middle class must, I argue, be understood not as 
a distorted variant of the U.S. middle class ideal or as an incompetent implementation of 
otherwise well-intentioned and benevolent U.S. policy. Rather, I contend, the transnational 
formation of a professional middle class was an intrinsic part of a new U.S. democratic 
imperial project of rule after World War II. This conclusion invites us to rethink the 
meanings, operations, political rationalities and technologies of rule at work in democracy, 
rather than assuming their benign or banal qualities. It is not my goal to evaluate if—or 
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where—the middle class could be more or less democratic but, instead, to critically 
reconsider its crucial role in the consolidation of U.S. imperial rule in the Americas after 
the Second World War.  
 Having explored this transnational formation, I now move to see how these 
historical problems were experienced and appropriated by those professionals designated to 




Chapter 2: “Doing Our Job.” Middle-Class Women, Middle-Class Men and 
the Formation of a Professional Democracy in Bogotá, 1958-1965 
  
The task of this professional generation is particularly important. They have everything in front 
of them to uplift us away from La Violencia to a period of peace, democracy, stability and 
tranquility. They just have to revive and vitalize every member from of the base of society to its 
summit…All we need is a professional with sharp consciousness to instill social sensibility and 
humanness in all members of society…a professional capable of reconstructing a true 
understandings between capital and labor …All we need is a true professional to instill in the 
society as a whole the desire for progress… the desire to live in democracy…a professional 
capable of accomplishing peace…to modernize our society by closing the gap between those 
who have everything and those who have nothing. All we need is a professional who has the 
preparation to deal with those at the base of society social base and those at its summit… then 
peace, political stability and a true democracy will necessarily follow… this is the task of the 
twentieth century… nothing else we need to do[!]207  
 
Peace cannot exist without equality; this is an intellectual value desperately in need of 
reiteration, demonstration and reinforcement. The seduction of the word itself—peace—is that is 
surrounded by, indeed drenched in, the blandishment of approval, uncontroversial eulogizing, 
sentimental endorsement. It takes a good deal more courage work to dissolve words like “war” 
and “peace…”208  
 
 
 In 1958, Luis Escobar, a rural extensionist working for the Colombian 
Ministery of Agriculture with a program sponsored and coordinated by Colombian 
American Cooperative Technical Service in Agriculture (SCATA), wrote extensively 
about his obligations and duties as a professional working for democratic change. 
Escobar was excited to learn it was about time for him to put in practice his (middle) 
class preparation, motivation, knowledge and, above all, commitment to work for 
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“greater democratic good of the Colombian nation.” Although he faced daily 
frustrations, Escobar was committed to the task of assembling a “truly, 
strong…muscular democracy” for Colombia, as his annotated yet disorganized field 
notes produced during the late 1950s and 1960s suggest. To do so, he insisted, all 
members of society needed to cultivate those “human qualities” that one cannot put a 
price on. Escobar, furthermore, wanted to bring about a professional democracy 
premised upon the inculcation of “human empathy and social sensibility” within the 
ignorant oligarchs, so they could potentially harbor feelings toward the social 
experiences and cultural situations of the national laboring classes. Equally 
important, it was crucial to encourage a “mental passion” for democratic change 
within the peasants and the working classes. Escobar understood, it seems, that in 
order to become a true middle-class professional he had to undertake what he 
referred to as the task of the twentieth century— to guide the laboring classes in 
becoming neither those oppressed by others nor the oppressors of anyone else but 
rather, and above all, the owners and “active masters of their own life.”209 Indeed, 
Escobar, like many other professional men and women working for state institutions 
during the late 1950s and 1960s, wanted to go up to the “summit of society [cúspide 
social]” and transform an “evasive oligarchs” into “truly national elites,” as well as 
go down to the “base of society” to awake “the hidden yet potential democratic 
sensibilities of the poor.” In doing his job—and that was all he was doing, he argued, 
as a committed professional—Escobar envisioned a democracy through which he 
could become the “most valuable” human being in society precisely because all of 
                                                 
209 Notas de campo, programas rurales y desarrollo de la comunidad, subgerencia: fomento industrial, 
1958-1961, Minister of Agriculture, Colombian-American Cooperative Technical Service in 
Agriculture Archive (hereafter, STACA). 
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his professional superiority, knowledge, commitment and preparation existed only to 
prepare others to believe in, and indeed to long for, the very possibility of 
experiencing political stability, social harmony, democracy and peace. With all of 
these tools as his disposal, moreover, Escobar wanted to transform a traditional 
society characterized by “social indifference, mutual [class] ignorance, unawareness 
of each other’s social interests… inhumanness [and] prejudice” into a true 
democratic society based upon “social empathy, compassion, human emotion, [class] 
understanding …intelligence, competency [and] humanness.” 210  
 In the previous chapter I attempted to interrogate how a professional middle-
class became historically inserted in an U.S. imperial governmentality after World 
War II. In doing so, I elaborated on the historical conditions through which middle-
class professionals were selected, trained and hierarchically positioned to become the 
counselors of the oligarchs and the sympathizers of the laboring class as part of a 
transnational/imperial project to create a new form of democratic rule. In this chapter 
I move into how these professionals attempted to carry out their political class 
assignment in their endeavor to become middle-class women and middle-class men. 
To be clear, at issue is neither what professionals knew, nor the incongruence or 
authenticity of their class and gender practices according to a putatively external 
ideal of a middle class. Rather, I am interested in interrogating what happened when 
these professionals intimately encountered those whom they thought desperately 
needed class guidance in the ways of democracy, so that an experience of violence 
could be overcome. As Escobar eloquently suggested in the late 1950s, the middle-
class professionals needed to create the necessary social and political conditions to 
                                                 
210 Ibid.  
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experience democracy and peace by working along with those at the bottom and 
those at the top. In so doing, I maintain, these professional women and men 
understood themselves as part of a middle class by redeploying their hierarchical 
positioning as best governors in society to assemble their own project of class and 
gender rule—a project I refer to as professional democracy.  
 Furthermore, by navigating these trained lives, I endeavor to problematize 
how in these never-ending class encounters were arenas in which professional 
women and men fought over, practiced and reconfigured the very political meanings 
of being, and performing as, middle class. My intent is not to repeat the by-now the 
familiar story of the omniscient expert who at a distance could utilize his panoptic, 
knowledgeable gaze to rule others. Quite to the contrary, at the center of this chapter 
are those professional women and men who, while attempting to structure their own 
project of class and gender politics, found themselves facing constant and tragic class 
dilemmas, gender frustrations, and collective deceptions. Those struggles, I argue, 
paradoxically created, as much as questioned, the gender and class hierarchies 
















 “Going Down to the Base of Society; Going Up to the Social Summit”—The 
Foundation of a Professional Democracy.  
 
 
 The overthrow of Rojas Pinilla and the formalization of the bipartisan 
National Front in 1958 sought to establish a “new era” of peaceful, participative and 
pluralist civic culture by, on the one hand, inviting different social sectors to engage 
in a national political reconciliation, and, on the other, promoting the long-awaited 
possibility of achieving social peace. That is to say, it sought to achieve a social and 
political harmony between different class groups. The National Front, furthermore, 
attempted to legitimize the exclusionary practices of the two-party coalition by 
claiming the possibility of invoking the specter of La Violencia of the 1950s. Alberto 
Lleras Camargo sought to make a sharp distinction between his administration and 
the short-lived dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla (with whom La Violencia became 
quickly associated) by expanding programs and social policies that paradoxically had 
been initiated under the dictatorship. To be sure, Lleras Camargo’s administration 
began more systematic state social policies aimed at moving away from a 
confrontational style of politics. As part of a transnational dialogue, the National 
Front actively appropriated, as much as influenced, policies and ideas of the Alliance 
for Progress in order to legitimize the restricted Liberal-Conservative constitution. 
Specifically, as explained in the previous chapter, the National Front reclaimed the 
“real possibility” of achieving peace, democracy and progress by overcoming the 
putative problems, causes, consequences of La Violencia: “class misunderstanding, 
class oppositions, party politics [communism], …party rivalry…party sectarianism, 
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political bossism and corruption.”211 In promulgating a series of systematic policies 
to resolve these problems, I would like to contend, the different administrations of 
the National Front not only considered how to establish (new) containment strategies 
informed by a real and imagined anti-communist sentiments, as we have consistently 
argued, but also, and perhaps more importantly, confronted the possibility of 
discussing how rule should be working in democratic societies. At issue was, as 
President Lleras Camargo put it in 1959, how “to make social relations right.”212  
   Although historians and social scientists have rarely paid close attention to 
these policies as a central part of the constitution of the National Front during the late 
1950s and 1960s, there are some who consistently see these social policies as a 
reflection of a National Front’s wishful thinking that, albeit with good intentions, 
were never translated into reality.213 Furthermore, historians and social scientists 
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Nacional de Colombia, 2007). Romero argues that, in fact, the National Front’s policies attempted to 
address the “social questions,” but she sees those policies only as a way to foster anticommunist fears. 
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seen as a sincere president attempting to implement policies to resolve social problems but oligarch 
resistance in several cases got in the way for the good intentions of the president. Needless to say, I do 
not dispute that these polices were the result as much as the cause of a transnational anticommunist 
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have usually argued that this endeavor to create the social and political conditions to 
overcome violence and establish peace was precisely a distraction from the National 
Front’s real political agenda. In arguing so, historians usually deliver preemptive 
judgments about policymakers’ failure to truly implement the social policies they 
promoted.214 That is to say, such historical understandings are highly conditioned by 
a tendency to evaluate what is conceived as the policy, on the one hand, and what is 
purportedly understood as real practices, on the other. In this critique, the policies 
implemented by the National Front were empty political rhetoric meant to justify 
(i.e., veil) the real lack of interest about the Colombian’s major “social questions.” 
Mauricio Archila, for instance, has argued that one of the major historical features of 
this period was precisely “social disregard,” as if the very possibility of considering 
“social questions” would have made the National Front different—or least justified 
its political exclusionary practices. Specifically, several Colombian historians cite 
how Alberto Lleras Camargo sought to “reconstruct labor-capital relationships in 
more human ways…promote economic development…perfect the democratic 
institutions…forge modern societies with no class divisions as they are today.” 
Furthermore, the argument goes, these policies would be constantly celebrated in 
different presidential administrations precisely as a way to mystify the continuation 
                                                                                                                                                 
political sentiment, nor do I wish to argue against elite resistance. My argument, rather, is that we are 
missing a critical understanding about the very modality of rule that these policies were trying to 
create.  
 
214 Jonathan Hartlyn, for instance, categorized these policies as “frustrated reformism” precisely 
because these policies were ideas that never came to reality. If only they did, there would be a lot to 
celebrate about the National Front. All of these works then based their arguments in a evaluation: It 
would have been a success if they were truly and completely implemented. Of course, we need to see 
what it is done and what is said, but the analysis cannot be limited only to a relational evaluation of 
what is really done forgetting the political meanings of what is said. Jonathan Hartlyn, The Politics of 
Coalition Rule in Colombia. 
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of La Violencia, as well as to dissimulate the real concern for forestalling 
social/political protest and communism. It was simply a “rhetoric with good 
intentions,” because otherwise these policies would have been able to create a 
professional middle class that would have overcome the so-called class division and, 
by extension, put a “real end to La Violencia.”215 This historical reasoning, I would 
maintain, mimics the very discussion happening among policymakers who also 
thought that the middle-class was the quintessential requirement to overcome La 
Violencia, and create the necessary conditions to reach democracy and peace. And 
yet these historians conclude that the formation of the middle class (as argued in 
chapter one), was at the very center of this putatively political distraction, and that 
these professionals—and their political assignment to create a society distanced from 
confrontational style of politics—were, at best, bound to fail or, at worst, politically 
inconsequential. 
   In this chapter I question these historical arguments. These social policies 
were, I believe, more than an ideological embellishment purposely crafted to 
dissimulate the exclusionary practices of the National Front. It was a methodology, a 
strategy, and a modality of rule at the very core of how the National Front wanted to 
remake Colombian society. These initiatives, policies, political discourses and social 
projects, initiated during the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla but markedly consolidated 
during the first administrations the National Front, aimed at overcoming, and 
eventually forgetting, La Violencia and establishing peace, democracy and political 
stability; as such, they played a pivotal role how class rule should work in 
                                                 
215 See Archila Idas y venidas,346-347; Latham Modernization as a Ideology; Stephen G. Rabe, The 
Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).  
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democracies. Most of all, I hope to elucidate the specific historical practices of class 
and gender rule that were put to work when these professionals were attempting to 
create the social and political conditions to, first, overcome La Violencia and, 
second, reach peace and democracy.  
 Constantly constructing this political legitimization in sharp contrast to a 
recent dictatorship and its association with the causes and consequences of La 
Violencia, the National Front continuously promoted what it was considered the 
professionalization of social and political relationship between different classes as 
crucial way to achieve democracy, peace and political stability. The traditional 
political class had lost legitimacy to exercise politics, as they were now seen as the 
embodied evidence of conventional party rivalry, confrontational politics and 
political bossism—the very causes, and certainly, the consequences associated with 
La Violencia and the dictatorship. It is in this discursive matrix that the middle-class 
professional became paramount in the consolidation in the practices of rule during 
the first years of the National Front.  
 Very soon after coming to office in 1958, in a practice that would become 
common during the 1960s, Alberto Lleras Camargo intensified an extensive dialogue 
with national and international “experts” to advance the professionalization of the 
social relations as a part of the political preoccupation of overcoming La Violencia. 
After some years of intense conversations, in 1959 Lleras Camargo composed a long 
letter to be sent out to several state institutions and private organizations describing 
the democratic undertaking of a new generation of professionals, to which they 
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should be committed while performing their job.216 Advised by the very influential 
Colombian sociologist Orlando Fals Borda, who played a pivotal role in the 
consolidation of community development programs while director of the Ministery 
of Agriculture, and the French priest J.L. Lebret, who had recently delivered the 
results of a influential study of Colombian social conditions, Lleras Camargo 
specifically told “the professionals of Colombia” to actively engage in the “task of 
the 20th century”: to turn Colombia “into a democratic society comparable to those 
industrialized nations of the world.” Very much echoing the training and teaching 
discourses these professional were subjected to, Lleras Camargo wanted to let these 
middle-class professionals know that, given their class preparation, they had been 
chosen to “revive, activate [and] vitalize every human capacity of the society.”217 It 
was imperative for middle-class professionals, furthermore, to accumulate a national 
knowledge about those at the base of society, as well as those at its summit. 
Duplicating the language of political negotiation between Laureano Gómez, the 
leader of the Conservative Party and himself as a representative of the Liberal side 
for the consolidation of the National Front in late 1956, Lleras Camargo repeatedly 
wrote in the letter that professionals should be concerned with “forgetting La 
Violencia, reconquering liberty…and the interests of the great majority…thus 
achieving a political stability for the whole nation.”218 Furthermore, the first 
                                                 
216 Public Letter from Alberto Lleras Camargo to the Professionals of Colombia, Despacho Señor 
Presidente, Comité de Relaciones Labores, February, 15, 1959. This letter was also found in Instituto 
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president of the National Front urged Colombia’s professionals to engage in “closing 
the abyss between a small enriched social class and a great mass of an impoverished 
class.” In so doing, their “concerns, preoccupations and passions” as professionals 
should be aimed, above all, towards “harmonizing the social relations between these 
two classes…their mutual understanding, their peaceful coexistence.”219  
 Consequently, the imperatives of the middle-class governing project targeted, 
on the one hand, the laboring classes, who were in need of orientation to become 
aware of their own human potential to live in democracy, and, on the other, and 
equally importantly, the oligarchs, who were in urgent need of guidance to be able to 
connect themselves socially to the problems of the nation. In the process, Lleras 
Camargo assured the Colombian professionals, it would be possible to instill social 
solidarity, social equilibrium, humanness, mutual class understanding and 
negotiation among different interests. Only then, he concluded, could the nation 
become a “sterile ground” on which “dictatorship and violence” could not survive.220 
As Lleras Camargo, presumably following the advice of Fals Borda and Lebret, 
eloquently put it in 1959,  
 …We need a new generation of professionals committed to the nation. Every 
Colombian must serve in efficient cooperation with the great enterprise of the 
reconquering the dignity of life, peace and democracy… If La Violencia has 
                                                 
219 Public Letter from Alberto Lleras Camargo to the Professionals of Colombia, Despacho Señor 
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brought 200,000 dead per year…it is still more important to know what we are 
going to do with the 400,000 new people that remain alive…We know it is 
harder to live in a stage of violence and we have just done that…so it is not 
difficult to see how we can coexist peacefully with one another…your job is 
exceptional…exceptional in the sense that it can make the difference between a 
democratic future and a dictatorial one… [exceptional] because it can make the 
difference between violence and peace. There is a satisfactory solution for all 
the problems we suffer…to give the humanity of the fatherland a new birth by 
saving society from falling deeper into an abyss that is currently opening the gap 
between the few who act against the interests of Colombia and the many who 
are becoming poorer each passing day. What better way than making a peaceful 
dialogue possible between the few and the many?…what better way for you to 
work for your nation?221 
 
 
 Rather than try to measure up the incongruence between an assumed ideal and a 
purported practice or evaluate whether these professionals remained within the 
boundaries of the assignment given to this political ideal, I want to interrogate how 
these discourses became paramount to the (re)definitions of their very subjectivities 
as middle class.222 More importantly, I want to question how through very process of 
constituting themselves as middle class, these professionals mobilized those very 
political class assignments as “best governors” to assemble their own project of class 
and gender rule—a project that sought to materialize what I refer to as professional 
democracy.  
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What Is the Class Assignment for Today? 
 Despite, or perhaps because of, the capillary class and gender selection, as 
well as the intimate training on the analytics of rule, these professionals were 
continuously debating over who was prepared for the political class assignments of 
discovering the “human capital and potential of the nation” and how this should take 
place so that henceforth different class interests could coexist democratically and 
peacefully  
 Excited to leave “the books behind” and encounter those who needed their 
guidance, Fernando Agudelo, for instance, recalled how this period was a very 
important moment for him as much as it was for the nation. He, along with numerous 
professionals, was convinced that they were “merely doing [their] job” by creating 
the necessary social and political conditions for finally bringing democracy. This 
was a political class assignment, however, that was to be achieved only by a “select 
few” who had the preparation and capacity to do so. Furthermore, Agudelo anxiously 
remembered, it was clear that there was nobody else available to do this job. 223 
Because this task was clearly to be achieved by a select few, the very classification 
of who could belong to professional middle class that would advance the 
materialization of a professional democracy was sharply debated. While echoing 
transnational discourses on the importance of a professional middle class for 
democracy to flourish, professional men and women argued that a professional 
middle class had to undergo an “overwhelming democratic change.”224 Specifically 
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using ideas they were trained in, these professionals wanted to be different from 
earlier generation, since such “ancient professionals” had for so long been imbued 
within a set of biased assumptions and rigid social attitudes toward the laboring 
classes. These ancient professionals, as they were called, had only employed a 
patronizing relationship that obligated the peasants and working families to passively 
follow the dictum of the “remote and foreign experts.”225 These ancient professional, 
furthermore, were merely “redeemers of the masses” who only perpetuated a class 
stereotype of the popular classes as “backward, recalcitrant, stagnant, inactive, 
ignorant, with strong tendencies toward violence, untouched by democratic 
principles and, therefore, resistant to change.”226 
 These class stereotypes, argued those who considered themselves new 
democratic professionals, were precisely the result of limited “scientific concern.” 
Until now, these new professionals wrote in their notes during training workshops, 
the laboring classes had been hidden in complicated statistics, dry reports and 
specialized studies. These ancient professionals, furthermore, were assumed to be 
following “feminine behaviors,” since they were merely stuck in their offices, glued 
to their desks, and, above all, unmasculinely afraid to face the “social reality of the 
nation.” As such, it was argued, these ancient professional could only have “classist 
[clasista] stereotypes” because they had neither knowledge nor real experience—that 
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is, male authority—to speak on the conditions and realities of the laboring classes. 
Cowards hiding behind their desks, these unmanly professionals could only see those 
laboring classes as living “in darkness, in economic hopeless, in passivity…in the 
margins of the Colombian nation…with no agency [protagonismo] of their own... 
and bound to be miserable.”227 These professionals were concerned only with social 
status and prestige, and they wanted to reify a “social patronizing” by promoting the 
“passivity of the peasants and workers.” These ancient professionals, moreover, were 
not manly enough to abandon their “professional privileges…the conformity of who 
they were, and their lucrative career,” to merely work “on behalf of the poor.”228 
 Other professionals, however, begged to differ. To some of them, it was 
counterproductive to rely only on the experience with the “real realities of the 
nation.”229 Those who saw themselves as already democratic were feminized 
precisely because they could not embody the very masculine ability—that is, the 
authority—to know and stand apart from the “real realities of the nation” in order to 
master them. Furthermore, these new and democratic professionals could become 
“too attached” to the laboring classes and hence lose one of the main (masculine) 
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qualities of being a middle-class professional: the “objectivity” to educate 
themselves and others in the conditions needed for democracy and peace to flourish.  
 Once again, during the late 1950s ad 1960s several professionals called upon 
their class colleagues to get out of the office—that is to say, to become truly middle-
class professional men—and set out themselves to prepare both the oligarchs and the 
laboring classes to experience democracy. And if during the 1940s and part of the 
1950s the office was the quintessential place associated with the formation of a 
middle class, in contrast with the factory, now this association, among professionals 
at least, became a questionable source of class and gender identification.230 
Furthermore, a professional “passively using a pen behind a desk” could, it was 
constantly argued, neither prepare nor discover the human capital of every member 
of the society precisely because it was necessary to (masculinely) “penetrate into the 
nature of those at the top [as well]… as those at the bottom.”231 It was impossible to 
prepare the “national humanity” to live in democracy from the distance of a “cold 
…passive…unengaged desk professionalism [professionalismo de escritorio].”232 As 
several professionals wrote during the 1950s and 1960s,  
Too many professionals prefer to feel at home in the quietness of the office…to 
hide their cowardice and professional ineptness behind a desk…they are in 
theory committed to the problems of the nation…the reality of the nation only 
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appear in their dry statistics…They are conformist professionals that prefer to be 
agents of conservation [rather than agents of democratic change].233  
 
In stark contrast, these new middle-class professionals would do their job in a manly 
fashion by becoming democratic professionals. Endlessly arguing against an ancient 
professional defined as anti-democratic and feminine, this new class of professional 
would begin its political assignment to materialize a professional democracy by 
removing some “historical stereotypes” about the laboring classes. During the late 
1950s and 1960s, several professionals argued that it was impossible to continue 
looking at the peasants and the laboring classes as either “impermeable or unfit for 
progress, modernity and democracy” or as “shameful, passive…violent, incurable 
people who deserved their social position.” The only way to overcome those class 
stereotypes was to recognize that within the laboring classes there was a “great 
potential and latent human talent” that could actively participate in the process of 
democratic self-improvement.234 In contrast to those ancient professionals, these new 
and democratic ones would go—in “flesh and blood”—to learn along with the 
laboring classes, and so, on the one hand, discover the human capital of the poor, and 
on the other, concretize, rather than alienate, that human capital as a central 
component of a professional democracy.235 Challenging those ancient professional 
for who the peasants and the working classes were “foreign terrain [terreno ajeno],” 
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these middle-class professionals would include the “human capabilities…the social 
agency of the laboring classes” so that the poor, the peasants, and the working 
families could participate in their own process of democratic self-improvement. 
Furthermore, by taking into account the very social agency of the lower classes and 
making it productive for the nation, professionals could indeed orient, rather than 
impose, those groups toward the political enjoyment of the “pleasures of 
democracy.”236  
 Interestingly, professionals also thought that to create a professional 
democracy, it was equally imperative that they could, in their effort to become 
middle-class men and women, “change minds, sentiments [and] transform the human 
values of those who [were] at the summit of the society.”237 Deploying the 
transnational discourses on the importance of the middle class as a democratic force, 
they endeavored to cultivate the human capabilities of the rich in order to develop 
their potential democratic sensibilities. And if the first democratic political 
assignment for professionals was to remove those ancient stereotypes from the 
society, it was likewise essential to persuade those who were “cultured by tradition” 
to detach themselves from “classist thoughts” and reject “classist sentiments.”238 
 Throughout late 1950s and 1960s, this was a crucial political project, I 
maintain, that professionals wanted to materialize in the very process of becoming 
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middle-class women and middle-class men. Although constituted by transnational 
discourses on the importance of the middle class as best governors in democracies, 
this political project was never determined by those discourses and rationalities. 
Always in the making and the subject of endless contestation, furthermore, these 
professional attempted to structure a professional democracy through which both 
oligarchic and laboring classes could use their human potential, class capabilities and 
democratic sensibilities to construct what they thought was most needed in order to 
overcome the causes and consequences of La Violencia: “a peaceful and stable class 
coexistence [convivencia de clases].”239 This political project tried to guide the 
laboring classes to deploy their inherent human resources to become masculine, 
autonomous, independent members of the society that could participate, and 
meaningful experience, democracy. At the same time, this political project to 
democratize the oligarchs so that they could transform their class dispositions toward 
society and the nation.  
 
Making the Oligarchies into Affective Elites 
Education is used to train members of a class and to divide them from other men as surely 
as from their own passions.240 
 
  The discourses, political rationalities and imperial practices that 
hierarchically positioned a professional middle class at the center of the creation of 
stable democracies enabled those professionals to play a very important role in 
educating the oligarchs about the basics of democratic rule. Some historians would 
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quickly object that I am perhaps naively ignoring how power works in society, as it 
is impossible to argue that the middle class could be educating the oligarchy 
precisely because the former had less power that the latter. These objections work 
within a shared framework through which class rule is understood to be fixed and 
omnipotent in society. Understanding power as a commodity to own, rather than to 
practice, this historical reasoning assumed a class rule composed of discrete entities 
occupying their respective fixed location in an economy of power. This historical 
reasoning, I argue, limits us to denouncing this omnipotent class hierarchy without 
historically explaining the conditions through which it emerged. My argument is not 
just to say that the middle class had more power than the oligarchs. Rather, I want to 
interrogate how several class rules could coexist uneasily, in struggle, in the same 
historical contexts. More specifically, I want to question how class hierarchies were 
contested and constituted as political projects in constant formation. I attempt to 
demonstrate how, as a part of an attempt to create a professional democracy, 
professionals sought to construct class hierarchies—usually taking place not through 
a well-planned, precise, and all encompassing endeavor, but rather through a fuzzier, 
disjoint and certainly paradoxical, political campaigns.241  
 As explained in chapter 1, throughout the late 1950s and 1960s, and certainly 
with the inauguration of the Alliance for Progress during the last years of the Lleras 
Camargo administration, professional men and women became involved in both state 
and private programs to support the modernization of several industrial concerns 
throughout the country. The Instituto de Fomento Industrial (IFI), a state financial 
                                                 





corporation founded in the 1940s, intensified its social policies to “industrialize the 
nation.”242 When this political agenda was put in place in the late 1950s, this state 
financial corporation began to promote professional consultation on human relations 
and scientific management as a means to democratize capital and labor relationships. 
By putting specific policies of the National Front into operation, IFI’s professional 
consultations sought to create the necessary conditions for an integrated and peaceful 
coexistence between capitalist and workers so that an expanded industrial production 
and increased productivity could be at the center of the creation of democracy.243 
Working closely with the ICT, the Ministry of Labor, the ESAP, the Cafeteros, and 
the OAS Committee on Labor Matters (as part of the Alliance for Progress), the IFI 
established a large—albeit disjointed—program to reach out “those who rule…those 
who rule in factories and [had] no social contact with national life.”244 In a similar 
vein, during the late 1950s and 1960s, the national office of community development 
attached to the presidency, the Ministry of Agriculture, CINVA, the ICT and 
Cafeteros jointly developed sporadic programs in Bogotá and surrounding areas to 
reach out those who were considered to be at the top of the society—that is to say, 
those who were commonly categorized as “industrialists, presidents of companies, 
national leaders, high level bureaucrats, managers and administrators factory owners, 
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entrepreneurs, businessman and bosses.”245 It is in this process that some engineers, 
educators, psychologists, social workers, home economists, industrial hygienists, 
nurses, doctors and architects began to get in touch with those who they considered 
were “those who rule [Los que mandan].”246  
 And it was, indeed, a crucial project these professionals put forward to 
materialize a professional democracy, and equally important, to perform as middle-
class women and men. In fact, the very possibility of achieving such a difficult yet 
democratically crucial political assignment was sharply debated among those 
professionals. During the first half of the 1960s, some of them argued that, although 
they were very much willing to undertake this class assignment, it was doubtful that 
oligarchs could change themselves, since they were “still living in a nineteenth 
century situation.”247 As a consequence, several professional men and women 
argued, these oligarchs were only willing to perpetuate “political party sectarianism, 
bossism, corruption,” and in doing so, avoid any process of democratization. These 
oligarchs were “just happy living in their own nineteenth century world.”248  
 Some other professionals went even further in their reports and sketchy field 
notes to say that the renewal of oligarchic collective was difficult, if not impossible, 
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because these oligarchs were not only living in a nineteenth-century situation but 
also were turning that situation into the problem of the twentieth century—that is to 
say, they were trying to perpetuate their nineteen-century condition, their backward 
behaviors and their old-fashioned political practices by keeping themselves “behind 
the nation…and away from the democratic society of the twentieth century.”249 
Because of this, professionals contended, these oligarchs could not be made to 
realize “the democratic change of Colombia.” Anti-modern, backward and old-
fashioned, these oligarchs still were haunted by a recent past of violence which 
simultaneously allowed them to be “passive, ignorant, [and] evasive” when the 
(democratic) future of the nation was at stake. Indeed, these oligarchs, rather than 
promoters of progress and democracy, were becoming the “major obstacle in the 
development of the nation,” because they were still “locked away in their elitist ivory 
tower…untouched by the problems of the nation.” As a result, several professionals 
insisted that, up to that point in Colombian history the oligarchs had been “ignorant 
and mentally underdeveloped,” as they neither knew nor have affective dispositions 
toward “those who were outside their ivory tower.” Importantly, these oligarchs had 
remained feminine precisely because, historically, they had been oblivious, 
unmindful, unaware, insensitive and indifferent members of a nation who could only 
act and feel “within the walls of their home,” and so they were forgetting their active 
masculine role in development, progress and democracy. La Violencia, several 
professional argued, would have not happened if the oligarchs had possessed an 
ethos of “feelings and affections.”250 In short, isolated from the nation and detached 
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from society, oligarchs had lived in a backward stage of ignorance concerning the 
real needs of the people, and they lacked proper sentiments toward the nation.  
 Other professionals, however, begged to differ. Although they agreed that the 
oligarchy played a passive, anachronistic and feminine role, the problem was that 
these oligarchs did indeed develop sentiments—but of “disregard, hostility, 
aggressiveness and disdain” for those who live outside their ivory tower. La 
Violencia, had, in fact, happened precisely because the oligarchs had been nurtured 
with feelings of “social hatred feelings… and fed from the milk [amamantados] of 
disgust for other members of the nation” and had been “kissed by senseless class 
prejudices toward the nation they belong[ed].”251 Furthermore, the oligarch’s 
families had been raised with improper sentiments of “revenge, retaliation, repulsion 
and intolerance” that had put the history of the Colombia nation in a permanently 
confrontational situation, where those at the top lived only for “an autocratic passion, 
abhorrent feelings and egoistical emotion toward those below in society.” Those 
inappropriate sentiments cultivated at the core of the “oligarch’s anachronistic ethos 
and spirit” had not allowed them, several professional concluded, to consider the 
possibilities of creating a society in which “all the sons of the nation could live 
politely and peacefully.”252 
 Whether the problem was a lack of sentiments or else an overexpression of 
inappropriate and anachronistic sentiments, professionals thought that these were the 
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problems that needed to be transformed among the oligarchy. It was their imperative 
to modernize and democratize these oligarchs by transforming them into a proper 
elite that could appropriately be integrated into the nation and belong to “a 
democracy of the twentieth century.” To accomplish such difficult democratic 
assignment, the professional middle class needed not to distance themselves from 
those who were categorized as “those who rule” but rather, and perhaps more 
importantly, to “root themselves [enraizarse] in their social situation.”253  
 Certainly, professional accounts of their jobs do not offer direct evidence of 
past behavior but rather are mediated narratives for understanding how these men 
and women experienced their class and gender encounters with those who were in 
dire need of democratic education. By remembering their experiences, they engaged 
in a struggle over the practices of what it meant to belong to the political project of 
middle-class rule and the practices this entailed. Such remembering was classed as 
much as gendered.254 Alicia Perdomo, a social worker, for instance, recalled how in 
1962 she embarked on a visit to high-level directorship of a private corporation 
located in Bogotá.255 Although she was excited about this political class assignment, 
she recalled that she was clearly unsure what she would encounter—a “despot 
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entrepreneur or a nice boss willing to listen to [her].”256 She was nervous, she 
recalled, because she was approaching “a group of people” she had never had the 
opportunity to face. Furthermore, she argued, one could learn from somebody in 
theory, but it was quite different to “experience their everyday life.” As she 
elaborated in our conversation,  
You do not know what would you get…a nice boss…a boor [patán]…it was 
always complicated, you never knew if a despot entrepreneur or nice boss could 
be in your way…a despot entrepreneur not even looking at you or a nice boss 
willing to listening to you….I believe that the truth of the matter was that until 
you met them you could actually say who they were, not before…because we 
heard about them, what they did and what they did not do…but you had to meet 
them to see how they were and even after you met them…I mean, well, 
sometimes at the beginning they could be nice and all of that but then they were 
boorish and did not want to listen to you. So I did not know what I was getting 
myself into…257 
 
 Although this professional uncertainty was clear, she was nevertheless excited about 
undertaking the challenge because, she recalled,  
It was a very important for me…To be a professional…to go and speak with 
these men on equal terms [de tu a tu] and feel of some importance for the future 
of the nation…we had La Violencia right around the corner and we all knew that 
we had to get over that, so we felt we were really important. And that was 
important for me because not too many women could have done this job. It was 
demanding…but the challenge was welcome because we were playing an 
important role for the society in general.258 
 
 In order to demonstrate how important this role was for her, as much as for 
the “society in general,” Perdomo appealed to her rather disorganized archive as a 
way to authorize her version of the past. She drew upon her extensive field notes and 
teaching plans to argue that what she performed was, above all, “invaluable…but 
                                                 








unrecognized job.”259 Furthermore, she complained that now nobody recognized or 
valued what she did. And precisely because of that, she needed to read out loud what 
she found the most important part of her job: “to sensitize [sensibilizar] and raise the 
consciousness [conscientizar] of the Colombian privileged classes ”260 Moreover, 
Perdomo concluded, it was necessary to guide those privileged classes on how to be 
compassionate toward the social problems of the Colombian society.  
 Professionals narrated similar preoccupations in their field notes and teaching 
plans as the very ground through which they could authorize their job as middle-
class women and men. In 1961, Marta Gallegos, another social worker, for instance, 
highlighted how such an important political assignment could be performed. If the 
task was to transform the oligarchs into elites, argued Gallegos, the oligarchs should 
not be left to their own devices, since they had been on their own throughout 
Colombian history. On the contrary, Gallegos was convinced that it was crucial to 
appreciate what they could potentially do for the nation and to recognize that their 
“cultured tradition” gave them a “human element” that could be put the service of 
progress, development and democracy.261 In so doing, it was possible, outlined 
Gallegos, to immerse herself in what the oligarchies desired, their “class universe,” 
their personal life experience, their family settings, their interests, and, hence, 
promote a transformation of their sentiments and thoughts according to their own 
social condition. By immersing herself in their “class ethos,” furthermore, Gallegos 
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thought she could persuade oligarchs to struggle against their own social isolation 
and thus move toward a “stronger desire” to understand, have compassion for, the 
social problems of the nation.262  
 These professional women and men were engaged, I maintain, in a 
sentimental education of the oligarchies usually concretized in lectures, 
presentations, professional consultations, conferences and talks. This was a crucial 
and endless political project of rule that attempted to elevate these assumed 
“backward… anachronistic… feminine oligarchs” into affective, and presumably 
masculine, elites who could, above all, be sentimentally engaged with the problems 
of the nation and the social situation of the laboring classes. In this sentimental 
education, professional men and women attempted to educate these oligarchs in 
specific sensibilities that were fitting for progress, in aspirations that were 
appropriate for democracy and dispositions that were suited for social peace so they. 
In doing so, the oligarchs could become an integrated part of the nation—indeed true 
elites leading the path of the nation into progress and development. As an industrial 
engineer eloquently wrote in his unsigned report (which was probably as a response 
to a positive job evaluation made by the Department of Special Studies at IFI in 
1963),  
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… I am certain what a professional job does. I am delighted to learn that they 
[presumably directors and presidents of a factory in Bogotá] have expressed 
satisfactions with what I have been doing. Together with them [the elites] we 
can make the workplace the best source to improve the relationship between 
workers and patronos…to humanize the relations between those on the factory 
floor and those in the director’s industrial units… From the factory work there 
will be a family nation…my job is a national job [since] it is a way to see how 
those patronos, directors, entrepreneurs could feel more attracted to the lives of 
their workers… to sense their problems…to feel more involved…[Thus] I am 
sure that in a underdeveloped country like ours it is responsibility of the ruling 
classes’[clases dirigentes] to, once and for all, use their class ascendancy to 
dignify democracy rather than ignore it…to build a nation rather that destroy 
it…to light the way to a peaceful future rather than shadow it…to be the 
promoter of progress rather than the obstacle to it. 263 
 
Teaching Elites Dispositions for Social Peace 
 It is through this classed and gendered sentimental education, I would argue, 
that professional men and women sought to put it in practice the very possibility of 
materializing a professional democracy—and in doing so, perform as middle-class 
men and middle-class women. Writing field notes, preparing lectures, and making 
presentations became the very ground—indeed the class methodology—through 
which these professionals attempted to educate those oligarchs who needed to be 
transformed into elites. In 1963, for instance, a group of social workers, nurses, and 
home economists working with the IFI and participating in CINVA and ICT 
professional workshops, began a series of talks and professional consultations on the 
topic of human relations in several factories located in Bogotá. These professional 
women were excited about the opportunity to work for these “democratic programs,” 
because, one office memorandum suggests, the patronos and directors of these 
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factories eagerly requested “professional assistance.”264 Although Alicia Perdomo 
did not work for the aforementioned program, she remembered how it was crucial to 
prepare for such “professional visits.” For her the “first impression was what really 
counted.” It was necessary, she recalled, to dress according to the situation so they, 
as professionals, could cause a positive impact on those who were supposed to be 
listening. She remembered, 
  
 Well, you know, we thought…we were sure and most of the time actually 
things went better when we dressed according to the situation. First impression 
gave us the possibility to build long and sustainable relationship so we needed to 
dress professionally…We were not just going to the factory floor; we were 
going to talk with the patronos and directors of factories and companies, so we 
could not just go there suggesting you did not know your profession. We had to 
be certain of what we were doing, and the way your dressed was a good sign of 
professionalism so they would listen to us.265  
 
 After taking care of how to dress professionally, it seemed, these social 
workers and nurses participated in several professional visits to carry out social 
surveys as a way to grasp a general idea about the interests and desires of these 
“bosses and owners.” Specifically, these professionals wanted to evaluate how 
motivated, socially and sentimentally, these patronos were to actively participate in 
these programs. Deploying discourses on human relations, furthermore, these social 
workers sought to know, above all, how these patronos felt about their “brothers and 
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sisters of the lower classes.”266 When considering how to do this, these professionals 
needed to prepare surveys that were neither too specific which would “hurt some 
[class] feelings” nor too general which would disengage those patronos from 
answering the questions. In doing so, the social workers advised respondents there 
was not a right or wrong answer. Rather, those patronos should answer what they felt 
it was correct and not what professionals wanted to read. In a similar vein, 
professionals also worried about the language and class meanings of these social 
questionnaires. Although there are several and similar versions of these surveys 
available, a quick comparison revels that in earlier draft the word patrono was 
common to refer to those who were target to fill out the questionnaires. In contrast, 
late drafts, and presumably the last version, patrono quickly became replaced by a 
more “attractive language”—hombres de empresa. Always wary not to produce class 
hard feelings, using language that could resonate in those who were supposed to be 
educated, professionals discussed why, instead of patrono, hombres de empresa was 
more arresting and appealing language to use in social surveys. For some, patrono 
could represent “violence, tradition [even] machismo” as it condensed the necessary 
confrontational attitude against those who were “working on the factory floor.”267 By 
comparison, hombres de empresa, it was argued, pointed toward a peaceful man who 
could work along with the workers and, as a truly leader, set the examples for them 
to reach development and progress. After discussing the form and the content of the 
social survey, these professional expected to learn what these patrons—or rather, 
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hombres de empresa—really thought about themselves and the feelings they had 
toward others members of society.268 Through much class contemplation and debate, 
they produced a final version of a social questionnaire in 1963 that used varied forms 
of responses to measure respondents positions between two extreme of belief. It 
reads,  
 Is it a good thing for a hombre de empresa to think that the laboring classes 
are able to improve their conditions by themselves, 
 Yes, I agree 
 Yes, I agree partially 
 No, I do not agree. 
 
Is it a good thing for a hombre de empresa to believe that he needs to know 
about his workers?  
  Yes, I agree 
 Yes, I agree partially 
 No, I do not agree 
 
Which of the following assertion do you think is correct? 
1. Men must be at the service of the machine 
2. The machine must be at the service of human men 
 
Which of the following sentences would describe best the role of an hombre de 
empresa? 
1. An hombre of empresa who is amiguero, confianzudo and likes to favor 
those of his friends and is not really knowledgeable of his occupation. A hombre 
de empresa who likes to impose punishments and work as a prison guard  
2. An hombre de empresa who is serious, hard worker, does not get 
married to anybody in the workplace. An hombre de empresa who teaches by 
example and provides the lines of action for responsible workers to follow. An 
hombre de empresa who teaches by doing.  
 What is the most fundamental preoccupation of a hombre de empresa? 
1. The welfare of his men  
2.  The preservation and maintenance of the mechanical equipment 
 





  What of these assertions describe an hombre de empresa best 
1. An hombre de empresa is someone who thinks that his interests are in 
total oppositions to those of his workers, feels there is no need to get involved 
with his workers and is happy as long as the company is producing some profits. 
2. An hombre de empresa is someone who thinks that his interests are 
compatible and negotiable with those of the workers, who want to know about 
his workers, who trusts them as the most important human capital of his 




 As formulaic, naïve, and obvious as these surveys questions might seem to us 
now, I would argue, professionals took them quite seriously in thinking about who 
they were encountering. Moreover, these social questionnaires were not just hard 
evidence, as we easily tend to assume, of the situation of the hombres de empresa but 
also an active- political force that produce a class effect—that is to say, it provoked 
and authorized the dire need to provide sentimental education to that would transform 
patronos into affective elites.  
 Although it has proven impossible to find any statistical tabulation of this 
survey, those professional women who participated in these series of talks and 
consultations wrote social reports narrating their disappointments, anxieties, 
frustrations and surprise at how these so-called hombres de empresa could care less 
about “their workers [and] the development of the nation.” Indeed, the political 
content, as much as the form of these reports, were driven by these frustrations. These 
social workers and nurses argued that, presumably following the tabulations of the 
social questionnaires, the hombres de empresa overwhelmingly insisted that “workers 
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did not think by themselves.”270 Worse still, it was argued, they thought that “social 
problems…and conflicts” could be easily resolved with “small fixes…and good 
salaries.” If that was not enough, these professional women concluded, these 
patronos—not hombres de empresa—made it clear that “no human sentiment other 
than distrust and disregard existed in employers toward workers.” Furthermore, while 
working with those whom they considered oligarchs and patrones, professional 
women and men frequently felt frustrated and deceived because what they thought 
they knew they found they did not. According to them, it seems, those at the top were 
neither feeling nor doing what professionals expected them to do. Despite or precisely 
because of their intimate class preparation, professional women and men were 
annoyed with themselves for not knowing what to do “with those patronos who [did] 
not want to listen…with those who think they [knew] everything.” Some 
professionals complained about themselves because they felt they were not doing 
their job—“it was not working” they usually faulted themselves in their social reports. 
Along these objections, however, these professional men and women endlessly asked: 
“What sort of education could instill a national sense of belonging…a social 
sentiment for the greater good?”271  
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 These frustrations, uncertainties with their class preparation and 
epistemological anxieties, however, became the very place to experience the 
possibility of being—and performing as—middle-class professionals. At stake, 
moreover, was the struggle about how and whose class rule should precedence in 
materializing democracy and peace. These professionals, I maintain, aspired not only 
to be distinguished from the oligarchs, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to 
educate those oligarchs into (masculine) elites as a way through which those 
professional could remake themselves as a central gendered class in the structuration 
of a professional democracy.272  
 Thus, these professionals engaged in endless strategies to convince and 
persuade those hombres de empresa or patronos how they had to prepare themselves 
to experience peace and democracy. Preparing talks, presentations, reports, and 
outlines became not just the evidence of, but the very technology for, rule, the means 
through which these professional attempted to educate, and indeed to govern, those 
oligarchs’ ethos to become “the elites of a Colombian modern nation.” The way of 
making presentations, for instance, became quite crucial in the pedagogies of class 
persuasion. Most of the talks available followed an organization in which the 
professional men and women began by explaining the “the hard facts…what could 
not be questioned because [it was] scientifically and statistically beyond doubt.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
La violencia, on the other—to, indeed, promote the much needed social peace and democracy. It is 
here, I would argue, where a history of Colombia elites becomes quite crucial. There is a seated 
historical method—one I would like to refer as Machiavellian a historical understanding of the elite. 
We need to move beyond this methodology to understand how these elite remake themselves by 
creating a project of class politics. Throughout this dissertation I merely hint at how some elites were 
trying to remake themselves. Needless to say, a more extensive, theoretical and historical study of the 
elite is largely undue.  
272 Not only a professional democracy. As it will become clear in the next chapter, they also put 




They then moved into descriptions of different social class conditions, and finally 
provided lengthy suggestions about how to approach particular social situations.273 In 
the political content of these presentations, furthermore, these professionals wanted 
to demonstrate what the oligarchs did not “want to see…listen or feel: the social 
situation of the laboring classes.” They needed to explain to these hombres de 
empresa “how the peasants and their family live, how their workers worked, what 
they were able to do during and after working hours.”274 
 In 1963, for instance, Lilia Sanabria and María Eugenia Santana, professional 
nurses for IFI and ICT, were assigned to pursue a series of talks about labor and 
human relationships in a factory located in the south part of the city. The 
professionals found they needed to begin by establishing their authority and 
objectivity as truly and capable professionals. They reported telling the hombres de 
empresa,  
…we are here merely to offer you a professional, objective, impartial advice on 
how to communicate with your workers…how to relate to them… Our 
professional experience, extensive preparation and our knowledge allows us to 
offer you an objective view of the social situation in your factory…the needs of 
your workers and the potential problems you may face. Our professional advice 
will help you assess a complete view of the situation and avoid any easy 
solutions that at the end would not follow any professional 
understanding…leading to deterioration of social peace, financial stability, and 
production on the factory floor and in the family of the nation.275  
 
  After establishing a necessary professional authority in front of the hombres 
de empresa, Santana and Sanabria were confident to explain, their teaching plans and 
                                                 
273 Informes profesionales a industrias del sector automotriz en Bogotá (1961-1963), sección: 
departamento de estudios especiales, fondo: subgerencia técnica, IFIAR; See also CINVARC and 
ICT.  
274 Ibid.  
 
275 Informes de trabajo en industrias del sector automotriz en Bogotá (1961-1963), sección: 
departamento de estudios especiales, fondo: subgerencia técnica, IFIAR. 
 
 146 
report suggest, how the laboring classes were seen in society. As argued previously, 
professional usually thought that such presentations could not be so specific as to 
produce “hard feelings,” and by extension, to disengage these hombres de empresa. 
For this reason, Santana and Sanabria presented a story with a familiar trope: the 
doings of a “traditional patrono” and his teleological class transition into a “modern 
hombre de empresa” who could potentially transform himself into the promoter, 
rather than the limiter of, progress and democracy. Although the story takes place in 
a factory setting, Santana and Sanabria composed an abstract comparison narrating 
class characterizations they imagined these traditional patrones had to change in 
order to play a progressive role in society. In fact, the political content of the story 
was aimed at providing the “conceptions of the world” usually hidden within 
“patrones’ minds and spirits.”276 In doing so, these professional attempted to 
contextualize these experience so these patronos could learn about themselves by 
comparing the story’s class descriptions and their experiences in real life as 
patronos. 277  
 The traditional boss, Santana and Sanabria instructed those presumably 
potential hombres de empresa, was unaware of his important role in society did not 
have any sentimental attachment toward the “social problems of the peasants or 
workers,” since, above all, he did not want to know them intimately. Without 
expressing a truly masculine disposition, this traditional boss, Sanabria and Santana 
                                                 
276 Informes de trabajo en industrias del sector automotriz en Bogotá (1961-1963), sección: 
departamento de estudios especiales, fondo: subgerencia técnica, IFIAR. Similar stories appear in 
reportes de trabajo de campo, visitas requeridas por varias industrias del sector metalúrgico en Bogotá 
y sus alrededores (1961-1963), sección: departamento de estudios especiales, fondo: subgerencia 






wrote in their presentation’s outline, had only “ancient stereotypes” about lower 
classes—“peasants, workers, the poor, the people.” For him, the laboring classes 
were at best “objects of production,” and at worst “beasts of burden [animal de 
carga], dirty, sick, malodorous, unable to take in what [was] new…and unable to 
leave their position as a serf of a demesne.”278 Living in a anachronistic past, this 
traditional oligarchic boss was “less than a man” precisely because, on the one hand, 
he did not want to leave “his social sphere…his privileged social bubble” and, on the 
other, “face the peasants and workers for what they really [were].” In all, this lesser 
man, with his unsentimental conceptions of the social world and lack of manly 
actions, cultivated a paternalistic relationship where neither the privileged nor the 
laboring classes could take any active role in the development of the nation because 
it only expanded the “chasm between the oligarchs and the laboring classes.”279  
 In stark contrast, Santana and Sanabria lectured, the hombre de empresa was, 
above all, an “active man” willing to leave his privileged status for a moment in 
order to face peasants and workers for what they were capable of doing for the 
development of the nation. Fighting his feminine tendencies—that is, his embedded 
desire to isolate himself from the realities of the society—the hombre de empresa 
was willing to develop a “social spirit” and thus a position of sympathy for the role 
of the laboring classes in the nation’s growth. In so doing, said the story taught by 
Santana and Sanabria, this hombre de empresa was eager to recognize how an 
“intimate relationship between those who work at the factory…cultivate the land and 
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those who rule [dirigen]” was the condition for reaching a mutual goal: a peaceful 
democratic society where each social group had different responsibilities and roles. 
A society where, therefore, some had to “rule, while others cooperate.”280 
 In similar visits, other professionals also composed stories as a methodology 
to inculcate certain class dispositions toward the laboring classes. This newly self-
transformed hombre de empresa, several professionals wrote in their teaching 
accounts, developed a democratic disposition by being willing to understand that 
neither peasants nor workers were the “serfs of a glebe…miserable and ignorant.” 
Rather, this hombre the empresa had a masculine disposition toward the active role 
of the laboring classes in reaching progress. Indeed, for this hombre de empresa, the 
laboring class were, above all, part of “the human capital of the nation.” The task of 
the potential elites was to discover and multiply that human capital so they, as part of 
the privileged classes, could place themselves in an “advanced place among the 
whole group of developed nations.”281 Contrary to the unmanly traditional patron, for 
whom the workers and the peasants were just “ignorant and miserable,” the virile 
hombre de empresa knew—and felt—that, if human capital was to be multiplied, it 
was necessary to conceptualize and face “the members of the laboring classes as a 
total men” desiring to be part of progress and development.282 In doing so, these 
professionals attempted to educate the patronos to develop a class disposition that 
could promote investment in, rather than the waste of, the human capital of the 
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peasants and workers as a means to achieve greater productivity and, by extension, 
social peace, political stability and democracy.  
 
Changing the Hearts of Men and Educating the Male Sensitivity for Service  
 And if the disposition to recognize the human capital of the laboring classes 
was critical to turning imagined feminine oligarchs into future virile elites, it was 
equally imperative to take advantage of the “oligarchy’s latent human capital.” 
Because they occupied a “superior rank in the nation,” several professional lectured, 
the oligarchs somehow owned an innate masculine authority that could be profitably 
utilized and celebrated to change their “oligarch ethos.”283 In order to encourage the 
elites to play a critical role in progress, the professionals were to make use of their 
“superior authority as oligarchs …their human values as leaders” at a means to instill 
what was most needed in the consolidation of a democracy: an active sentiment, 
indeed a sensitivity, to serve the larger interests of the nation and larger good of the 
society. The professionals saw themselves as becoming middle class by educating 
these partially effeminized male oligarchs—passive, insensitive, unconcerned, 
ignorant and mentally underdeveloped yet with a potential and male authority to be 
used—in totally masculine elite men who could serve the nation through social self-
improvement. In so doing, the oligarchs themselves, with the guidance of the 
professionals, could turn their “feminine [and] traditional sentiments of hatred, and 
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passion of societal indifference and disregard” into masculine and active sensibility 
for national service.284 
 In order to achieve such a difficult task, during the first half of the 1960s, 
professionals began using a teaching methodology that soon would become common 
in these class encounters. Having in mind that it was necessary to speak to these 
patronos according to their “class ascendancy,” professionals used popular sayings 
as quotation to provoke discussions among those who were supposed to be educated 
as true hombres de empresa. Through these discussions, furthermore, professionals 
expected these patronos bring up the truth about themselves, and in doing so, 
discovered their class ethos so they could change themselves into masculinised elites 
at the service of the nation. 285In 1964, for instance, Carlota Montoya, a social 
worker trained in the National School of Social Work during the late 1950s and hired 
by IFI in 1962, found herself compelled to use a popular saying as an invitation for 
those patrones “to understand their own reality.”286 Moreover, by discussing these 
quotations, she expected to have “some kind of impact on those heartless oligarchs.” 
She wanted to begin her presentation on February, 12, 1964, by discussing a very 
suggestive quotation: “Ojos que no ven corazón que no siente”—a saying that is 
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figuratively used to mean “out of sight, out of mind,” but that more literally means 
“the heart does not feel what the eyes cannot see.”287  
 Although the detailed discussion of this quotation has proven impossible to 
find, her reports suggest that Carlota Montoya used this quotation, and the much-
desired discussion about it, as a hopeful pedagogical technique to instill some social 
sensibility in the “rule of the upper classes.” Furthermore, following the assigned 
meaning of the quotation, Carlota envisioned that if these patrones or oligarchs were 
able to see the problems of the laboring classes, they could then develop some social 
sensibility to those very same social problems. And similarly, if these oligarchs were 
able to feel, they were able to see the problems of the laboring classes. As a result of 
these cyclical motions, Montoya further elaborated, the oligarchs would cultivate a 
sentiment to serve precisely because they would tend to be actively involved in the 
resolving “the gravest problems of the nation—social division among classes, social 
indifference, social disregard, mutual class misunderstanding and distrust” that only 
had produced “deadly confrontations.”288 Once those sensibilities—defined as the 
capacity to understand and feel the problems of the laboring classes—were “under 
the command of those who rule,” these oligarchs could become the true elites of the 
nation who could lead the way, in a manly fashion, to both forget the “violent errors 
of the past and achieve social peace.”  
 Because a lot of political hope was put into those methodologies of rule, 
several professionals complained in their reports about the impossibility of achieving 
their class assignments. “Those directors, presidents of the company, and patrones or 






hombres de empresa,” one wrote, “were willing neither to feel nor embrace their 
sentiment of national service.”289 Again, these professional women were annoyed at 
themselves over their frustrated attempts to educate these patronos to play a national 
role. Indeed, while encountering and attempting to educate those patronos, class 
questions haunted this group of professional women:  
What sort of education is necessary to instill a feeling of national service…a 
sense of…national belonging…a feeling that they are also part of the nation…an 
education that can make them feel integrated into the nation?...Why do they 
work against their nation, country, their society to which they belong?290  
 
 The oligarchs were neither developing a social sensibility toward the laboring 
classes nor recognizing a sentiment of national service, because in the midst of their 
“comfortable lives” they could not, above all, feel “what every other member of the 
society [felt].” Although they did receive some sentimental education at the hands of 
professionals, these oligarchs remained “locked in their privileged bubble”—that is 
to say, these oligarchs continued to be too feminine, since they only traveled from 
the “comfortable house to the solitary office desk.”291  
 These professionals’ frustrations and class anxieties, however, did not 
prevent such women to continue attempting to educate the oligarchs in the 
democratic role they should play in the nation. In fact, several professionals agreed 
that these problems were, above all, “the challenge of exercising the democratic 
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professions.” Although they always felt their class preparation was not enough and in 
need of improvement, they were also convinced that these democratic professions 
were becoming more important than ever, for they, given their class preparation, 
were the select few who could accomplish such difficult tasks.  
 Although they used similar teaching methodologies, professional women 
argued more forcefully that, above all, talks, lectures, consultations and professional 
visits should be dedicated to educate “the heart of those who rule.” Furthermore, “a 
change of heart” was imperative in those “unfeeling and uninterested men.”292 These 
professional women hoped these stories, comparisons and examples could speak 
directly to the experiences of these leading classes and bring about a “change of their 
heart.”293 This change, they insisted, demanded both compassion and social 
sensibility so that distrust, disregard and indifference would no longer cause a return 
to a epoch of violence. Helena Escobar, for instance, argued that the quotations and 
popular saying used as teaching tools were too indirect and proposed, instead, to use 
open questions along with stories that could make the patronos feel their role in the 
development of the nation. Although it is unclear if these questions and stories were 
ever presented in any factory, the proposed strategies were not unique. Escobar, a 
nurse and social worker trained in the School for Social Work and working for the 
IFI and who took several professional workshops sponsored by CAFETEROS and 
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ICT, attempted to ask patronos directly what they were capable of doing—that is to 
say, “how much they would care to serve the nation.”294  
 Having in mind this concern, Escobar presumably planned to ask a very 
telling question: “what can you do in the ocean of poverty?”295 And this was 
precisely the inquiry she developed through the organization and use of tropes in the 
stories she prepared to present in front of patrones. In these, she narrated the 
disposition and sensibility of two hombres de empresa when learning about the 
“unbearable situation of underdevelopment.” The brief story depicted how two 
hombres de empresa discovered not only certain “social problems in their own 
nation” but also the “chasm of class” between a “cultured group on one side and the 
rustic classes on the other.” Indeed, said the story presumably prepared by Escobar, 
these oligarchs realized how they were living “isolated within a nation.”296 Although 
up to this point in the story, both hombres de empresa showed an “excitement to 
learn something new,” the dispositions and sensibilities toward the class discoveries 
were rather different. One failed to assume either responsibility for nor an active 
sensibility toward changing this situation of underdevelopment. Quite the contrary, 
wrote Escobar, he blamed the laboring classes for their own “deserved situation,” 
since they were “slaves of their own condition.” With no passion to serve society, 
much less a concern with the future of the nation, and in an act of “cowardly 
machismo,” the hombre de empresa was content to continue working for himself. 
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This cowardly machismo, the story concluded, became the major obstacle for the 
integration of the society, since it expanded the gap between those at the top and 
those at the bottom. In the end, he was destined to live in isolation, concerned only 
about his material interests and ignoring the lives and welfare of the members in 
society. 
 In stark contrast, the other hombre de empresa was “touched” by the 
situation. At the outset, Escobar argued in her teaching story, this man proclaimed a 
“exemplary virile” sensibility: he was sure that “after feeling…[and ] knowing the 
situation…the laboring classes could not be indifferent to [him].”297 And precisely 
because of this exemplary virile disposition, this hombre de empresa was ready to be, 
first, integrated into the society and, second, a man of service. Furthermore, this 
virile hombre de empresa was quite aware that by developing a sentiment of service 
he could position himself as a true man in society and play the role he should have 
played all along: “the superior elites of the nation dignifying the path to 
progress…illuminating the road to peace…and democracy.”298 In contrast to 
machista who only expected servility, this hombre de emperesa wanted to show 
some consideration and respect for those he was willing to serve. He even was 
willing to understand the “subaltern position of his inferiors” and treat them 
accordingly. Contrary to the machista hombre de empresa who was afraid to face his 
leadership position, showing a disposition of disregard, this hombre de empresa, 
concluded Escobar, was a virile leader that recognized that “superior men” were 







known by the sensibility they displayed toward their inferiors—indeed, “superior 
men [were] easily known by the way they treat their inferiors.”299  
 
Cultivating Aspirations and Desires for Democracy 
 Besides the education of the sensibility suited for progress and development, 
as well as suitable dispositions and attachments toward the laboring classes, 
professionals also attempted to educate the oligarchs in the appropriate aspirations 
and desires for democracy. During the late 1950s and 1960s, this class assignment 
became crucial in the endeavor of creating a professional democracy. By arguing that 
democratic education should take place according to the appropriate culture norms of 
each class, professionals argued that they needed to transform what they considered 
oligarchs’ “equivocal aspirations and doubtful desires” toward democracy.300 That is 
to say, several professional women and men argued that the oligarchs had 
historically been nurtured with “materialistic desires and egoistical competitiveness.” 
Furthermore, these professionals maintained that “the oligarchic motto of life has 
always been to own more material objects only for personal satisfaction.”301  
 Thus, the class assignment, I would argue, consisted of emancipating these 
oligarchs away from their sentimental attachment to material artifacts. By using, 
rather than ignoring, their masculine aspirations “to be important…to be superior… 
[and] to be competitive,” these professionals were attempting to educate these 
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oligarchs to become “socially driven men.” In 1963, for instance, Antonio Villegas, 
an architect working for IFI, prepared a conference to be given in front of the board 
of directors of a recently founded steel factory. The factory was largely sponsored by 
IFI, and there were several professional teams involved in the development of new 
programs of management and rational organization. As a member of these teams, 
Villegas was assigned to travel to Boyaca to give a series of conferences about 
“social solutions for progress and democracy.” Presumably, the employers requested 
IFI to provide several conferences—in fact, Villegas’ talk made references to earlier 
lectures given by other professionals. Villegas decided to discuss how Acerias Paz 
del Río, as a recently founded factory, should be an example of “class friendship and 
harmony.”302 More specifically, he elaborated on what he referred to as employers’ 
equivocal (class) aspirations. Villegas, like many professionals, was concerned about 
the possibility of cultivating democratic aspirations in oligarchs’ ethos in order to 
prepare them to live in social harmony and political stability. As he noted in a letter 
to the Department of Special Studies at IFI some weeks prior he went to give the 
conference, 
I will talk about the conduct and attitudes of a considerable part of our ruling 
classes …about the cancerous influence of an egotistical and autocratic attitude 
of these classes toward peasants and workers. Perhaps it will not be too much to 
ask these ruling classes to abandon these attitudes of ignorance toward the social 
forces…perhaps it will not be too much to ask these ruling classes to think over 
their attitudes and conduct. Perhaps it will not be too much to ask these ruling 
classes to step back and reflect upon their interest and actions so that, in leading 
the society, they can create a country where our sons can live peacefully.303 
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 Villegas was deploying transnational discourses and National Front 
ideologies that sought to hierarchically position the middle-class professionals as 
advising the ruling classes on the basics of democracy. Thus, he went to the steel 
factory to talk about hope and peace precisely because, he cautioned at the outset, it 
would be socially masochistic to go into detail about La Violencia only to find no 
light for the “democratic path [that was] ahead of us.”304 And precisely because he 
did not want to rely on a past of violence, Villegas’s main reference was to La 
Violencia as a tradition that still haunted the experiences of those ruling classes he 
was attempting to educate. Indeed, the ruling classes had to overcome this violent 
tradition in order to move into an anti-confrontational stage—a new society, he said, 
where “every member of the society can live harmoniously.”305  
 “Who wants to return to la Violencia?” he asked the employers of steel 
factory in Paz del Rio. This violence, Villegas elaborated, had occurred due to, above 
all, the lack of a “social friendship.”306 According to Villegas, furthermore, this 
social friendship did not exist because those at the top of the society aspired to show 
their superiority by displaying “their ostentatiously material richness” in the face of 
the misery and poverty of those at the bottom of the society. Consequently, argued 
Villegas, those at the bottom of the society appeared, at best, as “factors of 
production” and, at worst, as “source of material profit.” In stark contrast to the 
period of La Violencia, Villegas envisioned a class friendship through which the 
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hierarchical superiority of some men was not to be measured by “what one [had]” 
but, above all, by “what one did as a man.”  
  As a very important part of the middle-class political project, Villegas 
proposed that “those cultured by tradition” should understand and feel a “modern 
and progressive moment [had come] to the country.” The leading class should, he 
said in his letter to IFI, change their attitudes and create new social and democratic 
aspirations. If, Villegas lectured, in the past the ruling classes were driven by 
“sentimental aspiration to material objects and possessions…and egotistical profit,” 
it now could be possible to imagine a class friendship through which the potential 
democratic elites, as true men, could be distinguished by what they were capable of 
doing for the nation—that is, an “authentic aspiration for peace and democracy.”307 
And in order to do so, Villegas argued the oligarchs had to get away from the 
“oppression of the economy,” which had only mutilated “their pleasure in feeling 
what humans were capable of.”308 Villegas, then, proposed that these ruling classes 
should feel their role in the nation by understating that true men were not those who 
could be oppressed by the economy but rather those who were able to master the 
economy at the service of men. The assignment was to masculinised the oligarchies 
into feeling elites by liberating them away from their sentimental attachments to 
material profits, in which peasants and workers appeared “as machines ready to be 
used.” In contrast, Villegas lectured, the ruling classes had to make major invest in 
their sentiments in order to understand that workers and peasants were human 







beings. Furthermore, the leading classes needed to develop their democratic 
aspirations to respect the laboring classes, their capabilities, and their activities—
their human capital—as a central part the development of a productive economy. 
This would create, Villegas concluded, a harmonious coexistence because every 
member of society could participate in the progress of the nation according to their 
own hierarchically defined capabilities and capacities. La Violencia would have not 
happened, Villegas declared, if the ruling classes had assumed, and hopefully would 
assume, their role according to their superiority and class ascendancy. It would not 
happed again if they were now able to do so, and to  
lead the nation into democracy…lead the nation into peace…lead the nation into 
progress…[and] to place the nation among those advanced in the world. 
Undoubtedly, the course of a new life for a new Colombia will depend of the 
ruling classes. If they do not take charge…if they do not feel differently about 
their role in society…if they do not change their aspirations for democratic and 
attitudes for the nation they live in, we will have no other future than that of 
national destruction.309 
 
 During the late 1950s and 1960s, these professionals—as conscripts of a class 
trained to be the best governors in democracy—continuously made such important 
political calls as part of their project to educate the putatively feminine oligarchs to 
be true affective and masculine elites. These professional men and women could 
truly become middle class by rescuing these patrones and oligarchs away from their 
“traditional, elitist, violent and macho past” into a manly present composed of elites 
who could sentimentally engage with the social problems of the nation. In so doing, 
these professional expected, these oligarchs could recognize their “deserved 
important role” as democratic leaders of the national enterprise in achieving 
“progress and development.” In making these oligarchs true “authoritative men of 




feeling,” furthermore, these professionals thought they were doing their job—that of 
structuring a professional democracy through which “every human being in 
society…their interests…desires and aspirations” could peacefully coexist in the 
development of the Colombian nation. Rather than being detached from society and 
isolated from the nation, these new, truly affective men with appropriate 
dispositions, social sensibilities and democratic aspirations could potentially create 
hierarchical social bonds with the laboring classes. In an hierarchically integrated 
society where “everyone [knew] his place,” the elite, sentimentally engaged, would 
lead the society by a male superiority, valuing not the “material objects they 
possessed” but using their class ascendance to enlighten, rather than obscure, the 
path to progress. They might take advantage of their superior competence to dignify, 
rather than ignore, “all the members of the society according to their condition,” and 
they might exercise their potential integrity to construct, rather than destroy, a 
peaceful society.310 
 And yet, as I have argued previously, this project of class and gender rule 
was eternally in the making, as professional women and men often complained in 
their reports and field notes, letters and memorandums about the inappropriate “class 
arrogance” of the oligarchs. As much as the professionals tried to get oligarchs to use 
their class ascendancy to lead the nation, they found that oligarchs reveled in an 
exaggerated sentiment of their “class importance,” disdaining other members of the 
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society. 311These reports’ tropes and organization reflected class and gender 
frustrations, as professional women and men repeatedly complained they could not 
do their job. Many professionals protested that patronos and oligarchs, as they call 
them in their complaints, wanted neither to learn about the problems of the 
Colombian society nor to care about their potential democratic role in society. Rather 
than being “sweaty capitalist men” these oligarchs were destined to be feminized 
“traditional laggard[s] [holgazán]” who were becoming “the greatest obstacle to 
democracy, development and progress.”312 Detached from the society to which they 
belonged, these traditional laggards were perpetuating their social passivity and lack 
of social feelings by denying the possibility of participating in a “good-natured 
capitalism [capitalismo bonachón]” through which they could perform, as men, “the 
leadership of the nation.” In contrast, these “lazy oligarchs” were suffering of a 
“classist cholera”—a fatal social disease that did not allow these oligarchs to develop 
any disposition of sensibility or empathy whatsoever to what other members of the 
society could “feel, think need or do.”313 Furthermore, with neither compassion nor 
sensitivity or understanding, these feminized traditional laggards were not willing to 
even give a “bead of sweat for the development of the whole nation.”314  
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 Some other professionals went even further with their complaints, usually 
unloaded in frustrated reports and memorandums to immediate superiors. In 1962, 
for instance, Ana Agudelo, a social worker working for the IFI trained in the School 
of Social Work and in several workshop sponsored by CAFETEROS during the late 
1950s, wrote a rather lengthy report. She organized it by first explaining in some 
detail all the strategies used to persuade the hombres de empresa to become aware of 
their role. She reported, however, that given this situation, the only possible 
conclusion was that these oligarchs were not willing to exercise “social agency 
[protagonismo social].”315 This lack of agency, Agudelo complained, was so 
common precisely because these “hard to understand men” possessed neither 
sentiments nor appropriate social dispositions but rather, and perhaps only, “a 
passion toward material objects.”316 Although the political assignment was to 
dematerialize the oligarchs—that is to abstract them from the attachment to material 
possession as the ultimate class aspiration—Agudelo complained that this was not 
possible because their human sentiments and desires were driven religiously by 
“material profit and self-serving ambitions.”317 Furthermore, Agudelo wrote, the 
oligarchs were a traditional force concerned only with “idolatry,” who had 
surrendered their sentiments and agency at the expense of an “adulation, 
adoration…reverence…veneration, and glorification of self-centered material profit 
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and objects.” In so doing, the oligarchs were inappropriately attributing a false value 
to object and things. Indeed, oligarchs continued to privilege “object and material 
profits” over the capacities, abilities and development of that which was priceless—
human beings. Traditional, backward, feminine, and somehow not yet human—these 
oligarchs could not develop sensibilities that were fitting for progress, aspirations 
appropriate for democracy and suitable dispositions toward social peace.318  
 Consequently, the structuring of a professional democracy as a project of 
class and gender rule was paradoxically constructed through hierarchical classed and 
gender antagonistic bonds in which professionals, in the very process of becoming 
middle class, constantly found themselves in a tragic dilemma. On the one hand, the 
formation of middle-class identifications created a hierarchical classed and gendered 
antagonists (the feminized oligarchies, the patron, the privileged classes, the lazy 
capitalist) as the constitutive yet excluded other in eternal need of sentimental 
education on how to become true men (i.e., semimetal elites, authoritative men of 
feelings, hombres de empresa and not patrones) who could play a democratic role in 
the nation. This hierarchical excluded other, as a partial historical production of 
professionals themselves, was the very class constitutive possibility to materialize a 
professional democracy—and in doing so to become a middle-class. On the other 
hand, however, the very possibility that this other would still maintain a role of 
feminized oligarchs or traditional patrones challenged the same possibility of 
creating a professional democracy precisely because if they remained in this state, as 
several professional repeatedly wrote in reports, then middle-class professionals 
“were not doing their job.” Frustrated and dissatisfied, these middle-class 




professionals experienced a constant sense of collective deception: they could not 
become the professional middle-class—much less materialized a professional 
democracy—precisely because they were not able to succeed in sentimentally 
educating those oligarchs into democratic men. And yet, this impossibility 
authorized and perpetuated the middle-class professionals as forever superior to 
those who were still too feminized men to lead the nation and, therefore, in need of 
eternal sentimental education to experience democracy.  
  And it is with this class and gender dilemma that professional men and 
women recurrently wrestled in their encounters with those oligarchs. In fact, this 
dilemma produced further hierarchical fragmentation among those who were 
attempting to perform as middle-class men and middle class women. During the 
early 1960s, the IFI’s department of Program Evaluation, together with some 
consultation from CINVA, intensified performance evaluations for professionals 
whose job was to work with “directors, presidents, industrialists, entrepreneur, and 
businessmen.”319 The program evaluation office sent several letters to different 
factories and companies inviting directors to evaluate professionals’ performance.320 
There are very few forms and tabulated evaluations available, but it seems that the 
IFI requested directors to evaluate several aspects of professionals’ jobs—from 
personal presentation to the preparation of talks and lectures. Some of these 
evaluations complained that professionals “lack[ed] professionalism, competence 
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and skills,” and presented “problems of character.” In the one short letter I have been 
able to find, for instance, Jesús Antonio Toro and Gabriel Millamarín, the presidents 
of a metal manufacturing factory in Bogotá, protested that these “women went to 
[their] company to tell [them] just what to do.”321 With arrogance, they complained, 
these professional women showed “a spirit of intrigue,” and, worse still, they 
manifested a “violent attitude,” “neglectful manner,” and “desire to annoy,” seeking 
to disrupt these directors’ “usual way of doing business.” In all, these directors 
concluded, these professional women were “very uncomfortable to deal with.”322  
 As argued previously, professionals’ stories of their jobs do not offer direct 
evidence of past behavior but rather are a mediated source for understanding how 
professional women experienced the problems, frustration and deception in trying to 
structure a professional democracy. Furthermore, these stories allow a fuller 
reconstruction of the subjective professional work lives of women and their struggle 
to understand themselves as middle-class. As I read some of the complaints 
concerning Alicia Perdomo in IFI’s archive, she responded that certainly these 
evaluations did create anxieties among professional women. In fact, she told me, the 
problem with these “arrogant oligarchs” was that they could not “deal with [them] as 
professional women.”323 Furthermore, Perdomo said, these oligarchs were unable to 
be “more like a real man” and to understand that “they were addressing real and 
professional women.” Instead, Perdomo complained to me, these oligarchs thought 
they were “dealing with their own wives” who showed them “deference and 
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servility.” Servility, Perdomo continued, that “among rich women” manifested itself 
as an excessive “willingness to do whatever their husbands ask them to do.”  
 In order to demonstrate that she was not “lying,” Perdomo once again used 
her archive to reconstruct her historical identification as a middle-class professional 
woman and defend her job as a democratic force in achieving development, peace 
and democracy. In all, Perdomo said, she needed “to move the past so [her] 
professional reputation [was] not damaged.”324 She invited me discuss admittedly 
sketchy papers, unsent draft reports and some letters produced during the late 1950s 
and 1960s. For her, in this material I would be able to find the truth of the matter, 
since these papers would speak for themselves. Even so, however, Perdomo felt 
compelled to advise me that privileged women, not men, were the problem in 
democracy.  
 During the late 1950s and 1960s, Perdomo devoted most, if not all, of her 
writing to discuss the role of these privileged women. In one of her unpublished 
papers, written by 1962, she criticized the role of those she then categorized as 
“frivolous women”—women with neither any “serious purposes in life… [nor]… 
female value in society.”325 Moreover, Perdomo argued that among oligarchs there 
was a tendency to assume that “all women [were] the same.” She pondered how 
sometime or another they, as professional women, had to ask themselves about 
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“those ladies in the upper spheres of the society” who were unconcerned with their 
life or the life of others. It was difficult not to notice these problems, wrote Perdomo, 
as these frivolous, careless, and irresponsible women were generally “unsympathetic 
to and alienated from the problems of the nation.” And when trying to do otherwise, 
“they frivolously assumed that everything [could] get fixed with money.”326 Evident 
in the “social pages of any newspaper,” Perdomo elaborated in her unpublished 
paper, these women were framed in a selfishness that did not allow them to transcend 
beyond their elegant salons or social clubs. Ever worse, it was impossible not to 
wonder with deep melancholy why these women would go to Europe and the United 
States, if on their return they wanted to stay as “frivolous, or perhaps a little bit 
more” than when they left. As Perdomo wrote by 1962,  
It this female frivolity that is highlighted when the newspaper describes, detail 
by detail, the characteristics of the dress, the sumptuosity of the social party or 
the magnificent gift…women from the privileged classes are so frivolous for 
true social life. They only care about having a luxurious car…driving it and 
having a dog riding shotgun who is named after a fancy international president, 
[and] these women do not even know who this president was or what he 
did…We have seen this triviality in newspapers, detail by detail, how they do 
not want to put all their preparation to use, they are just satisfied with 
unimportant things of life.327 
 
 By no means were these complaints unique. Reports, field notes, some formal 
complains and daily memoranda suggested that professional women struggled to 
educate those oligarchs. While encountering these entrepreneurs, presidents and 
directors, these professional women reconfigured their identifications as middle 
class. If, as explained earlier, social workers, nurses and professional women were 
hired to work in these programs to educate the oligarchs into elites assuming they, as 
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women, would be able to transform the “tradition of politics”—that is that “machista 
tendency of selfishness”—among elites who they hoped could open “their hearts for 
a more pleasant and peaceful society.” And yet, it is the same discourse those 
professional women mobilized in order to define themselves as middle class. During 
the late 1950s and 1960s, several professional women complained, as suggested by 
Perdomo, that oligarchs acted like they were dealing with “their own wives at home” 
or, even worse, presupposed “all women were the same.”328 These men of the 
oligarchy reacted negatively to the presence of women because, it was argued, they 
only wanted to “love superficial and little women” over which they could exercise a 
“protective and paternal authority.” The oligarchic men, said several professional 
women, suffered of an “inferiority complex,” because they could not face “de tu a tu 
with a intelligent women.” Instead, they expected a “wife like theirs” who was 
“enslaved by a valueless vanity”—that is, “an obsession and passion for their 
appearance”— and who was happy to be at a “level of intellectual inferiority.” 
Indeed, accustomed to seeing and talking with “useless decorative doll,” these men 
could not recognize the women’s professionalism and preparation that existed in the 
“social spheres of the nation,” the women complained.329As Perdomo remembered 
and elaborated in our dialogue,  
Perdomo: We tried to work with calm, clarity, professional rectitude, 
judgment…but it was challenging to say the least; the situation made things 
worse! 
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R.L: What do you mean by the situation? Working with those patronos 
 
Perdomo: Well, yes. But also the situation of women in the country. To do our 
job professionally, we needed calm, clarity and all of that because facing those 
patronos was not easy thing to do. I am telling you, we had to have patience, 
persuasive sweetness [dulzura persuasiva] to work with them… professional 
knowledge…preparation and a certain kind of toughness. 
 
R.L: But why were all of these qualities really important for your job? 
 
Perdomo: As I told you earlier because these men had to see we were not just 
any women…We had to use all the feminine qualities that nature had provided 
us with to do our best effort. Logically, at the moment not all the women were 
prepared for such a difficult job. Perhaps now they are more prepared, although 
I doubt it…but back then for sure only selected few were really well prepared to 
deal with the tremendous difficulties that Colombia was facing …not all women, 
I mean, not all women were really well prepared morally, intellectually, 
emotionally to do the job successfully…we could not continue doing things a la 
macha. We wanted to do it with a generous eagerness to serve others, not with 
egotism, but with professional neutrality to see what we could do for the 
democracy of the nation…professional dignity, knowledge, a certain 
professional fitness in every possible sense…and that’s why what we were 
doing was important, because we were doing something, no matter how small it 
was, for the democracy of the nation…ours was a difficult profession.330 
 
 And yet again, this gendered and classed collective self-deception at not 
being able to educate the men of the oligarchy, and presumably by extension their 
careless wives, became the very opportunity to perform as middle-class professional 
women. Now, these professional women could place themselves as inhabiting a 
classed and gendered position as educators of oligarchs and the “frivolous women” 
attached to them, who should be placed below precisely because they were in an 
eternal need of sentimental education. In inhabiting this gendered and classed 
position, these professional women always attempted to create a professional 
                                                 




democracy through which all members of the society could coexist peacefully and 
hierarchically integrated.  
 
Encountering the Laboring Classes—From Peasants and Workers into 
Capitalists 
 
Working with the poor made me realize who I really was. 331 
 As explained in previous chapter, during the 1950s and more forcefully with 
the consolidation of National Front and the formalization of the Alliance for 
Progress, several state institutions, new universities, and private organizations 
carefully selected and intimately trained professionals to work assiduously with the 
laboring classes. As several historians have shown, these professionals were crucial 
in the processes of early industrialization during the first half of the 20th century in 
different places throughout Latin America.332 Yet, whereas these projects were rather 
sporadic, at least in the Colombia case, the consolidation of the National Front, a 
remarkably state expansion and the development of private transnational 
organizations began a gradual and usually disjointed promotion of economic 
planning, social management, population improvement and proper political training 
to create social peace and political stability peace as the quintessential conditions to 
create democracy. Propelled by these transnational and national interest in creating 
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the proper conditions for democracy, which would relegate violence to be a 
“nightmare of the past,” these professionals men and women, in the very process of 
becoming middle class, elaborated a coherent but contradictory gendered and classed 
project of rule to prepare the laboring classes on how to live in democracy. Nurses, 
doctors, social workers, human economists, agronomists and architects attempted to 
put in practice this project of democratic rule through at least three overlapping and 
competing fronts: with the intimate guidance of professionals, peasants as well 
workers, and certainly their families, needed to transform themselves into truly 
gendered and classed economic subjects for the progress of the nation; those 
laboring classes needed to be closely guided by professionals on how to participate 
actively and properly as political subjects in democracy; and, finally, those laboring 
classes deserved face-to-face professional guidance in becoming subjects who were 
socially conscious not only of who they were but, more importantly, of what they 
were able to do collectively for themselves.333 
 Alberto Valencia, an architect trained during the late 1950s in CINVA who 
worked for the ICT during the 1960s, assiduously worked to create what he thought 
were the appropriate environmental conditions for democracy and progress to 
flourish. In our long conversations, he recalled his professional encounter with the 
peasants and workers as a gendered and classed experiences.334 Those encounters, he 
said, shaped his life as a professional man. “There was a turning point in my life 
when I went to work with the peasants…a before and after,” he proudly remembered. 
Furthermore, Valencia argued he was transformed from a naïve young man into a 
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professional man quite aware of the democratic role he had to play in society. 
Besides, he asked me, who else would have been able to at least try to guide those 
peasants into a democratic path? The oligarchs, he answered himself, had always 
been the same—they do not care about the poor. We, Valencia continued narrating 
his experiences, middle-class professionals were able to do something about it. Who 
else? Valencia repeatedly asked in our conversation. And in order to demonstrate this 
gendered and classed experience, he appealed to his rather disorganized personal 
archive to narrate what he thought and felt in those late years of the 1950s when he 
encountered peasants and workers who needed his professional preparation to live in 
a democracy.  
 By reading his field notes and professional diaries, he held that, although he 
was very committed to working with the peasants, he felt at the time he was “still a 
privileged city life boy.” Valencia needed, he said, some real and manly experiences 
in life to become somebody important: not in terms of prestige or privilege, but 
rather as a collaborator in the consolidation of peace and democracy in Colombia. To 
face those “remote but attractive places” like a man would help him to overcome his 
“fears and weaknesses of city-boy life,” and enter into a more challenging, 
rewarding, and masculine life where he could be recognized by his professional 
commitment to democracy. By reading some of his field-notes, Valencia began to 
remember those first trips to “learn about the Colombian peasant in person…their 
families…their lives…their souls…their activities.”335  
                                                 




 As part of what it seems to be the very first professional trip in 1955, he went 
to Anolaima, a small town two hours outside of Bogotá. He sought not only go and 
visit the peasants, but also to guide and teach them how to live in democracy.336 
Interestingly, Valencia remembered these first experiences as happening during the 
first administration of the National Front from 1958 to 1962, even though the very 
his first trip to Anolaima occurred in 1955, when dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla was 
in power. Valencia insisted that the National Front formally began some years prior 
and, consequently, he did not work in any way possible under a program supported 
by the dictatorial regime. The National Front, and more specifically Lleras Camargo, 
Valencia explained to me, gave Colombia the opportunity to leave “La Violencia and 
enter a moment of peace and democracy.” Valencia placed himself within this 
opportunity and argued that the importance of his job was precisely because he, as a 
manly middle-class man, was also working for democracy and peace by properly 
preparing those who needed the most—the peasants and workers. As we discussed, 
R.L: If you started to go to Anolaima in 1954 or 1955, and I see how you went 
to several training workshops during those years, and Rojas Pinilla was in power 
even if there was a lot of discussion to remove him from power.  
A.V: No, I do not think so. Everything started with the National Front and 
president Alberto Lleras Camargo. The National Front had getting rid of la 
Violencia as an objective and Rojas Pinilla was the cause of it. We received 
letters from Lleras recognizing our professional job. And I only wanted peace 
because so many years of violence, it was not possible that we wanted more and 
my job was just that…to bring peace and democracy to the rural setting. For 
many people what we were doing was too little, but it was something, and 
besides, after that I realized how little it was and that I had to do more…so I 
started working in Anolaima under the National Front. 337 
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 At stake is not whether Valencia was correct in his historical understanding. 
Rather, I would argue, Valencia was specifically narrating how the National Front 
began as a specific way to remember himself as a gendered and classed subject—that 
is, as a middle-class professional man working for the peace and democracy of 
Colombia and having noting to do with the short-lived dictatorship.338 Valencia’s 
retelling attempted to authorize his professional role as a middle-class men working 
for peace and democracy. And precisely because dictatorship and violence were 
associated with Rojas Pinilla, he was now convinced that in order to maintain a 
professional reputation he needed to celebrate the role of the National Front even 
though, as it will become clear in the next chapter, he himself would sharply criticize 
it because of its lack of commitment to real democracy. 
 Working during the late 1950s with several rural populations as part of 
numerous community development programs, Valencia decided to live with a family 
in Anolaima. In his oral history, he remembered that if a true professional man 
wanted to get familiar with “the peasants and all their complexities.” he could not 
just go to the rural parts of the country and then return to the “luxury of city life.”339 
Valencia wanted to stay in a rural setting for a period of three or four weeks to be 
recognized as a true professional man working for the democracy of the nation. In 
his field notes, he wrote that although he was hesitant to ask “difficult questions,” 
since he did not want to sound too sophisticated, he could not help but begin 
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wondering about the family, the home, the land, and their occupations, along with 
their literacy, cultural relations, political tendencies, and personal belongings. He 
was very happy, Valencia recalled, because these experiences were finally giving 
him a “valuable and intimate sense” about the specific conditions of the peasant—a 
intimate sense that was rather crucial, since the democratic guidance was to take 
place by integrating, rather than ignoring, the peasant’s family.340 Echoing his 
training and class preparation, Valencia usually wrote in his reports how he was, 
above all, attempting to establish some “rapport with the people in order to be 
accepted by them.341 It was crucial, it seems, for Valencia to tell the peasants “how 
much [he, Alberto] would learn from them.” He was willing to get involved in “how 
to grow vegetables, how to cultivate, how to treat the land [and] how to live in a rural 
setting” only if the peasants allowed him to do so. Alberto was committed to 
teaching not only how “to build houses” but also, and more importantly for the 
architect, create the necessary conditions “to live in democracy.”342  
 As a result, for Alberto was clear that, unlike with the careless oligarchs, he 
needed to not only preach and work for the good of the peasant families, but to 
celebrate—and even sanctify—every act of their labors and pleasures, their gestures, 
their tools and their tasks. Consequently, field notes as well as final reports to 
CINVA and ICT were organized to show that he was doing his job—learning about 
the peasants and become known by them. In several reports during the late 1950s and 
1960s, Alberto described his strategies to, above all, become “unnoticeable” among 
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peasants themselves. If, as argued previously, there was a need among middle-class 
professionals to dress properly to establish a professional authority those patronos 
and oligarchs, now, in contrast, professional had to dress not to impress, but rather to 
be somehow mask their class origins. That is, professional class authority had to be 
established by going unnoticed among workers and peasants precisely because that 
would create the opportunity to have a democratic influence over those who needed 
to be educated. Alberto remembered how he specifically did not want to dress “so 
professionally” that could provoke “hard feelings among peasants” and hence not 
being able to pursue his job as a professional. As he said in our conversation,  
It was clear that you did not want to look too different…to dress like a city boy 
and just remind them [the peasants] how poorly they were dressed. I used to 
choose simple clothes [ropa sencilla] to go by unnoticed [desapercibido]…and I 
had friends who did not pay attention to how to dress and it was costly for them 
because then their job, well, it was really difficult once the first impression was 
made, since you begin by creating too much of a difference just because the way 
you dress. Then, it did not matter how poor you want to dress, the first 
impression was what counted. It was not big deal for me. I was just trying to 
somehow fill the cultural gap that existed between the cultured elites and the 
peasants. If we started by reminding them of this gap, I thought our job would 
be more difficult for us because there would not be either enthusiasm [ánimo] or 
trust from them.343  
  
  It was therefore imperative, Alberto emphasized in reading his field notes, 
not to make himself be seen as “excessively superior or different.”344 Alberto, then, 
decided to wear a poncho, use the pickaxe and even, he wrote in his reports and field 
notes, to get his hands dirty “by working the land.” He wanted to participate in the 
“darkness of the drinking places” and seating in the floor when visiting peasant’s 
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families. Valencia proudly read his field notes to constantly remind me that he never 
asked the peasants to “remove their hat” —and, in his committed disposition to 
portray himself as not excessively superior, Valencia ordered the peasants “not to 
address [him] as doctor.”345 
And yet, it was not easy, he argued in our conversation, because his 
privileged upbringing somehow had put him “away from the reality of [his] 
nation.”346 It was precisely this privilege that he wanted to overcome in order to 
become a true middle-class professional man—to transform in practice the habits and 
thoughts that continually reproduced their privileged life as middle-class, Alberto 
wanted to show their “sympathy [and] “solidarity” for the oppressed. For him, 
Valencia wrote in unpublished papers and field notes during the late 1950s and 
1960s, to be a middle-class professional was to truly understand those who could be 
guided into social and democratic change, unlike the oligarchs for whom the people 
were just “numerous ignorant deserving their situation.”347 
  Although one could be tempted to merely commemorate Alberto political 
involvement with the peasants and their putative problems, I argue that Alberto’s 
story offers the opportunity to think more carefully about the middle-class 
professionals and the project of class and gender rule these professionals attempted 
to structure. For Alberto, and those who defined themselves as middle-class 
professionals, it was not a matter reeducating themselves through peasant discipline 
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and merging into the anonymity of the “numerous peasants.” Above all, these 
professionals—in attempting to pursue their project of class and gender rule—had to 
continually manifest their double hierarchical collective selves. That is, it was crucial 
for professionals like Valencia to be seen as a part of the peasants precisely because 
that could create a hierarchical social bond between themselves and the peasants so 
that those professionals would be able to prepare those peasants to live in 
democracy. And yet, professional also needed to be seen as middle-class 
professionals in order to exercise a hierarchical authority in providing the necessary 
conditions for those peasants to transform themselves in democratic subjects. In this 
double perpetual formation of the middle class, the peasantry and the working class 
were intimate hierarchical others, rather than a distant distinct ones as we tend to 
assume, to be respected as much as to be transformed. In this project of class and 
gender rule, professionals sought to locate themselves above—although in an 
intimate class relation with—those they thought should be endlessly taught to 
experience democracy.  
 Professionals worked in this double hierarchical relationship to immerse 
themselves into what they thought was crucial to transform peasants into truly 
economic subjects: the point of view of the peasant and worker. If, professionals 
elaborated, it was necessary to transform the laboring classes, it was imperative to 
position oneself with how those workers and peasants worked, lived and thought. 
Furthermore, these professionals hoped to be able to discover the political rationality 
of these peasants and workers—that is, their conditions, their desires, and, most 
importantly, how these peasants and workers used their available human capital and 
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material resources to make specific economic decisions. The task, then, was to 
respect, tolerate and certainly, maximize class difference to transform the peasants 
into truly economic subjects.  
 In 1960, for example, Lilia García, a social worker working in a program 
supported by CINVA, CARE, the Ministry of Education and ICT, went to work in 
Zipaquira, a rural town two hours away from Bogotá. After several visits, she wrote 
in her field notes her thoughts about the major objectives she thought should be 
achieved when coming back to work with peasants. Echoing discourses on 
community development, she wrote that the transformation of the peasants and his 
families required them to actively participate in their own process of “democratic 
improvement.”348 This was crucial, she argued, because until now the peasants—
their needs, their ways of life, their habits, their conditions—had been ignored and 
marginalized. For several professionals, she complained, the peasants were a foreign 
country within their own country. Even worse, Garcia protested, these professional 
had wasted or deformed all the human capital these peasant classes owned. Now, it 
was about time, as true middle-class professionals, to discover “the human capital of 
those who have been ignored,” and, more importantly, to guide those peasants into 
how to invest in their human capital in order to multiply it for the economic benefit 
of peasants themselves. Because there was a tendency to ignore the “human latent 
talent [and] intelligence,” the poor had been seen only as passive economic actors in 
the society. In contrast, the professional would guide, rather than not impose, the 
process of restoring the “economic agency [protagonismo económico]” of the poor, 
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by inviting them to maximize their human and material capital according to what 
they were capable of doing.349 Thus, in respecting, tolerating and even celebrating 
the class difference of the peasants, García, and numerous professional like her, 
envisioned the possibility that the peasants could become not only a productive part 
of the nation but also, and I would argue quite crucially, become capitalists 
themselves—that is, owners of their own human capital, who would know how to, 
under the specific class conditions as peasant and workers, produce, accumulate, 
invest, maximize and multiply that human capital for their own “family 
enterprises.”350  
 Despite recent assumptions in scholarship that sees the economy as 
ontological given or as a determinant in some dreaded last instance, I would like to 
argue that these attempts to transform peasants into active economic subjects (i.e., 
capitalists) play a very important role in shaping the gender and class rule of 
bringing a middle-class professional democracy into being. These professionals, 
drawing on discourses of community development, attempted to maximize 
hierarchical class difference not through the alienation of the peasants’ and workers’ 
labor, as we have thus far argued, but rather and more importantly, by conceiving 
peasants and workers as independent economic subjects who could concretize their 
labor into human capital that could be accumulated and invested to their own benefit. 
This project would transform, I would argue, feminine laboring classes dependent on 
oligarchs into masculine independent capitalists capable of investing their own 
human capital for the development of their “family and national enterprise.”  






 As has been compellingly argued by several historians, these projects 
centered their efforts in the household as the bedrock of working-class 
communities.351 Home was, above all, the center of the potential family enterprise to 
be created and where those prospective capitalists should invest and optimize their 
own human capital. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, professional women and 
men were very active in this task by constructing (quite literally) houses as the 
quintessential space to transform the laboring classes. In 1962, for instance, Javier 
Gómez, an architect working for ICT, went to the south of Bogotá to work in a place 
he described as neither as rural nor urban but indistinguishably both. The very social 
reports, the architectural plans he draw and the interviews he made were the ground 
through which he contemplated two related questions about the situation of these 
peasants/workers: “how these potential laboring classes” were living in family 
setting and, perhaps more importantly, whether all members of the family were using 
their available human capital. This was crucial, Gómez argued, because “a house was 
not just a house but an economic unit for the future life of the Colombian laboring 
classes.” Furthermore, these professional women wanted to select and discover 
working-class families with the potential to channel their human resources for their 
own benefit so they could live not only in a new house but also in a new self that 
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could manage to overcome economic passivity by using all the “latent, dormant, 
hidden and wasted human capital at their disposal.”352  
 After several professional visits to the barrio, Gómez decided to make some 
interviews in order to immerse himself into the point of view of these 
peasant/workers. According to him, he wanted to know how these laboring classes 
envisioned their ideal houses so that he, as a professional committed to the perceived 
needs of the workers, could follow their lead. He celebrated that these peasants 
wanted independent, single-family houses, arguing that they really wanted to change 
the place where they were living at the moment. Likewise, he celebrated that there 
were enough nuclear families that could lead to the integration of family roles to 
make the home a productive place. Despite his intent, however, Gómez wrote 
extensively in his social reports how frustrated he was to learn that, above all, these 
peasants/workers did not know how to arrange and utilize the spaces in their houses 
efficiently. Although it has proven impossible to find these interviews, my interview 
with the architect suggests that he complained because the potential occupants of the 
houses did not how to separate the spaces within the houses to make it more 
productive—in a word, Gómez wrote in his reports, they wrongly envisioned the 
spaces of the houses.353 Specifically, he complained extensively because these 
laboring classes suffered of what he called “the immediacy of earnings.” There 
seemed to be one answer that bothered Gómez in particular —workers and peasants 
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envisioned having a small business or store in the house to increase family income. 
In report after report, Gómez portrayed himself explaining these peasants how 
underproductive and even counterproductive this economic aspiration was, because 
it was driven by the immediacy of earnings. 
 And this was, indeed, an economic problem that professionals complained 
about when working with peasants and workers. According to these professionals, 
the laboring classes could not think about the future of the family enterprises because 
they had a rationality that said “money for today…no capital for tomorrow.”354  The 
preference to have a small business in the house was read as a lack of economic 
concern with accumulating human capital, and that immediate satisfaction was the 
most important preoccupation. With this behavior, several professionals argued, the 
laboring classes’ human capital would ultimately be wasted due to the lack of 
distinction between the workplace and the place of rest. Assuming that  peasant men 
would be working in the home/store, these professionals complained that it would 
take time away from the family that, simultaneously, would be reflected in a deficit 
of human capital, since the children would be thus deprived of their parents’ love and 
attention. For professionals, it was crucial to create an appropriate environment for 
human capital to be accumulated, and families with no parents meant necessarily a 
waste of capital because the children, the future capitalists, would be unable to 
develop their intelligence, attitudes, and interests toward being independent. Here, 
the abandonment of the children could have a rather devastating economic effect: 
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they could potentially be unable to become owners of their human capital, because 
that human capital had been squandered.  
 And in order to prepare the environment for the true capitalist to emerge, it was 
argued, “the mothers of the laboring classes” were simultaneously seen as in dire need to 
be prepared in the important matters of development and democracy. Women were also 
to be guided into truly gendered economic subjects. Luz Eugenia Correa, a nurse and a 
social worker assigned to a working-class neighborhood in Bogotá called Quiroga in the 
early months of 1963, wrote in her weekly reports that the most challenging part of her 
job was to transform, on the one hand, how the mothers of the laboring classes were seen 
by professionals in general, and on the other, how those mothers thought about the future 
of their children. Always attempting to respect the “felt needs” of the working class, 
Correa routinely argued in her reports submitted to the office of Social Service at ICT 
that it was imperative to include these mothers as “active members of the society.”355 For 
so long, Correa wrote, “the machismo of the working class” and the social prejudice of 
working-class men were the major obstacle to women’s active participation in their own 
development. 
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Ilustration 1. Servicio a la comunidad. Source: Manual de Servicio Social, Dirrección de departamento de 
Servicio Social,1961, subgerencia admnistrativa, ICTAR. 
 
And yet, Correa also cited, on numerous occasions, how working class women 
had accepted this traditional role, and she urged them to participate more fully in the 
development of family enterprises and, by extension, in national development.356  It was 
imperative that these mothers begin thinking as modern members of society—they had to 
be guided in forming a “mentality for the future” and in planning for the “long run [largo 
plazo].” Correa complained, like many of her professional peers, that members of the 
working classes were usually driven by an economic desire to satisfy their needs 
immediately. Describing an interview she conducted in 1962, Correa reported to the ICT 
that it was disappointing to see “how much human capital was being wasted.” “Things 
were not getting any easier” for Luz Eugenia, it seems, since she was getting used to “too 
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much poverty.” Fathers were spending their time playing tejo and drinking, and mothers 
were neglecting “their tasks.”357 According to Correa, the mothers of the laboring classes 
had “a lot of unused human capital” but did not have the right mind to properly—and 
profitably—cultivate it to their family’s benefit. Above all, those mothers were able to 
teach their children “how to gulp down [their food]” but never how to eat properly. They 
knew how to get along but never how to live to “the fullest extent of their own human 
capacity and energy.” As she eloquently wrote in several reports during the early 1960s,  
These are not ignorant mothers…they know who their sons are…and they give 
them food and try to take care of them. They know that. But the problem is their 
obscure and indecipherable mind…it is this mind that does not allow them to 
progress, to think of the future of their families…in the development of their own 
capacities. It is the human capacity, the human energy that counts and not their 
stomachs—How much food do we need to make children capable of using their 
own human resources?  If only these mothers were able to develop what is 
important, to teach their children to be better, to develop un sentido de 
superación, then those women could develop their own familial enterprises.358   
 
Furthermore, the fate of working-class children (i.e., the future capitalists of the 
nation), Correa continuously argued, depended upon how mothers of the laboring classes 
would invest their human capital—that is to say “those feminine attributes or virtues” 
belonging to their female sex—to prepare the proper familial environment for the 
accumulation of human capital. Correa, along with other professionals working with 
peasants and laboring families, advised those mothers that if a husband were to be at 
home and included in—rather than excluded from—the family enterprises, it was 
necessary that they (the wives) prepare a welcoming environment. These professionals 
urged the mother of the laboring classes to keep a clean house where their husband would 
                                                 






be happy to be around spending time with their wives and children, providing not only 
monetary satisfaction but, more importantly, love, responsibility, moderation, dialogue 
and attention; these professional women offered advice on hygiene, nutrition, child 
development and household budgeting so these working class women would no longer 
play a passive role but rather an active one by taking care of the capitalists of today (i.e., 
their husbands) and the capitalists of tomorrow (i.e., their children). As active members 
of society, it was argued, they would create “peaceful and harmonious marriage” as the 
cornerstone upon which the human capital would accumulate. These professional women 
envisioned housewives creating the necessary (class) environment for peace and 
democracy to flourish precisely because their husband and children, rather than struggle 
with other groups in society,  would only be concerned with becoming true men—that is 
to say, bosses of their own life, owners of their own human capital, and capitalists of their 




“La asistente social instruye a la madre sobre el cuidado e higinene de los niños. Le da sugerencias 
sobre la forma de asearlos y vestirolos convenientemente conforme a sus posibilidades económicas.” 
Manual de Servicio Social, Dirrección de departamento de Servicio Social,1961, subgerencia 
admnistrativa, ICTAR. 
 
In several teaching outlines, social workers, home economists and nurses advised 
the mothers of the laboring classes to “help their husbands want to be with them.” A 
modern wife, these professionals contended, was not one who obligated her husband to 
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work overtime, earning supplementary income that would force him to come home very 
late. According to teaching outlines and reports written during the late 1950s and 1960s, 
the problem was that working class men were “asked only to be breadwinner husbands” 
at the expense of what was important in the long run.359 Numerous professional women, 
then, argued that the task of the modern woman of the laboring class—as a wife and as a 
mother—was not only to domesticate her husband but also to prepare the family 
environment for him to be truly capitalist—that is, a man capable of investing his own 
human capital in the future of the family enterprise by being “with their children, talking 
to them, taking care of them, the stuff that cannot be measured in monetary terms.” In so 
doing, these new capitalists would produce children willing to be productive “for their 
families…and for the nation…strong minded children who are incorporated into progress 
and democracy.”360  
Thus, these professionals, in their process of becoming middle-class, envisioned a 
professional democracy in which the working class would be hierarchically included to 
perform their specific virtues corresponding to their class and gender. Working-class 
women would become modern wives and mothers, whereas men would be further 
masculinized into capitalists who simultaneously could not only provide for their wives 
and children, but more importantly, invest in their future family enterprises. And in order 
to do so, these  masculinized capitalists should affirm their authority over women who, 
developing the human virtues specific to their sex, should prepare the proper environment 
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for the accumulation of the family’s—and by extension, the nation’s—human capital.  As 
Blanca Hernández, a home economist working with ICT, described the role of the 
modern laboring class wife in a report filed during the early 1960s,  
In all of our programs, training of working-class women is vital since she needs to 
learn to be a women in every sense of the word. The family depends on the 
women… on their spiritual education… and the role of the husband depends on 
the family. Wives must take advantage to keep their husbands at home with the 
children. She must always be at home to welcome him…she must not go out 
when he is at home…she must treat him as the owner of the home [el propietario 
del hogar]…She must make the home a welcoming place, peaceful, harmonious 
where her husband is happy to arrive, is happy to reenergize his human 
capacities…where he is willing to talk to his children…For the family enterprise 
to function, wives must develop small virtues: attention, tolerance, care, 
flexibility, generosity, sincerity and sacrifice.361 
   
 Because a great deal of political hope was invested in these projects to constitute a 
professional democracy through which everybody could develop their task according to 
their sex and class, some professionals repeatedly complained in their reports about the 
impossibility of achieving their class assignments. Although the reports are less specific 
in this regard, one can sense how home economists, social workers and nurses could not 
overcome their gender frustrations nor their class deceptions. Although showing 
“sympathy and understanding,” these professional women regularly griped that working 
class wives did not show any “interest in bettering their situation.” They found it 
frustrating that, given the services provided by professionals, the mothers of the laboring 
classes were still not able to “help themselves.”362 Their assigned role as modern wives, a 
social worker protested, was seemingly inapt for these women who only wanted “to have 
food on the table.” Another social worker wrote in a memorandum to the office to the 
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Social Service at ICT in 1963 that she was trying very hard, but that these working-class 
women were perfectly content to have “absents husbands who can provide money for the 
household.”363   
As was true in the case of working with the oligarchs, the structuring of a 
professional democracy as a project of class and gender rule was paradoxically 
constructed through hierarchical bonds in which professionals, in the very process of 
becoming middle class, constantly found themselves in a tragic dilemma.  While the class 
assignment for these professionals was to produce the conditions for class harmony and 
political stability as quintessential conditions for democracy and peace to emerge, in 
practice the formation of middle-class identifications created hierarchical antagonists (the 
not yet modern wife, the working-class machistas) as the included hierarchical other in 
constant need of guidance and education. In the process, these professionals sought to 
orient these laboring classes on how to become true economic men (i.e., capitalists and 
modern wives) who could play their gendered and classed role in the constitution of 
familial, and by extension,  national enterprises. Furthermore, these professionals would 
guide these laboring classes on how to live productively and peacefully in democracy so 
that the confrontational style of politics that had doomed Colombia to so many years of 
violence could finally be overcome. These hierarchical/included others, were partially 
historical productions of the professionals themselves.  At the same time, this other’s 
existence was the condition that enabled the emergence of the middle class professional, 
and concomitantly, professional democracy.  And yet, paradoxically, the very possibility 
that these mothers of the laboring classes and their husbands could still maintain 
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traditional economic roles, caring only for the immediacy of material satisfaction, 
threatened the effort to create a professional democracy precisely because if they 
remained in this state, then middle-class professionals “were not doing their job.” 
Frustrated and disappointed, these middle-class professional men and women 
experienced a constant sense of collective deception: they could neither become a true 
professional middle-class nor construct a professional democracy because they were not 
able to succeed in educating these working men to be true owners of their own human 
capital, or in guiding traditional women to become modern wives preparing the 
environment for new enterprises to emerge at the service of their family’s improvement. 
And yet this failure, this gender frustration and collective class disillusionment authorized 
and perpetuated the middle-class professionals as forever class superiors whose dire 
democratic obligation it was to govern those who should be beneath them precisely 
because they were not yet ready to experience the pleasures of democracy.  
And it is this gender and class dilemma that professional men and women 
recurrently wrestled with in their encounters with those laboring classes. As was true with 
the oligarchs, this dilemma produced further hierarchical fragmentation among those who 
were attempting to perform as middle-class men and middle-class women. José Tarazona, 
a rural specialist working for ICT and involved in programs of community development 
in Santandercito during the early 1960s, wrote a lengthy letter to the director of the office 
of social services complaining about the role played by social workers and home 
economists and educadoras de vivienda who were carrying out programs of social 
development.  Tarazona blamed women for his frustration at not being able to perform 
his class assignment as a true professional. For some time, he wrote in 1962, he had been 
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working closely with the peasant families of Santandercito  and, more importantly, had 
somehow succeeded in being accepted by the people. Indeed, he argued, his dress was 
“only slightly” distinguishable from the peasants’.364  Furthermore, Tarazona reported he 
was even using a ruana that, in the “darkness of the night, could make [him] pass as a 
peasant.” He was welcomed in all homes, whether he came to work with the peasants for 
a given project or just for a social call. He could even attend weddings and parties not just 
as “a special guest but as part of the pueblo.” He was immersing himself, his letter 
implied, in their class environment, a crucial step for discovering their rationality and 
thus, for initiating a process of education to make those peasants into true economic men 
according to their own conditions. In all, Tarazone was performing his class assignment 
as a true professional men.365  
And yet, he complained, the office of Social Service at ICT made a “pointless 
decision” by sending some social workers, home economists and nurses to work with 
peasant familes. A pointless decision, Tarazona argued, because these girls were never 
prepared for the “toughness of the rural setting.”366 It was, he argued, a job for 
professional men, and not for those “girls who [had] just come from their luxurious city 
houses.” They were becoming obstacles to the transformation he, as a true man, was 
about to effect in the lives of these peasants families. Tarazona was discouraged, he 
wrote, because since these girls had come to the town, most families associated him with 
them and had become distrustful of his role as a professional man. Frustrated and 
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disappointed, Tarazona griped that the only job these girls got right was to remind the 
peasants of how alien they were. He complained to the director of the office of social 
service at ICT,  
These young ladies speak to the peasants in the familiar tu form, which in their 
context and environment openly implied arrogance. These girls are city girls who 
do not know that here the peasants always use the formal usted form…Unlike the 
careful arrival of my group, these ladies could only come in a jeep in a very 
noticeable way and these young ladies were expected to be seen upon their 
arrival. Because of their sex, they were not able to walk for a few miles and 
thereby be unnoticeable at the moment of their arrival. The environment is rough. 
They came wearing fancy dress, high heels and cosmetics that only made it clear 
to the peasants how extranjero we were. These girls reminded the peasants of the 
cultural gap. And some of them preferred to stay in the jeep to avoid direct 
contact with the people…they are not really good workers…they are just city 
girls. I beg your help in this regard as I have always thought this work is not for 
women. I hope that you understand my complaints as I write them only with the 
concern that we really get our professional job right.367 
 
 Although rare in its eloquence,  this missive is by no means unique. In fact, it 
is fair to say that during the late 1950s and 1960s many professional men were 
dubious about the possibility of working with professional women in social 
programs. As is suggested by Tarazona, those frustrations and deceptions at not 
being able to perform as truly middle class professional men—that is, to educate and 
transform the laboring classes into true economic beings—was closely associated 
with the entrance of  “city girls” into a range of professions. Those “city girls,” 
several professional men complained, were becoming an obstacle to achieving 
progress and development as they did not know “how to approach the poor, how to 
listen to them, how to immerse themselves in their environment.”368 These gender 
tensions further highlighted the paradoxical constitution of professional democracy, 






raising new anxieties about the ability of professional men and women to continue 
“doing [their] jobs.”  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have argued how during the late 1950s and early 1960s some 
professionals, in their effort to become middle-class women and men, sought to 
create a professional democracy through which they could place themselves in a 
classed and gendered position as eternal democratic connoisseurs—rather than 
experts—with an urgent political obligation to orient both the oligarchs and the 
laboring classes. In deploying imperial and transnational discourses about the 
importance of professionalized social relations in the quest for peace and democracy, 
these middle-class men and women attempted to create a professional democracy 
that could produce the conditions needed to live in peace and enjoy political stability. 
On the one hand, they endeavored to transform feminine oligarchs into feeling 
masculine elites, so that they could become an integral part of the national body and 
coexist peacefully—that is, hierarchically—with other social groups in pursuit of a 
common goal: the progress and development of the Colombian nation. On the other 
hand, in the process of becoming middle class, these professionals also attempted to 
change the passive and nationally marginalized laboring classes into independent 
economic and political subjects ready to actively participate in democracy, so that 
they, too, could enjoy social peace and political stability. These professionals were 
those who would recognize and put to work the very human capital that neither the 
elites nor the laboring classes were able to utilize by themselves. These professional 
men and women could know, because of their professional training on national 
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problems, what the other classes did not. Professionals could perform as middle-class 
men and women in the very process of appreciating the social problems that other 
classes could not be aware of. In all, these professionals tried to structure a 
professional democracy through which they could respect and maximize class 
differences—that is to say, to hierarchically distribute how each and every layer of 
the society could contribute to the functioning of the nation—by eternally explaining 
to those who, given their specific class conditions, makeup and ascendancy, were 
never able to become ready to live in democracy. Usually, middle-class professional 
found themselves, as democratic connoisseurs, politically obligated to provide 
further explanations to those who, although active and with latent human capital, did 
not yet know or feel how to live for a professional democracy.  
 This constant class and gender uncertainty, however, of not being able to 
finally and appropriately prepare those above and below—indeed, the very condition 
of eternally postponing the final democratic preparation of laboring classes and the 
oligarchs—put the achievement of a professional democracy, and the process of 
becoming middle class, into question precisely because in its perpetual state of 
incompleteness, above all, they were not properly performing their political and 
democratic assignment. In short, as many professionals said, they were not doing 
their job. Anxious professionals therefore found themselves in disquieting position 
when the source of their self-definitions as a democratic governors seemed not to be 
working; indeed, concerned professional men and women saw themselves constantly 
struggling precisely because they were only sure that their class preparation and 
national knowledge was, at best, in endless doubt. Haunted by class and gender 
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anxieties, they did not know how to advise or explain to those who seemed to be, 
according to them, hesitant to help themselves in becoming full participants in a 
professional democracy. It is in this paradoxical quest to bring a professional 
democracy into being that these professional attempted to constitute themselves in a 
hierarchical classed and gendered position as democratic connoisseurs, or governors, 
with a never-ending political obligation to prepare, guide and explain to others how 
to enjoy the pleasures of democracy. By positioning themselves in a socially 
calibrated proximity to the “the privileged classes,” as well as to laboring classes, 
middle-class professionals understood themselves as being hierarchically above 
those they thought required never-ending orientation in the questions of democracy. 
Moreover, those close, yet antagonistic, others enabled the middle-class 
professionals to constitute themselves—that is, to have the opportunity to become 
democratic connoisseurs that were neither “those who rule” nor the “active [but] in 
need of guidance” laboring classes. In all, as much as the middle-class professionals 
were trained to promote a non-confrontational way of doing politics, in putting this 
political assignment into practice, the project of creating a professional democracy—
as an endeavor of class and gender rule—could only take place through the 
structuration of antagonistic hierarchical relations. Indeed, this project endlessly 
sought to sediment a hierarchical society in which these professional men and 
women could not only to be distinct in relation to other social groups, as most of the 
recent studies on the middle class would have it, but also, and more importantly, to 
be democratically in charge of ruling the working classes, the peasantry as well as 
the oligarchy. That this job was essentially impossible puts into question this very 
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hierarchical rule. In attempting to untangle these paradoxes, professionals 
simultaneously attempted to create a modality of class rule by proposing what they 





Chapter 3: “A Revolution for a Democratic Middle Class Society.” The 
Political Formation of a Gendered Middle Class in Bogotá, 1958-1965 
 
Genealogy is uniquely suited to bring to light a specific democracy’s historical attachments to 
and imbrications with non-democratic principles. Genealogy challenges conceits of purity: 
through it, particular democracies are revealed as enfolded within histories of imperialism, 
slavery, genocide, class dominance, or punishment and as saturated with these legacies in the 
present.369 
 
The class struggle still exists; it exists more intensely in democracies.370 
 
On Thursday, September 14, 1959, fifty-two representatives of professionals’ 
organizations, white-collar labor unions and small owners’ associations were eager 
to begin a meeting that would, they wrote in the minutes, “change the future of the 
middle class and the Colombian nation.”371 After many months of discussion, several 
participants agreed upon the urgent need to organize politically what was referred to 
as a dispersed Colombian middle class.372 Régulo Millan Puentes, a member of the 
                                                 
369Wendy Brown, Politics out of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 126, 135. 
 
370Michael Foucault, Remarks on Marx, Conversations with Duccio Trombadori (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), 147.  
 
371Minutes of Comité Ejecutivo Central, Bogotá, 3, September 1959, Box: Seccional Cundinamarca, 
Movimiento Aliado de la Clase Media Colombiana Archive (hereafter, MOCLAMAR).In 1962, this 
organization changed its name to Comité Ejecutivo Nacional de Clase Media Económica de 
Colombia. And few months later it changed again to Movimiento Aliado de la Clase Media 
Colombiana. Needless to say this archive has a precarious organization. I have tried to follow the 
larger organization of the political movement. Some of the professional associations that participated 
in this meeting and in the consolidation of MOCLAM were: National Union of Accountants, 
Association of Doctors For Social Assistance, Association of National Nurses, Association of 
Colombian Dentists, among many others.  
 
372Minutes of Comité Ejecutivo Central, Bogotá, 4, September 1959, Box: Secciónal Cundinamarca, 
MOCLAMAR. Several other central committees were organized in other cities throughout Colombia: 
Medellin, Barranquilla, Pasto, and Cali. I have been able to locate records for Cundinamarca that 
mainly included Bogotá. And there is indeed some material regarding discussions between the 
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National Union of Accountants and a major activist for the creation of what would 
soon be called the Allied Movement of the Colombian Middle Class (Movimiento 
Aliado de la Clase Media de Colombia, MOCLAM), argued that it was imperative to 
coordinate an organization to “defend the intellectual, moral, economic and social 
interests of those who [were] neither capitalists nor proletarians.”373 Furthermore, 
Anibal Castro, a member of the Association of Doctors for Social Assistance 
(ASMEDAS), emphasized that the organization also needed to demand “democratic 
rights” proportional with and according to the “political, moral and cultural level of 
the middle class.”374 With these very general requests and demands in mind, Millan 
Puentes replied to Castro that an executive committee should begin political 
agitation, demonstrations and campaigns to reach out neither to capitalists nor 
proletarians but only to “professionals, employees, and small business men.”375 In so 
doing, the movement would initiate a process of redeeming  and reclaiming a 
democratic society by demanding distinct rights befitting their position as middle-
class men in the Colombian nation.  
Furthermore, the participants in this first meeting were in agreement that the 
Colombian middle class was experiencing a “moment of crisis”—a crisis that, above 
all, was manifest and plain for all to see. It was thus necessary to face “this moment 
                                                                                                                                                 
different central city committees. Although very aware of how this middle class movement was 
experienced through regional categorizations, I, regretfully, focus only on Bogotá.  
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of truth” by putting their brains into political action so the middle class could be well 
and eminently represented. These professional men concurred that there was an 
urgent and unavoidable need to demand a political role and a greater political 
representation for those who were “truly middle class.”376 In order to achieve such en 
end, the recently founded MOCLAM, along with its radio periódico, sought to open 
spaces to interpret the “collective sentiment of the people” who were truly entitled 
and deserved to be grouped under the “label of middle class.” It was necessary to 
define for Colombian society, the government and the world, who would be 
considered “true men of the middle class,” so that their “voices, necessities, demands 
and claims could be heard clearly and unequivocally.”377  
 Millan Puentes, furthermore, informed those professionals in the very first 
meeting in 1959 that the moment of truth had come, and now, more than ever, it was 
time for a new group of middle-class men who, conscious and responsible of their 
obligations, duties, rights, and privileges, could defend the “most important class in 
any democratic society.”378 Indeed, as middle-class men of the Colombian nation, it 
was their duty to call upon those who were “truly middle class for a coordinated 
action in defense of [their] common interests.” It was necessary to initiate a political 
campaign to unite the middle class and to organize their middle-class interests, lives, 
backgrounds, concerns, concrete aspirations, and demands for a “political, moral, 
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social, cultural and democratic defense.” In short, the middle class, in order to 
become truly middle class, needed “a redemption and a revolution.”379 As a result of 
these political declarations, a group of professionals began to craft a middle-class 
manifesto as a guide for confronting the present and the immediate future. This 
manifesto proposed a course for a political action—indeed, for a democratic 
revolution—in order to create a new society. It would amount to a revolution, Álvaro 
Sánchez, the vice-president of MOCLAM argued, precisely because it would take 
place neither through a “dramatic or spectacular public rallies [reuniones callejeras]” 
nor through a “grandiloquent yet empty speeches” but only through “professional 
debates, intelligent discussions, meaningful and powerful ideas, peaceful 
deliberations, rational planning, political maturity and appropriate political 
behavior.”380 Addressing the nation, the society, and the government, this manifesto 
eloquently proclaimed in 1963,  
Perhaps because of our own guilty indolence nobody takes us seriously as a 
middle class. Big capital is represented by its own organizations and because of 
its influence and prestige it is able to have some say regarding public affairs. 
The workers [who] are organized around the powerful labor unions have the 
ability to deeply affect the nation. Until now the middle class has always labored 
in favor of the insatiable ambitions of the capitalists and the assertion of the 
rural and urban working classes. And we, despite the power we represent, are 
destined to be left to the side [destinados al ostranticsmo]. To overcome this 
anonymous, unspecified, and indeterminate middle-class situation; to make 
ourselves present in the national life as an organized, specific, and definite class; 
to properly fulfill to our duties; to require the solutions for our needs and win 
our rights [and] have these rights properly respected …it is inevitable that we 
join together to represent ourselves as a class…have our own political platform, 
                                                 
379Minutes of Comité Ejecutivo Central, Bogotá, 9, September 1959, Box: Secciónal Cundinamarca, 
MOCLAMAR. 
 
380Manifiesto: MOCLAM organismo al servicio de los intereses de la clase media se dirige al país y 
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concrete aspirations…ours is a class representation that is not connected [ajena 
a] to any political sectarianism …our only concern is a fundamental democratic 
revolution.381 
 
This class-based campaign would comply with their notion of proper politics by 
avoiding “political sectarianism,” but it nevertheless envisioned a “fundamental 
democratic revolution” in society so that Colombia could reach into the “level of the 
most industrialized and powerful nations of the world.”382 Moreover, the minutes the 
very first meeting argued that only through the redemption, promotion and 
renovation of democracy could these professional men bring about a political and 
social revolution, transforming an “undemocratic, old, disorganized, violent and 
traditional society of classes” into a “democratic and modern middle-class 
society.”383  
Although several historians would quickly dismiss these discussions as empty 
rhetoric or the assertions of a short-lived and somewhat reactionary, political 
movement bound to fail, in this chapter I argue that this political movement deeply 
influenced the practices and meanings of democracy during the first years of the 
National Front. I question the enduring view of the middle class in Latin America as 
having little, if any, associative life: that is, the historical understanding of the middle 
class as politically inconsequential. These professionals wrote letters, composed 
poems and stories, spoke on radio periódicos, coordinate political meetings, 
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published journal of opinion and founded professional organizations in their 
collective struggle to organize themselves as middle-class men. In interrogating these 
activities I ask: what were the political meanings these professional men put in 
practice through their campaign for a middle-class democratic revolution? In all, and 
in contrast to social science literature that takes for granted the historical meanings of 
democracy and their putative relationship to a middle class, in this chapter I question 
how these professional men struggled to enjoy certain democratic rights in order to 
structure a hierarchical middle-class society. In so doing I demonstrate how, rather 
than opposed and irreconcilable with one another as is commonly assumed, 
democratic practices and hierarchical class rule were profoundly interpenetrated.384  
                                                 
384 As I hope it became apparent in chapter 2, the role of professional women in educating the 
laboring classes and the oligarchs was crucial in structuring a peaceful and democratic society was 
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the executive committee of MOCLAM. An easy and rapid understanding of this crucial role could 
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professionals politically organized themselves as middle-class women in order to campaign for a 
constitution of a middle-class democracy. In a couple of broadcasts of MOCLAM’s radio periódico, 
Fanny Valencia invited women to “leave behind the middle-class lethargy.” Very much part of a 
middle-class redemption movement, she said that as professional women they should perform 
democratic jobs according to their sex and class. If we not only want to putatively assign a middle-
class agency to certain historical actors, I think it is crucial to see, as it is eloquently suggested by 
Fanny Valencia’s invitation, how these professionals constituted themselves as middle-class women 
in the very process of demanding a transformation of an “old, undemocratic society of classes” into a 
“middle-class society.” Regretfully, for this task I have not been able to find enough historical 
sources. Now, this also speaks to the argument of this chapter, as I want to interrogate how a middle-
class political campaign was premised—as much as it sought to structure—a gender and class order. 
Currently, I am tracing the story of several professional organizations created during the second half 
of the 1960s, particularly the Asociación Femenina de Profesionales, El Colegio de Abogadas, the 
Asociación de Trabajadoras Sociales, the Asociación Médica Femenina, the Asociación de Mujeres 
Profesionales, and Asociación de Secretarias y Oficinistas. Recently, I have been able to make some 
contacts with Georgina Ballesteros and Amanda Montejo, who have graciously agreed to grant access 
to their personal archives, which hopefully may prove a very important ethnographic site to see how 




The Middle Class Society Must Be Defended: Who belongs to the middle class? 
[Quién integra la clase media?]  
 
As explained in previous chapters, the consolidation of the National Front 
during the late 1950s sought to overcome, through gradual measures, the violence 
experienced during the late 1940s and 1950s. This National Front was a Liberal and 
Conservative power-sharing arrangement that formally endured for sixteen years. 
Under this agreement, the presidency was to be transferred at four-year intervals, 
cabinet posts were divided between the two parties, and all other elective and 
appointive posts were to be shared equally.385 Historians have consistently argued 
that the National Front accord was, following a process of containment, a narrow 
form of consociationalism that allowed only members of the nation’s traditional 
liberal and conservative parties to have access to the electoral and political process.386 
I argue that the National Front administrations reflected not only a formal power-
sharing arrangement, but also a search to consolidate an appropriate way to do 
politics. As explained in previous chapters, as part of larger transnational discussion 
on how to create modern and democratic societies, National Front administrations 
(especially the liberal side) sought to modernize politics—that is, to overcome La 
Violencia and political bossism—by promoting the professionalization of the social 
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and political relations among different class groups. Moreover, anxious imperial and 
national administrations struggled to select, train and constitute a middle class as 
proper political force—and not just as a transcendental apolitical class as we usually 
assume—that often functioned to strengthen the politicization of the society in 
general and the middle class in particular, even if those policies were an attempt to 
forestall the “improper” politics. 387 In this process, the middle class became 
associated with the possibility of abandoning a confrontational style of politics and 
imagined communist practices and, consequently, properly engaging in what was 
understood as a “peaceful, democratic and participatory civic culture.”388 By the 
early 1960s, middle-class professionals became indispensable for the project of 
transnational rule, operating as anchors of political stability and, certainly, and as 
evidence that this new—and appropriate—way of doing politics was indeed working.  
And yet, as I argue in the previous chapter, professional women and men 
reworked these transnational discourses. In attempting to educate the oligarchs and 
the laboring classes to experience democracy and live beyond confrontational 
politics, these professionals mobilized their own project of class and gender rule. In 
so doing, these middle-class professionals reworked their assigned democratic role in 
the nation, as well as redefined the very notion of proper politics.389  
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As part of these struggles, during the late 1950s and 1960s, those middle-class 
professional men engaged in heated class discussions on why, how, or whether they 
were entitled to set up a political organization for the middle class—discussions that 
were materialized through radio speeches, social surveys, letters, telegrams and 
missives. Well into the first National Front administration of Alberto Lleras 
Camargo, MOCLAM and its executive committee were extremely preoccupied with 
discussing what was considered “the problems, desires, aspirations, frustrations and 
concerns of the most important class in the nation.”390 In doing so, MOCLAM 
engaged in pedagogical strategies and persuasion tactics that became crucial to 
constituting of a political movement as a gendered middle class. During the late 
1950s and early 1960s, several members of MOCLAM argued that the middle class 
needed, above all, a political redemption—a rallying cry that was soon echoed 
through various venues. MOCLAM contended that the middle class had, if anything, 
committed several “demoralizing political mistakes,” putting its members in a state 
of perpetual crisis. Indeed, its middle-class members could not find—let alone 
reclaim—themselves as middle class precisely because they had perpetually felt “out 
                                                                                                                                                 
this process was manifested in the increase union membership that grew from 250.000 to 700.000 
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of joint…politically and socially.”391 In 1962, Rafael Viera Moreno, the executive 
secretary of the Central Committee of MOCLAM, went even further by claiming 
that, perhaps above all, the middle-class men could neither redeem nor reclaim 
themselves politically or socially because “by now everyone believe[d] they [were] 
middle class.” Such a demoralizing political mistake, Viera Moreno said, could only 
lead the middle class into a “political limbo”—that is, into an eternal state of 
oblivion and neglect—precisely because socially everyone wanted to be middle class 
and, thus, no one could potentially have the right to politically “speak for the middle 
class.”392 Therefore, MOCLAM argued, the middle class had suffered a 
“phenomenon of popularization.” The only way to redeem the middle class was by 
determining socially who was truly middle class, as well as politically naming who 
could speak for what was considered the most important class in the nation. This task 
was quite important precisely because this process would not only depopularize the 
middle class but also, and most importantly, redeem and reclaim the political 
belonging to and longing for a middle class. It was a redemption that could only take 
place, moreover, by overcoming a tradition or a past of demoralizing political 
mistakes, lack of class consciousness and political oblivion.393  
As part of this process of redemption, MOCLAM engaged in several modes 
political persuasion to succeed in such a “difficult task.” Trying to reaching out to 
“those who [were] middle class,” in late 1959 the executive committee agreed to 
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send some letters to major newspapers in Bogotá. The goal was to mobilize middle-
class men political and defend their social interests. Indeed, it invited men to get 
involved in politics in order to defend their class as part of a political campaign of 
gendered class politics. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, some of these 
newspapers published excerpts of these political missives written by several 
members of the MOCLAM executive committee. La República, a conservative 
newspaper, for instance, published an excerpt of the letter Millan Puentes wrote in 
December 1959,  
Dear middle-class colleagues: there is nothing more logical [than] for this 
conglomerate to recognize our interests. Although we are a leadership class, and 
even the spiritual and material force of the nation, we have been indifferent to 
knowing who we are and what we are capable of…and because of that we have 
been located within the social, political and economic organization as a 
sandwiche [sic], that is, we are neither from above nor from below. This is so 
true that we continue to be a dispersed class that has fallen into anarchy, in 
which every member of this class lives by forgetting the interest of those akin to 
him. We vegetate believing that we are big, even when we are so small: in other 
words we have nothing to satisfy our basic needs, we are hungry indeed, and we 
keep up appearances so nobody knows we are hungry. Given this situation, laws 
are always for the benefit of the lower and upper classes, but never for those 
who bring democracy, justice and equality…we must be ready to reclaim and 
obtain greater social, economic and political affirmation, and defend our rights 
and the rights of our sons.394  
 
And yet, in order to defend these rights and reclaim a political place in the nation, it 
was first necessary to delineate —in gender and class terms—those who were truly 
entitled to speak as/for a middle class. In January 1962, along with the continuous 
submission of letters to newspapers, the Executive Committee of MOCLAM agreed 
to commission Rafael Viera Moreno to develop a general census of the Colombian 
middle class. Viera Moreno, an accountant with far-reaching experience in social 
                                                 




statistics, was put in charge of the task of providing a “very good idea of who, in 
social terms, compose[d] and made up Colombia’s middle-class.”395 Although it has 
proven impossible to find any statistical tabulation, Viera Moreno composed a letter 
to be sent out to state offices, bank agencies, some industries and private companies 
to solicit data. Along with this letter, Viera Moreno attached a form to be filled out 
by “those who [felt] compelled to do so.”396 Although it is unclear whether these 
letters and forms were ever sent out,397 the very concern with characterizing the 
middle class in statistical terms worked as a way to persuade middle-class men to 
overcome a tradition of demoralizing political mistakes and, instead, struggle for a 
political right and entitlement to speak collectively as a middle class. In the letter, 
Rafael Viera Moreno encouraged respondents to answer “honestly, consciously, 
faithfully and, [above all] in a masculine way,” as they would begin integrating an 
organization speaking for the middle class.398 Viera asked the readers to give detailed 
answers to questions about their “profession, specific job, position in the office, 
education, instruction and previous position held in other companies or state 
                                                 
395Comisiones de trabajo, Comité Central, Bogotá, 11-14, January 1962, Box: Secciónal 
Cundinamarca, MOCLAMAR. Rafael Viera Moreno published a small statistical work in the late 
1940s and it was precisely this experience that would help, it was argued, for the development of the 
middle class census. See Rafael Viera Moreno “Situación económica de las clases medias,” Mes 
Financiero Económico 6, 7 (1946): 29-41. I will keep looking to see if I will ever be able to find any 
tabulation of these forms. In early 1970s, another middle-class organization, National Unity of the 
Colombia Middle Class (UNCLAMECOL), was founded. Although not related to MOCLAM, they 
shared several political demands and argumentations. UNCLAMECOL also attempted to do a middle-
class census during the late 1970s.  
 
396Comisiones de trabajo, Comité Central, Bogotá, 11-14, January 1962, Box: Secciónal 
Cundinamarca, MOCLAMAR.  
 
397Ibid. So far I have not been able to locate these forms and letters beyond the MOCLAMAR. 






institutions…residence and family composition.” Through this survey, according to 
Viera, it would be possible to know who the members of the middle class were, what 
they did, what they wanted and, most of all, who wanted to be part of MOCLAM.399 
More importantly, Viera Moreno attempted to persuade the readers by inviting them 
to believe that the political consequences of the survey could become a reality. 
Pondering these implications, he elaborated five main avenues by which “a middle-
class can become the center of the nation.”  
 
1. Only through a survey will the middle class achieve the goals and 
objectives proposed by MOCLAM. 
2. Through a survey we will be able to know who the members of the 
middle class are, what they do, how they live, who wants to be part of 
MOCLAM 
3. It is the only way the government, the nation and the society will 
pay attention to our rights. 
4. It is the only way to unite, communicate and raise awareness 
among the members of the middle class 
5. It is the only way to show the precise plan of action and appropriate 
orientation we are struggling for without demagogy—the manipulation of public 
beliefs just to gain power or popularity. 400  
  
Equally important, in 1962 MOCLAM founded a radio periódico suggestively 
called “the middle class hour at your service.”401 Although the radio periódico 





401Comisiones de trabajo, Comité Central, Bogotá, 28-35, March 1962, Box: Secciónal 
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1930s with the emergence of the March Revolution by Alfonso López Pumarejo. The former was 
specifically owned by a Manuel J Gaitán, an enthusiastic liberal. Some sources suggest that the 
Middle Class Hour at Your Service got on air because it promoted how to overcome the problem of 
violence in the nation. In a report of the radio periódico, it was said to MOCLAM, “a program like 
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initially consisted only of newspaper articles read aloud, it was increasingly 
dedicated to ongoing discussions of how to overcome the passive tradition of the 
middle class and thus constitute a political organization for the middle class. Jorge 
Méndez Calvo and Francisco Ricaute, professional accountants who hosted the hour-
long program, on February 19, 1962, called upon their middle-class listeners to 
become committed to their class.402 Méndez Calvo and Ricaute expounded 
extensively upon the allegedly demoralizing political mistakes made in the past and a 
middle-class tradition of political passivity, and began to narrate very short 
anecdotes that could resonate with the experiences of middle-class listeners. In one 
of those stories broadcast on April, 12 1962, Ricaute described the tale of unnamed 
men from a forgotten class who had no idea who they really were.403 Taking place in 
the recent past, the story depicted the everyday experiences of those who, although 
unnamed, were “dedicated professionals” who complied with the law, and above all, 
made the country move forward. Despite paying such an important role, these 
unnamed men did not see a clear path to find their “true interests,” nor were they 
compelled to do so. Indeed, they did not want to have a name. Some weeks later, still 
using anecdotes with the similar tropes and characters, Ricaute argued that, although 
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it was the principal base for a democratic social structure, the middle class was 
politically unnamed and, more to the point, had a “strong lack of class 
consciousness.” These examples of the past, continued Ricaute, affected the middle 
class in a circular fashion, since the lack of a class consciousness meant that nobody 
could claim their interests as—or as belonging to—the middle class. And since no 
interest could or membership could be claimed, by implication anybody would be 
entitled to speak for or about the middle class. Consequently, a representative, 
middle-class consciousness was difficult to raise.404 
Perhaps because of this constructed tradition, MOCLAM invited radio listeners 
to send letters explaining what specifically could define this important yet unknown 
class and who was part of it.405 Luis Carlos Gutiérrez attempted to inform listeners 
by contending that the middle class was composed of “several social” groups. This 
did not mean, he cautioned, that the middle class was an amorphous group of men. 
Rather, it was a problem of “political insensitivity” and “deracination.” In the 
political goal of becoming a named class, it was necessary to clarify and 
(re)appropriate the boundaries and the definitions of those who did not know where 
they belonged.406 As he eloquently remarked in 1962,  
If we must, and only if we must, put everything in one sentence, we could say 
that the middle class consists of those men who do not known where they 
belong…listeners. If you do not know whether you belong to the peasants and 
working class and you do not belong to the capitalist one…you are part of the 
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very much forgotten middle class…a middle class that acts between the rich and 
the poor and never knows who they are.407 
 
Perhaps as a response to Ricaute’s call, MOCLAM received numerous letters, 
telegrams and messages with requests to talk, write and debate about the middle-
class, the importance of supporting a middle-class political organization, and the 
politicization of the middle class in the present of the nation and the future of 
Colombia. While they agreed upon the importance of creating a middle-class 
political organization, professional men often disagreed sharply over the precise 
meanings of that political organization. Fernando Cortés, a professional working for 
COLSEGUROS, for instance, recalled in oral history how after the airing of this 
aforementioned radio show his life took a different path. If before, Cortés 
remembered, the daily routine of going to work as an insurance agent was pointless, 
now with all the talk about the middle class, the radio periódico made him wonder 
who he really was. His life, he said, took on a new meaning as “he and his peers”—
as a middle class—became conscious of their responsibilities, discovered who they 
could be, and moreover, became aware of the possibility to go beyond their “home 
and office.”408 
Drawing on their own assigned role as proper political governors, these male- 
dominated class discussions—usually translated into letters, radio speeches, 
messages and telegrams sent to the radio show and MOCLAM—became a space to 
advance a political campaign for what professional men referred to as the most 
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important political task: the redemption of the middle class. Indeed, in order to claim 
political legitimacy to speak as/for the middle class, this redemption could take place 
by “saving the middle class from oblivion, nothingness and unconsciousness.” In the 
very process of exercising this political practice these professionals concretely 
sought to define, occupy, demand and struggle for a hierarchical political and 
gendered position as middle-class men.  
As part of this process, professional men engaged in writing about a past not as a 
way to justify a political project that was already in place, but rather, and perhaps 
more importantly, as the very ground on which their political subjectivities as men 
were conjoined with the institutionalization of a middle-class collective self.409 
Although they were often contentious, most of the letters sent to MOCLAM and the 
radio periódico created a narrative about a past as a training and learning space 
constituting the political activities and definitions of what these professionals men 
could potentially become in the present and in the future as a middle class—political 
practices that should demarcate both the limits and the possibilities of what could be 
said, done and recognized as belonging to and as a part of a longing for a gendered 
middle class.  
Specifically, in writing these letters, professional men put forward two main 
interlocking tropes to assert a middle-class politics—an utopian narrative where, or 
through which, a future time and place would hold the promise of a new political 
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order in which a middle-class society could indeed materialize. As a political 
imaginary, it was a time and a place that could actually come into being by 
recollecting and reminiscing, as well as forgetting, the traces that connected an 
imagined middle-class “undemocratic tradition” with a new present and potential 
future defined as democratic. This use and recounting of the past was not merely a 
set of symbols, idioms and ideas that attempted to justify present practices. Nor was 
it a set of unchanging prescriptions to be referenced in the present. Rather, I argue, 
the narrating of a contested past tradition enabled a political campaign to create a 
(new) middle class—and in the process, redeem, reclaim, redefine and practice what 
it meant, politically, to be part of that “new democratic middle class.”410  
In 1963, for instance, José Marulanda, who signed his missive to the radio 
periódico as a true middle-class accountant, wrote a lengthy letter to “humbly 
collaborate in the crusade of middle-class redemption.”411 In the past he had felt 
disoriented, misunderstood and isolated, wrote Marulanda, because there was neither 
an association that could represent his interests nor a movement to speak for his 
rights and obligations.412 According to him, this disorientation was precisely the 
result of an “ancestral legacy of the middle class’s past.” Addressing an imagined 
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male audience, Marulanda continued by claiming that this legacy had produced a 
middle class with no class consciousness, whose men had only been alienated from 
their own class: that is, they had “rejected themselves as men of the middle class.” 
Now, in the present and in the future, Marulanda was envisioning an organization 
that could put the middle class onto a path of redemption, thus overcoming those 
“cowardly errors and sins of the past.”413  
Other professionals, however, begged to differ as to whether such a middle-
class tradition ever existed. In what may be considered as a sort of response to 
Marulanda, in 1963 “another man of the middle class,” wrote a short letter arguing 
that political redemption was necessary not because there had been an absence of 
middle-class consciousness, but rather because there had been no middle class at all 
in Colombian history. Jairo de Jesús Trujillo, a doctor from the Instituto de Seguros 
Sociales, wrote that if a middle class had indeed existed, the Colombia past would 
look strikingly different, because if middle-class men had arrived “at the right time 
and the right moment,” Colombia could have avoided experiencing La Violencia. 414 
Imagining a past with or without middle-class men was of political utility to advance 
and legitimize the formalization of a middle-class organization that could properly 
play the very role that it had not played in Colombia’s past. To belong to and long 
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for a middle class in the future to come was, in contrast to an imagined past tradition, 
“to be the buffer of the society…the buffer between rich and poor…the 
peacekeeper…the democratic promoter.”415  
And yet, other listeners and writers sharply opposed this argument. Francisco 
Henao, a white-collar employee in a private company, shared the political 
preoccupation with founding a middle-class organization, but he contended that the 
main problem was that, up to that point in Colombian history, “a middle class [had] 
only been a middle class.”416 Arguing teleologically, he claimed that the historical 
evolution and progress of Colombia would necessarily move the middle class “to be 
part of those at the top of the society.” But precisely because Colombia’s history had 
not followed that path of progress and evolution, given the Colombian elites’ 
reluctance to “allow anybody into their spheres,” it was necessary to form an 
organization that could help speed the process by “fulfilling” these class aspirations, 
allowing the middle class to become more like “those at the top.” Only then, Henao 
wrote, would the middle class free itself from its ancestral legacy, precisely because 
those aspirations could be met by becoming “like those from the elites.”  
Others questioned this legitimization of a middle-class political organization 
by becoming more like elites. During the late 1950s and 1960s it was precisely this 
political argumentation of trying to be more like elites—an  ancestral legacy, as 
some professionals called it—that became a constitutive yet excluded Other defining 
the possibility of a middle-class redemption. If there was a deracinated middle 
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classness—that is to say, a class easily “forgotten” by the nation, a class destined to 
be “buried into oblivion” by a society and a class with “no men in its constituencies 
to speak up”—it was precisely because “pretentious, insensitive, inauthentic and 
careless men” had, in the past, limited themselves to mimicking the elites.417 If the 
middle class could merely become part of the elites, Fernando Castaño wrote in his 
letter, there was no need for political organization, since the elites themselves were 
powerfully represented in the life of the nation. As Castaño elaborated, these middle-
class men that wanted to be considered part of the elites should be excluded from 
masculine membership in the true middle class, as they had only served as 
“promoters of the exploitation of the poor by the rich.”  
Although it is unclear whether this was a specific response to the letter from 
Francisco Henao, during several broadcasts Regulo Millan Puentes and Ovidio 
Rincón criticized this form of political legitimization, as it doomed the middle class 
to “political misery.”418 Other letters, moreover, voiced the same criticism and 
elaborated further arguments about how supporting a middle-class political 
organization that wanted to mimic the elites would be a mistake of terrible political 
consequences. Hernán Sandoval, a professional accountant working for the 
Contraloría General de la República, pondered the claim that the middle class in the 
past had been “socially selfish” at worst, and “politically individualistic” at best. One 
of the major manifestations of those “crimes of the middle-class past,” he wrote in 
1964, was precisely the “false appearances and embedded social climbing” that 
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inevitably had forced its class members to be in a position of political inferiority in 
relationship to other social classes.419  
Jaime Montoya, a “concerned and desperate man of the suffering middle 
class,” wrote a rather extensive description of the middle-class situation. In his letter, 
it is quite clear how an “undemocratic middle-class tradition” became a matter of 
crucial political utility in constituting themselves as middle-class men. Again, this 
tradition came to constitute a position of Otherness that simultaneously legitimized 
and questioned the very possibility of organizing a political association that would 
defend what they considered to be (new) middle-class rights, obligations, privileges 
and interests. Montoya argued that the in the past, the middle class had lived in a 
state of slavery. Very aware of how little sense it would make to talk about slavery in 
Colombia during the recent past, he wrote in late 1962 that this slavery had not been 
“barbaric,” but rather “very contemporary.”420 To consolidate a male political role 
required professionals to depend neither on a “heartless state master and insensitive 
elite” nor on “laboring classes who take good care of themselves.”421 After years of 
slavery—narrated as a past tradition in which the middle-class men had been “social 
climbers toward the elites and servants of the laboring classes with no compensation 
for their own [middle class] interests,” it was time for the “great men of the middle-
class” to win their “just right” to inhabit certain political and social positions in the 
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nation. Previously, afraid of public scandal and convinced that their interests were 
either those of the elites or those of the lower classes, these professionals had 
produced a class silence that only served to make the middle class politically 
available for “corrupt politicians who [were] willing to promise whatever was 
necessary.”422  
By attempting to create an undemocratic middle-class tradition—constructing 
the middle class as composed of selfish, individualistic social climbers, but also 
silenced, enslaved, unheeded and unconscious men—these respondents were 
engaging in a debate over the structure of an organization that could politically 
authorize who could speak democratically for the middle class. In some of the very 
first radio broadcasts of “The Middle Class Hour at Your Service,” during February 
1962, Francisco Ricaute explained how belonging to a political organization that 
would speak for the middle class depended on breeching the divide between an 
internal life and external sphere—a class consciousness defined as the relationship 
between each middle-class male individual and the life of those who shared the 
social space to which they belonged.”423 By using a teleological, gendered narrative 
of a past tradition, he now envisioned a belonging to, and identification with, a 
middle class as the very process of moving away from a “middle-class, undemocratic 
legacy…and a past of cowardly behavior” forward a “virile…present [and] future.” 
In so doing, these members of the middle class could finally experience a putatively 
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masculine present defined as “socially conscious and politically active.”424 In this 
(new) middle class, these professional men could utilize their “knowledge and 
professionalism to give opinions about society and political matters of the nation,” as 
well as to speak up “for the interests of [their] middle class.” Indeed, Ricaute insisted 
on an organization through which they could both defend their professional dignity 
in a manly fashion and claim the right to occupy a middle-class position. Now, in 
contrast to a constructed feminized alternative tradition, the middle class had to be 
integrated by virile men who could speak and stand for their own class. In order to 
do so, it was necessary to perform as a middle-class men by creating an organization 
that could—“in a manly way and constructively”—confront “those who [were] the 
owners of the capital, which is a minority, and those who [did] not have anything, 
which is the mass of workers and peasants.”425  
 By constituting this imagined feminized tradition, these professionals were 
able to envision a struggle to structure a society where they, as middle-class men, 
could become recognizable as “the center of the nation.”426 Very much articulating 
transnational discourses about the importance of a middle class in achieving 
democracy and peace, middle-class professionals not only supported certain policies 
or presidential programs, but more importantly, advanced a political campaign to 
characterized the middle-class past as a perpetual condition of “oblivion and 
nothingness.” In this process, these professionals were now authorized to consolidate 
                                                 








a different society—a masculinized one, above all—where the “middle class [could] 
live for the nation…and the nation could live for the middle class.”427  
 Thus after many years in the “darkness of ignorance,” the true middle class 
could only emerge by gaining political self-recognition and recognition from others 
in society. Sigifredo Vallejo, a member of the National Union of Accountants, 
argued that it was not so difficult to fight for recognition of the middle class in the 
various political spheres of the nation.428 Carlos Varela, a member of the 
ASMEDAS, however, sharply disagreed. For him, it was precisely this putative 
easiness that did not allow the middle class to gain proper political recognition. This 
assumption, moreover, would lead many to think, again, that “anybody could do 
what middle-class men do for the nation.”429 In his succinct but very telling letter, he 
asked the potential (male) reader to place himself in a “hypothetical moment.” 
Imagine, he asked in 1963, a nation with no professionals in sight—a nation with no 
doctors, no architects, no accountants, no agronomists, no sociologists, no dentists. 
How, he asked, was the nation to work without the middle class? One could easily 
say, Varela continued, that a “worker could build a building but never design one as 
architects do…a businessman could have money and know how to spend it but never 
know how to do the professional accounting…a peasant could own the land and 
work it but never know how to make it productive as agronomists do…a construction 
foreman may know how to assign tasks to workers on the construction site but never 
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know how to plan as engineers do…a charlatan could prescribe drugs but never take 
full care of patients as doctors do.”430 Thus, the recognition of the middle class was 
difficult to achieve, he argued, precisely because without a middle class, a nation 
could only be destined to live “a hypothetical moment” where professionals did not 
exist. As he wrote in his 1963 letter (and as would be reproduced, without 
acknowledgement, in the middle-class manifesto),  
From the middle class emerged not only the best brains that feed the 
administrative activities of the nation but also the development of public and 
private activities. The most dedicated activities of the state are run by middle-
class professionals, the administration of justice, the public order, the accounting 
of private and public companies, the heavy work of several banks, the design of 
the buildings of the nation, our nurses and doctors take care of the sick…in 
every productive sphere the presence of the middle class is felt…the middle 
class is the human group characterized by an eminent intellectual capacity, 
endless dedication to work and the compliance and respect for the norms. 431  
 
And in the middle class manifesto was added,  
 
We understand. It is indispensable to advocate, with a sense of class, for our 
middle class, and in harmony with other class spheres and not in a state of 
combat with them. The bosses must understand that their security depends on 
our tranquility…to be middle class is to make urgent the transformation of the 
Colombian society without the problems many of the elite have when trying to 
do so, since the middle class does not stick to traditional interests…to be middle 
class is to make urgent transformations without the problems of the working 
class and the peasants, who have not yet had the opportunity to consider their 
unthinking demands. To be middle class is not to disdain the businessman who 
put his capital to work socially …To be middle class is to understand the 
problems of the proletarian. To be middle class is to speak with one voice, 
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From Redemption to Revolution—The Middle Class Liberation Movement and 
Professional Colonialism 
 
Although other historians might only see metaphors and meaningless rhetoric in 
these statements, I argue that these contested retellings of a constructed, feminized 
middle-class history became instrumental as an illustration and a political Other that 
was constantly cited in phallocratic class discussions, debates, letters, radio speeches, 
projects and campaigns in the campaign to create a middle-class democratic society. 
Furthermore, these political practices, arguments and democratic demands were 
crucial in the constitution of what came to be known, during the late 1950s and 
1960s, as the Middle-Class Liberation Movement. Although never a formal 
organization, this liberation movement was a political project that emerged through 
the intense discussions, struggles, debates and everyday political practices among 
professionals who, above all, shared similar occupational experiences, since most, if 
not all, were subjected to selection and training in transnational and state institutions 
such as the Organization of American States, the United Nations, the United States 
Foreign Offices, CARE, ICT, the Federación Colombiana de Cafeteros and several 
other state institutions.433 Indeed, as shown in the previous chapter, these 
professionals shared experiences when attempting to educate both the elites and the 
laboring classes on how to live in a democratic and peaceful society. Frustrated and 
experiencing a collective deception, these agronomists, architects, accountants and 
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rural extensionists began to lobby members of congress, to send hundred of letters to 
presidents and state functionaries and to write petitions to government officials—all 
demanding legislation in favor of what they considered to be a middle-class 
liberation movement.  
More specifically, this middle-class liberation movement emerged as a project 
responding to what some professionals considered to be the political limitations of an 
organization such as MOCLAM. In 1961, a number of professionals composed a 
letter of constitution arguing that, if a middle class should “live for the nation…and 
the nation [should] live for the middle class,” its representative political organization 
could not just claim for a class redemption.434 Although in constant dialogue with 
MOCLAM, this middle-class liberation movement also struggled for “a democratic 
revolution” in the Colombian society and the nation. This revolution would be 
difficult to ignore, some professionals argued, because it would take place only 
through democratic struggle. 435  
  As part of a democratic political project that sought to educate the oligarchies 
to become the elites of the nation, professionals found themselves frustrated—in 
gender and class terms—at not being able to succeed in that difficult democratic 
assignment. The middle-class liberation movement was an alternative and 
simultaneous classed and gendered campaign to untangle those frustrations at not 
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being able, as several professional argued throughout the 1960s, to do their job. 
Now, I would argue, as the oligarchs were seen as not becoming proper elites in 
order to “eliminate the political bossism of the past” and establish a peaceful and 
stable nation, these men, in order to become true middle-class professional men, 
needed to change “a traditional, elitist, oligarchical, restricted, unequal society of 
classes” into “a more democratic [one]…with the middle class at the head of the 
society.”436 In order to do so, a “true and democratic revolution” would need to take 
place that would legitimize as leaders those men who, on the one hand, “really [had] 
the mental capacity to understand a democratic revolution,” and, on the other, had 
nothing else in mind than “to replace a disorder with order, exchange violence for 
peace, move the society from backwardness to progress…[and] replace particular 
interests with the interests of the nation as a whole.”437 
Fernando Agudelo, a very active member of this liberation movement, 
recalled in his oral history that he began coordinating meetings to talk about 
“professional issues” with several friends from the Instituto de Crédito Territorial 
(ICT) and other local state institutions.438 Usually after work, he remembered, they 
started organizing political get-togethers in a downtown café and at colleagues’ 
houses, since they felt there were “very important concerns in [their] lives as 
professionals.”439 Among these, Fernando argued, was that, as the letter of the 
movement’s constitution reiterated, neither the elites nor the laboring classes should 
                                                 









be at the center of the leadership of the nation. After encountering those above and 
those below as part of their democratic political assignment, these professionals 
argued that the former—the oligarchs—suffered too much from “undemocratic 
patterns,” and the latter—the laboring classes—had “a lot of human potential” but 
were “not ready for democracy yet.” Thus, inevitably, it seems, middle-class 
professionals needed to be at the head of the nation if, Fernando wrote in several 
unpublished papers, democracy were indeed to function.  
But in order to create this “form of democracy”—that is, a middle-class 
society—the liberation movement needed to create appropriate conditions. Fernando 
recalled how in the very first meeting in the early 1960s, the point of discussion was 
that this form of democracy would face many obstacles before it could become a 
reality. Furthermore, during our conversation, he felt compelled to bring out a paper 
he wrote then to demonstrate what “was really happening at the beginning of the 
movement.”440 This paper, suggestively entitled “Gringo Colleagues,” argued that 
the major obstacle to democracy was “the so-called country of the north: the United 
States.” According to his unpublished paper, the U.S. and democracy were “a 
contradiction in terms,” not only because a country could not be democratic when it 
attempted to impose its “will on others for monetary profits,” but also, and for 
Fernando more importantly, because “the United States [did] not let [them] be 
democratic.”441 
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While we were rereading this unpublished paper, Agudelo was eager to add 
“a couple of points to make things clearer.”442 We always heard, he said, that the 
United States was the “father of professionalism, scientific progress and democracy.” 
But how could it be so? According to Agudelo, other professional colleagues had 
discussions on how this way of viewing the United States was indeed “superficial.” 
“They were the father of nothing,” Fernando eloquently insisted, since professionals 
were the result of historical processes and not because “they came here.” 
Professionalization was a natural result, he elaborated, of national progress and thus 
made the “need for more democracy” inevitable, which simultaneously required 
more professionals. Thus, he concluded, the United States was not the father of or 
model for Colombia’s middle class. For him, this was a “sophism of distraction” to 
keep the national professional “disoriented” and under the “weight of the United 
States.”443  
And yet, argued Fernando, one of the main political campaigns of the middle 
class liberation movement was precisely to invite “professionals to be aware of this 
sophism of distraction.” It was common, he wrote in his unpublished paper in the 
early 1960s, to see how middle- class professionals in Colombia did not see the 
“gringos as colleagues” but rather as “unreachable superior experts.”444 Offering 
some examples to demonstrate his point, he wrote that middle-class professionals 
could not become a democratic force precisely because they only wanted to “show 
deference to the gringos.” In contrast, the middle-class liberation movement wanted 
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to “remove those thoughts and sentiments,” making others aware that there was no 
need to “show deference,” since there was nothing to “envy from the gringos in our 
professional quality.”445  
As part of this middle-class liberation movement, furthermore, some 
professionals began to organize what was soon institutionalized as “round tables” in 
offices, homes or cafes, as well as publishing newsletters and bulletins summarizing 
the main points discussed in those male-dominated round tables in order to inform 
“professional men about the middle-class liberation movement.”446 Through these 
discussions, debates and deliberations, they envisioned and even demanded the 
materialization of a middle-class democratic society. To do so, it was imperative to 
initiate a manly struggle to seek and reclaim “national professional sovereignty.”447 
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movement eventually began joining more radical political movements. 
  




This struggle could only take place by becoming new professional middle-class men 
who were liberated from what was often suggestively referred to as “professional 
colonialism [coloniaje profesional].” This form of colonialism, it was argued, had 
destined the middle class to a state of “undemocratic perpetual dependency upon the 
United States with respect to the affairs of the Colombian nation.” In what seems to 
have been one of the very first newsletters issued as a result of these round tables, an 
architect named Israel Guerrero published an editorial discussing the role of the 
United States as a central force of what professional men were assigned to do and the 
role they should play “in a changing society.” Guerrero detailed, furthermore, how 
this role assigned to middle-class professionals—“to be the conscience of the 
nation…to defend the national future…to speak for [and about] the nation…to alert 
others of the dangers to democracy…to guide the destiny of the people”—had been 
hindered by this professional colonialism, which “had been taking place in Colombia 
for a long time.” 448 Many “naïve…weak and cowardly professionals,” continued 
Guerrero, could not understand that there was a clear influence between the United 
States and how professionalization in Colombia was taking place. Imagining a male 
readership, he asked in his editorial what the relationship was between an engineer, a 
doctor, an architect, an accountant and North American influence. At first glance, he 
answered himself, there was no such relationship. But a closer look would reveal 
how the United States wanted to intervene in the “professional intelligence of the 
nation.” Furthermore, continued Guerrero, the United States wanted to “influence 
and control” what professional men did and thought, precisely because of “what the 






middle class [was] able to do for the nation.” The United States wanted the middle 
class, Guerrero concluded, to follow “certain models” that could benefit “North 
America’s interests” at the expense of the interests of the Colombian nation.449 
These conditions, contended Guerrero and a number of other self-appointed 
spokesmen for the male middle class, created a professional dependency on the 
“country of the north,” as it was assumed to be the model for how to play the role of 
the best leaders of the nation. And precisely because that model was premised upon 
an “undemocratic need of the United States” to impose its will and advance its 
interests, Colombian professionals could not depend on this model, since they 
wanted to “work in a democratic way.”450 Thus, this movement for “progress, 
democracy and professional advancement” would fight for the liberation of the 
middle class from any “colonial bond” with the United States. Indeed, the movement 
would struggle to be liberated from “U.S. professional colonialism.” In this way, 
Colombian professionals could exercise their intelligence, technical training and 
professional values entirely at the service of the Colombian nation.  
In later editorials and articles, professional men continued to discuss these and 
similar problems. In September 1961, for instance, Miguel Giraldo, an architect 
working for the ICT, presented some remarks about “the conditions of professional 
colonialism.”451 Giraldo argued that this type of colonialism was a process through 
which the United States wanted to make itself into a “democratic leader of other 
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nations.” Making some international comparisons, Giraldo structured his argument to 
demonstrate that “any type of colonialism was out of sync… [and] out of place.”452 
Out of sync because one could see how even “backward places such as black Africa 
and the Middle East” were being shaken out of the “dark night of colonialism”; thus, 
it was impossible that Latin America, “a more advanced society,” could still be 
experiencing “a professional dependency on the United States.” As a result, the 
United States was acting backwards—that is, out of sync—precisely because it 
wanted to promote professional colonialism. Similarly, this type of colonialism was 
out of place, because, argued Giraldo, some gringos believed that Colombia was a 
country with the “same level of intelligence and professional and cultural stage of 
those from Africa.” Either out of place or out of sync, this professional colonialism, 
Giraldo concluded, could lead many to believe that there were neither “middle-class 
men to do their democratic job” nor an “independent professional intelligence to be 
recognized and respected.”453  
And this was precisely what the middle-class liberation movement was 
campaigning against. As various professional men declared in newsletters and 
bulletins during the early 1960s,  
Our professional sovereignty…the ability to claim primary and supreme 
authority in the national affairs… [we want] to claim the right to direct the 
course of the Colombian nation according to our professional values, training, 
intelligence… hopes, aspirations and ideals. We [want to] possess [that training] 
without foreign interference or control from extra-national forces; [we] claim 
our professional and intelligence sovereignty for Colombian professionals, 
staking a claim to that which is within our domain as professionals. This domain 
is characterized by our desire to lead the present and the future of this nation by 
putting to work our scientific, technical and professional training at the service 
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of the greater good…[we] claim professional sovereignty, as we are mentally, 
physically and morally capable of providing a democratic leadership with no 
foreign intervention.454 
 
Thus, professional colonialism would come to an end when professional 
sovereignty could be “gained in a true and manly fashion.”455 And this was a central 
demand among middle-class professionals during the late 1950s and early 1960s, as 
agronomists, doctors, accountants, sociologists and some economists began holding 
annual conferences.456 Although promoted and organized as occupational meetings, 
these conferences became heated transnational phallocratic conversations through 
which, I would argue, these professional men fought over the political meanings of 
being middle class and rehearsed their political campaign for structuring a 
democratic middle-class society by engaging in what they called the liberation 
movement of the middle class. During those years, professional men started traveling 
to various countries in Latin American (Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, Puerto Rico and 
Mexico) and began, when possible, to create alliances to advance the materialization 
of their political demands so that the concerns of the Colombian middle class could 
be heard on an international scale.457 In 1963, for example, a group of accountants 
went to Chile to take part in the Inter-American Conference for Accounting 
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organized by the Organization of American States and the United Nations. Besides 
presenting formal papers, they used those opportunities to reach “continental 
colleagues,” as well as to discuss “the future of the middle-class liberation 
movement.”458 After this meeting in Chile, Colombian professionals were able to 
maintain sporadic—yet very productive—correspondence with accountants from 
Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. In 1964, they were able to organize the 
Congreso de Contadores Bolívarianos with the support of the National Union of 
Colombian Accountants and MOCLAM, inviting participants from different 
countries.  
The very first meeting of this congress took place in Quito, Ecuador, and 
although it was organized as an occupational conference, there was little discussion 
of formal professional matters. Germán Giraldo recalled how this conference was 
anything but a professional meeting. At issue was, instead, the situation of the 
middle class in Latin America. As one of the central figures of MOCLAM and a 
person actively involved with the middle-class liberation movement, Giraldo played 
a critical role in the formalization of this short-lived—although very important—
continental middle-class organization. Giraldo, along with Clodomiro Rodríguez, 
was assigned to write the inaugural speech, which was to be recited in front to the 
Monument of Bolívar in Quito, on July 24, 1964.  
Although Clodomiro Rodríguez recited the speech, the presentation was 
discussed, prepared and written by Giraldo and Rodríguez. While doing so, they 
engaged in a discussion about what one might now call the content and the narrative 
of the speech. For Rodríguez, the speech had to be centered on questioning the role 
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of the United States in the consolidation of a professional sovereignty. While re-
reading his sketchy outlines for the inaugural speech, Clodomiro argued that this 
intervention was, above all, a struggle against “the giant of the North.”459 Indeed, for 
him, to be a professional middle-class man meant to engage in the very defense of 
professional sovereignty—that is, the struggle to be professionally entitled to 
command the technical, scientific and professional knowledge of the nation, a task 
that replicated the major demands of the middle-class liberation movement. 
Although he did not have any preliminary notes, Giraldo argued that if a middle-
class liberation movement was to have some political resonance, it was necessary to 
go beyond these complaints. Thus, Giraldo contended in the speech, and still insisted 
when he discussed its drafting with me, the task was to call upon professionals to 
draw on what I would call a homosocial past—“the past of those who were true 
men,” through which professional men could learn how to proceed with this middle-
class liberation movement.460 Moreover, this homosocial remembering became the 
very ground though which political demands could be materialized for the 
constitution of a middle-class society—namely, the democratic right to enjoy the 
“democratization of the Colombian society, professional independence and 
intellectual sovereignty.”461 
As a result of these male discussions, it seems, the final version of the speech 
reflected Rodríguez and Giraldo’s political concerns and arguments. To make the 
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point as clear as possible to the middle class, they recalled, it was important first to 
give examples that could tap into the experiences of middle-class professionals.462 
And from there to move into what it was possible to do “for the liberation of the 
professional middle class away from the Yankee’s control.”463 In doing so, 
Clodomiro began the speech by asking some questions about professional 
experiences. In front of Bolívar’s monument in Quito, he asked a presumably 
middle-class male audience,  
How many of you have seen a national job being stolen from you because a 
gringo is seen as more qualified to do this job? How many cases have you seen 
where the gringos get hired by the government to write an opinion about the 
future of your country? How many of you have seen gringo experts supposedly 
working for your country? These are two-bit experts [expertos de pacotilla] that 
only want to write reports, with no knowledge of the national reality to benefit 
their country and so we are in perpetual dependence…where we depend on them 
on what to say about our countries.464  
 
This was the perpetual dependence, along with what they called “exploitation of 
intelligence and professional monopolization,” that the middle-class liberation 
movement had to campaign against. If previously, Clodomiro and Rodríguez wrote, 
the middle class could wait for “the gringos and the oligarchs to recognize” the 
importance of the professionals for the nation, it was now imperative to take an 
“active and manly posture to unite the professionals to fight against professional 
colonialism.”465 
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And to illuminate that “manly posture,” indeed to become professionally 
liberated, they argued, Bolívar was close at hand to offer some political guidance. 
The historical role of Bolívar became a homosocial past—that is to say, “the stories 
of those men and their organizations, their political and social relations, as well as 
the lives of those men who have united to liberate our countries from the foreign 
burden”—that offered a political guide to reorganizing the situation of those middle-
class professionals.466 Above all, then, professionals should experience, and embody, 
those “virile and libertarian standards of Simon Bolívar” in order to create a 
democratic middle-class society with independent and intelligent professionals 
leading the Colombian nation.467 In the same way as Bolívar, these professional men 
now represented “middle-class liberators” of the vast and progressive expanse of the 
Americas. And as such progressive, virile and liberating men, they had to incarnate 
what Bolívar had faced in order to fight against professional colonialism and, at the 
same time, reclaim professional sovereignty. Professional middle-class men should 
possess, furthermore, “strength, energy…impartiality, professionalism… [and a] 
strong drive toward justice and democracy” in order to engage in a liberation 
crusade. Thus, once these masculine traits from a homosocial past were recuperated, 
embodied and performed in a manly way, a new political and social order could 
come into existence. As Clodomiro proclaimed under the (male) gaze of Bolívar’s 
statute in Quito, 
…our professionalism and intelligence must be similar to [Bolívar’s]. He 
overcame all odds. Just like he did, we want to form a movement of professional 
independence. Today we represent a new mentality and we represent the six 






nations he liberated, and we promise to make his vision and projections of unity 
into reality in order to defend ourselves from the rampant voracity of the pirates 
of the United States. With our professional intelligence as our only weapon, we 
are a force to specify the demands of the middle class…because we have the 
guidance provided by Bolívar…and Bolívar wherever you are, from the heights 
of your position enlighten us to take the right path to democracy…And Bolívar, 
wherever you are, from the heights of your position listen to our demands. Oh 
Bolívar, oh America we demand professional independence, justice and 
democracy.468 
 
As it is suggested in this vehement speech, these professional men attempted to 
reconstruct a homosocial past of those who were historically engaged in liberation 
causes as a way to work out a national democratic middle-class campaign. This past, 
embodied in the male figure of Bolívar, was a political inspiration for the struggles to 
liberate the middle class from professional colonialism. In so doing, these men were 
also campaigning to constitute themselves as sovereign professional middle-class 
men in charge of leading the nation along a democratic path. 
 
The Democratic Struggles for Intellectual Labor  
Despite the shared assumptions of some recent scholarship, labor—and more 
specifically intellectual labor—was hardly incidental or accidental; rather, 
intellectual labor became paramount in the political discourse configuring the 
interests, concerns and demands of this middle-class liberation movement and its 
political campaign to authorize middle-class men as sovereign professionals to lead 
the nation—and the middle-class society these men were attempting to structure. As 
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several letters written by professional men suggest, the participation in the nation of 
the middle class, composed of professional workers, could no longer be ignored, as it 
was now to imagine a time to come when this gendered class should embody an 
“eminent intellectual capacity.”469  
Through written letters and regular discussions, several professional 
organizations, along with MOCLAM, demanded that this intellectual capacity should 
be embodied by professional men who had a “natural democratic right” to occupy 
their proper and normative middle-class position in the nation and to become a 
liberated middle class.470 Clearly drawing upon transnational discourses about the 
importance assigned to the middle class in democratic societies, discourses which 
were appropriated and promulgated by the National Front political agendas during 
the early 1960s, numerous professionals asserted that if Colombia had “not been able 
to attain democracy,” it was precisely because the labor of professional men—that is, 
their intellectual labor—had been neither recognized nor valued as “a democratic 
force in the nation.”471  
More specifically, these professionals demanded that as men performing 
intellectual labor, the middle class should occupy neither a “privileged” position, like 
the oligarchs, nor an “underprivileged” condition, like the laboring classes, but rather 
a gendered place of “valuable and democratic equilibrium in society.”472 
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Consequently, professionals constantly demanded that this democratic and balanced 
position could only be gained by elevating the value of the intellectual labor they 
were producing for the nation. As several hosts and guests of the middle-class radio 
periódico said on the air and as “true and humble” middle-class professional men 
wrote in letters, discussed in round tables, debated in informal meetings and 
eventually published in the middle-class manifesto, 
The middle class has never been seen as an important part of the nation. It is like 
we do not exist…and Colombian democracy depends on us, as we can be 
situated in a place of precious equilibrium. To be middle class is to use our 
intellectual labor to know how to appease the spirits of others… We are the 
professionals who think for the nation…we are patriotic thinkers. The time has 
come to claim our future, using our heads to claim social justice and 
freedom…to work especially for a democratic society, to work eminently for the 
middle-class society. This is our democratic struggle. 473 
 
 
And it was indeed a political struggle constituted in everyday political practices. 
In 1961, for instance, Gabriel Castaño, a “frustrated man of the middle class,” wrote 
a letter to the first president of the National Front, Alberto Lleras Camargo, 
complaining about the undemocratic situation of the nation.474 This situation was to 
be blamed on the government’s and society’s “loss of vision” regarding what 
middle-class intellectual labor would be able to achieve. According to Castaño, it 
was impossible to believe how the National Front, and more specifically Lleras 
Camargo, could still see Colombian society as composed of “a tiny oligarchy and a 
mass of workers.” It wass as if, Castaño argued, “middle-class professional [did] not 
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plan, think and use [their] intellect for the development of the nation.”475 Although it 
is unclear if Lleras Camargo ever responded to his letter (and most likely he did not), 
some months later Castaño wrote a new missive demanding to be considered “part of 
a specific nation [parte de alguna nación],” given the fact that he, as a professional 
man, would only “work, serve, live and think” for that nation.476 Castaño wanted to 
remind the government and the society that if Colombia wished to reach “the heights 
of developed countries,” it needed to remember that the middle class was entitled to 
embody a democratic right to belong to the “thinking nation [nación pensante].” 
According to Castaño, a democratic society should integrate, rather than exclude, 
four nations—the peasant nation, the working-class nation, the oligarchic nation and 
thinking nation. More importantly, all the members of the society should be 
“integrated” into some nation. Indeed, he demanded that, as members of society, all 
members had a democratic right to belong to a specific nation. Integrating the 
nations into each other, this democratic right, he demanded, should represent the 
distribution of the “virtues and qualities of life,” corresponding to “what everybody 
[was] able to accomplish.” As he wrote in his nineteen-page letter to Lleras Camargo 
in 1961,  
A Nation of peasants able to work the land for the richness of the nation…a 
nation of workers working for the production of the nation…an elite nation 
putting capital to the service of the nation…and a nation of democratic 
professionals thinking for the greater good of the nation.477  
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Although exceptional in its length, Castaño’s political arguments and demands 
were by no means unique. In 1963, Luis Botero, an engineer working for the ICT, 
submitted a short story to a writing contest organized by the agency’s headquarters in 
Bogotá. The writing contest invited ICT personnel to write stories, tales, poems or 
essays describing preoccupations and concerns of their life as professionals.478 
Perhaps following these suggestions, Botero wrote a political short story 
suggestively titled: “The cobbler should stick to his last [zapatero a tus zapatos]”479 
In it, he depicted the story of three male members of society who met in a social 
gathering. When introducing themselves, the story went, the three men had the 
chance to describe what they did for a living. The first member of the society, wrote 
Botero, was an “important businessman in a company located in Bogotá.”480 His 
main concern was to make his company “bigger and more productive” so he could 
offer more opportunities for employment for those who really needed it. The second 
member of this society, described as an outstanding, talented and intelligent 
professional, was interested in “think[ing] about strategies, tactics and plans for the 
betterment of the greater national good.” Finally, the third member, Botero wrote, 
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was a “worker of peasant origins who had recently been hired to manufacture glass 
containers.” Indeed, Botero endeavored to demonstrate how every member, as part 
of the “society as a whole,” was entitled to perform the “tasks they were supposed to 
do.”481 
And yet, this rather repetitive narrative of harmonious conversations among 
these male members of a society and the different tasks they were entitled to perform 
was abruptly interrupted by a discussion that, Botero implied, potentially threatened 
the harmonious “social gathering.” With the outstanding professional as a central 
character of the conversation, an exchange takes places at the very end of the story 
through which the implication of the title becomes all too clear: Botero portrayed 
both the worker and the businessman as “giving too much advice about what [the 
professional was] able to do.” According to the narrative, this professional was 
“bombarded with suggestions on how to perform his job, what to do, what to 
say…and even what to think.” After tolerating so much unsolicited advice, the 
professional concluded that, with all due respect, they “should each tend to their own 
business and develop the virtue pertinent to what each and every one [was] able to 
achieve.”482 
This short story was a specific political argument, I would contend, through 
which professionals like Luis Botero repeatedly demanded the right—that is, the 
privilege—to embody the virtue of intelligence and, more importantly, to be 
recognized as the thinkers of the nation. Furthermore, these democratic demands 
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attempted to hierarchically split places and occupations that assigned roles to middle-
class professional men, elites and workers according to what were constructed as the 
virtues, vocations, qualities and merits of the different members of the nation. In this 
hierarchical sharing, several middle-class professionals men demanded the right to 
enjoy a position as the pinnacle of refinement and as thinkers of and for the nation 
while assigning, even celebrating, on the one hand, the role of the workers as “the 
sweat of the nation” and the role of the elites as “potential social investors…[and] 
producers,” on the other.483 In demanding this democratic right, it was argued, a 
democratic middle-class society could materialized precisely because this society 
would be based on homage to hierarchical distributions of labor, dedication, 
occupations, tasks, assignments and roles specific to “the conditions of each and 
every member of the society.”484 Indeed, the campaign for this universal democratic 
right, and the middle-class society it sought to materialize, was constructed upon a 
particular exclusionary inclusion of others who would be hierarchically situated, 
performing tasks, qualities and virtues other than to think, precisely because it should 
follow the “democratic principle” of permitting, tolerating and, above all, respecting 
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The Democratic Struggle for the National Intellectual Capacity  
As middle-class professional men demanded the entitlement and recognition of 
their intellectual labor for the nation as a central part of the middle-class liberation 
movement, they argued that this was the “democratic pursuit of the 20th century.” 
According to MOCLAM, for some participants in the middle-class liberation 
movement and several other professional organizations during the late 1950s and 
1960s, democracy was not yet a reality in Colombia precisely because there existed 
some obstacles that did not allow those professional to become part of the thinking 
nation. As I argued previously, among these obstacles was the way that the 
“government and the oligarchs” constantly privileged, as I argued previously, the 
“foreign intellectual capacity or brainpower for the leadership of the nation.” Several 
professionals who were not formally affiliated with the middle-class liberation 
movement, but who shared similar political demands, wrote lengthy letters and 
protests to Lleras Camargo requesting that he explained such undemocratic 
practices.486 In these missives, self-defined dedicated middle-class male 
professionals engaged in political argumentation and persuasion to claim, struggle 
for and demand not only the recognition of their intellectual labor for the nation, but 
also, and equally important, their ownership of what Marco Soto, in his 1960 letter to 
the president, suggestively called “the criolla and autochthonous national 
intelligence.”487 Soto, a professional working for a municipal housing office, argued 
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that if Colombia wanted to be a “democratic…developed and industrialized society,” 
it should not allow the monopolization of this national intelligence in “U.S. and 
oligarchic heads.” According to him, and several other professionals, Colombia was 
not a democracy precisely because “the government and the oligarchs” were hesitant 
to recognize “the modern and democratic moment that Colombia” was experiencing 
and, hence, did not want to “popularize”—that is to say, universalize—the national 
intellectual capacity.488 
It is not coincidental that during the late 1950s and early 1960s accountants, 
dentists, social workers and sociologists were actively engaged in struggling for the 
professionalization of their occupations. Although it is tempting to argue that these 
movements merely sought the legitimization of their professions, as several scholars 
have contended, I would argue instead that these processes were a central part of a 
political campaign to organize themselves as middle-class men. 489 In claiming what 
they considered a universal democratic right, these professionals simultaneously 
demanded particular gendered and classed notions of who contributed to the 
“autochthonous and national intelligence.” Indeed, these demands also sought to 
classify how that intelligence should be practiced as a central part of becoming 
liberated from “foreign interests.”  
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By defining this national intellectual capacity as the “talent…to know how the 
nation should be organized for the greater democratic national good,”490 these 
professional men continually demanded the right to own this national intellectual 
capacity, precisely because neither oligarchs nor foreign experts had the ability or 
talent to understand the problems of the nation.491 More specifically, professionals, 
in becoming middle class, would need, first, to pursue the universal democratic task 
of promoting the “greater national good”—certainly in contrast to the elites, who 
were only interested in satisfying “their own well-being” at the expense of the 
national welfare. Second, they would also engage in “knowing the social 
reality/problems of Colombia”—in contrast to the foreign experts, who, although 
interested in offering solutions to “problems of poverty,” were quite “detached from 
Colombian society.”492 Thus, these professionals, as middle-class men, should have a 
particular right (i.e., a privilege) to own a national intellectual capacity, because they 
would put it in practice universally by “leading, organizing and planning” the society 
only at the service of the “greater democratic/national good.”493 Indeed, the middle-
class professionals would exercise their national intellectual capacity for the 
democratic/national good precisely because they would hierarchically distribute the 
virtues, abilities and tasks that “every member of the society” was specifically 
                                                 
490 Minutes of Comité Ejecutivo Central, Bogotá, 1-7 November 1963, Secretaría organizacional, 
Box: Secciónal Cundinamarca, MOCLAMAR. 
 
491 Ibid. See also, Minutes of Comité Ejecutivo Central, Bogotá, 1-4, March12, 1964, Secretaría 
organizacional, Box: Secciónal Cundinamarca, MOCLAMAR.  
 
492 Minutes of Comité Ejecutivo Central, Bogotá, 1-4, March12, 1964, Secretaría organizacional, Box: 
Secciónal Cundinamarca, MOCLAMAR.  
 




capable of developing, performing and contributing to the nation. This democratic 
demand, and the middle-class society it sought to materialize, were gendered as well 
as classed, since it was middle-class men who were entitled to put the national 
intellectual capacity into practice and decide how to situate and include/exclude 
those unsuited to the tasks of thinking, planning and organizing the Colombian 
nation. As several professionals demanded during the late 1950s and 1960s, 
…the national intellectual capacity is for those who are able to put it to work in 
the interest of the nation… intelligence is for those who use it. 
 
Precisely because these demands were at once universal and particular, they 
became simultaneously practiced and imagined together with political desires, 
gender identifications and class aspirations. Although one could argue that these 
ideas were metaphors that merely informed some political demands, my argument is 
rather that those classed and gendered desires were instrumental in both the very 
formation of the political campaign of the liberation movement and the democratic 
middle-class society they were seeking to structure.  
Even as these aspiring middle-class professional men demanded a right to own 
the national intellectual capacity, they lamented “the devastating influence from 
elites and foreign countries on the weak middle class.”494 Numerous professionals, 
for instance, wrote detailed papers explaining what they thought it was the 
undemocratic situation of the middle class.495 Although never published, these 
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papers were a political space through which professionals could claim their demands 
as middle-class men. Fernando Lópera, a doctor in the Insituto de Seguros Sociales 
who was actively affiliated with the middle-class liberation movement, wrote in 
1962 about the importance of defending the national intellectual capacity. Lópera, 
together with many professionals like him, argued that there was a middle class to 
which he did not “want to belong.” More importantly, this other middle class, he 
implied, could not be entitled to own the national intellectual capacity, because they 
were either actively mimicking “the selfishness of the oligarchs” or passively 
importing “the foreign brutishness.”496 Furthermore, he asked, how could this other 
middle class have the right to exercise the national intellectual capacity—that is, to 
guide the nation for the greater national good—if they were acting “like women who 
love[d] to be snobs.”497 Moreover, continued Lópera, these feminized professionals 
passively respected “high social positions [and] all that is foreign,” as well as 
“disowned the authentic nation…the peasants, the working class, the poor.”498  
This feminization was a problematic aspect of the Colombian middle-class 
tradition that would prevent some from becoming true middle-class men. In 
reconstructing a history of this middle-class tradition, Lópera hoped to offer the very 
political ground upon which his demands as a middle-class man could be 
legitimized, authorized and secured. According to him, this tradition, or past, 
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consisted of two sequential and feminine stages in the “importation of foreign 
brutishness [brutalidad extranjera].”499 First, argued Lópera, this past covered a 
historical period from the independence decades of the early 19th century through the 
beginning of the 20th century. During this historical period, the oligarchs, “with no 
real men among their constituencies,” had only been concerned with living 
“europeamente…they wanted to think as the French, walk like the English and be 
like the Italians.” No doubt, he concluded, during this period, the elites, instead of 
“facing the real and the realities of the Colombian nation,” were desperately and 
irrationally seeking to be European.500 
The second stage was categorized as the “Coca-Cola phase” and consisted of the 
period after Europe was displaced by the United States, when “Panama was 
shamefully removed from the Colombian nation in 1903.”501 Since then, mimicking 
the “cowardly actions of the elites” in the 19th century, the middle class had wanted 
to “think like gringos, walk like Yankees and drink coca-cola.” For Lópera, this 
backward tradition was not only an obstacle to “middle-class independence” but also 
a “potential social danger,” since if this “yankizada” and feminized middle class 
were to own the national intellectual capacity, a democracy could not take place.502 
Lópera cautioned that, unless a middle class composed of manly professional men 
were to own and defend the national intellectual capacity, “a new epoch of violence, 
disruption, backwardness [and] discord would be inevitable.” This violence, in 











contrast to the one experienced during the 1950s, could not be explained by 
“loyalties to traditional parties,” but rather, as the consequence of the “middle-class 
crime of cowardice.”503 Thus, insisted Lópera, the national intellectual capacity 
should be democratically represented by those national professionals who were 
“manly enough” to face the “the problems and realities of the nation.” As he wrote 
1962,  
To be middle class…is to collaborate in making the Colombian nation one of the 
greatest nations of the world…to be middle class is to put the Colombia nation 
in the ranks of the most industrialized nations…we deserve to think for 
ourselves… We are the ones who work for the nation. We are the ones who 
know the nation… we are the ones who can spread justice, equality, order and 
peace.504  
 
Among professionals there were, however, sharp class disputes during the late 
1950s and 1960s over the political grounds on which to acquire these democratic 
rights. In 1963, several professionals working for private insurance companies and 
state offices drafted and signed a lengthy letter to MOCLAM arguing why “foreign 
authority,” and more specifically, “United States influence,” had become too 
pervasive and productive to simply renounce or ignore.505 Specifically addressing 
those professionals associated with the middle-class liberation movement (although 
not mentioning them), and other professionals who shared the movement’s political 
demands, these self-defined true middle-class men argued that there should not be 
any contradiction between this inevitable U.S. influence and the development of the 
national intellectual capacity. In fact, this influence would make this national 
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intellectual capacity more democratic, these professional men argued, as it would be 
possible to show the world how middle-class men could guide and take care of the 
Colombian nation.506 
And this was indeed the political ground put forth to reclaim the democratic 
right to enjoy possession of the national intellectual capacity. Sharing the political 
claim that the oligarchs were not in any “position to represent the nation 
democratically,” these professionals declared that they as true men could stand up for 
the nation and make it to the “level of the most industrialized countries of the 
world.”507 Seeking the political authorization to practice the democratic task of 
national representation, as entitled bearers of national intellectual capacity, these 
professionals argued that there was another middle class that could claim this 
democratic right precisely because its members suffered from a “parochial 
professionalism.”508  
In a most telling passage of the letter, these professionals explained to 
MOCLAM how this parochial professionalism was clearly manifested by certain 
professionals who were acting with a “feminine vision and outlook.” More 
importantly, this parochialism was leading some professionals to behave like 
“traditional women who never get out of house [mujeres godas que nunca sale de su 
hogar].”509 By juxtaposing the concrete abstractions of home and nation, these self-
defined true and sophisticated men argued that such parochial professionals—that is, 











presumably those associated with the middle-class liberation movement—could not 
be entitled to exercise the national intellectual capacity precisely because they were 
acting too feminine. They were acting like women not only because they did not 
want to see beyond the home/nation, but also because they were too “sentimental.” 
Thus, the parochial professionals lacked the male objectivity needed to exercise the 
national intellectual capacity to guide the nation democratically.  
Unlike the reputedly feminized parochial professionals, however, these true men 
of the middle class demanded and deserved the right to embody the national 
intellectual capacity and to put it to work, precisely because they could “compete” 
and “talk face to face on equal terms” with “other men of the industrialized 
nations.”510 Furthermore, these sophisticated and competitive men, with knowledge 
that extended beyond the borders of the nation/home, could take their place as men 
in front of those men from powerful countries and defend the Colombian national 
intellectual capacity.  
And yet again, there were other professionals who contested this political 
association between parochialism and the inability to exercise national intellectual 
capacity. Although they shared the belief that middle-class professionals were 
entitled to the leadership of the nation, numerous professionals demanded for 
themselves this democratic right as a vital part of creating what they also considered 
a middle-class democratic society. During the first half of the 1960s, several 
editorials published in the newsletters and bulletins of the middle-class liberation 
movement claimed that, if these sophisticated middle-class professionals were manly 





enough to stand up before “the men of the world,” they nevertheless lacked a “manly 
capacity” to face the problems of the nation. Inculcated with the theories produced 
by the country of the north, they should not be entitled to the democratic right to 
exercise the national intellectual capacity, since they supported professional 
colonialism, a major undemocratic as well as unmanly manifestation.511 Asked one 
editorial, “How are we going to do the work of democracy if these [sophisticated 
professionals were] nothing more than backward, incompetent and unproductive 
empty vessels of the United States?”512 The editorial continued by claiming these 
supporters of professional colonialism were just like women precisely because their 
activities merely mimicked and served big owners; like women, these professionals 
were enamored of “fancy desks and luxurious offices,” forgetting “the reality of the 
nation.”513 It was impossible for a “man in the all breadth of the word” to forget the 
reality of the nation after working closely with the situation of the poor, the peasants 
and the working classes. But as these sophisticated middle-class professionals 
remained in their comfortable, if unmanly, office chairs, their intelligence could not 
include any “capacity for national understanding.”514 Characterizing the office as a 
quintessentially feminized place, the critics claimed these professionals were not 
                                                 
511 Rafael Sabogal, “De profesionalismo y otras cosas importantes, “Noticias al servicio de los 
profesionales del estado, 1-2, April 1963, MCLMAR. See also, Alfonso Segura, “Tareas 
profesionales del hoy y del mañana,” Noticias al servicio de los profesionales del estado, 3, March 
1964, MCLMAR; Marco García, “Todo pasa y algo queda,” Noticias al servicio de los profesionales 
del estado, 4-5, July 1964, MCLMAR.  
 
512 Alfonso Segura, “Tareas profesionales del hoy y del mañana,” Noticias al servicio de los 




514 Marco García, “Todo pasa y algo queda,” Noticias al servicio de los profesionales del estado, 4-5, 




manly enough, as they had neither experiential knowledge of the country nor 
familiarity with “the idiosyncrasies of the Colombian people.”515 Both undemocratic 
and unmanly, these professionals were unfit to embody the right to own the national 
intellectual capacity as a political requirement for leading the nation.  
 
“It is Our Wealth.” Intelligence as a National Treasure 
This gendered and classed rivalry continually defined the political campaign to 
constitute a middle-class society. As previously noted, during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s professionals began to participate in occupational conferences as part of 
a political movement of liberating the middle class from “U.S. professional 
colonialism.” In 1960, for instance, several accountants went to Chile to the Inter-
American Conference of Accounting. Juan Emilio Echeverry, a professional who 
participated in this conference, remembered it as a “life experience.”516 They went 
there, he said, to inform the professional of the continent about the middle-class 
situation in Colombia. Although they stayed only few days in Chile, he continued, 
they found new opportunities to concretize support for the “middle-class cause” and 
the fight to become the “bearer of the national intellectual capacity.”517 Although 
most of the panels and papers were admittedly about the details of their occupation, 
Echeverry said, he presented one of the few more political pieces in the 
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conference.518 He presented a paper, he told me in an interview, about the role of 
accounting as a patriotic and humanistic profession, as well as how its professional 
knowledge could be placed at the service of the nation.519 Originally he had hoped to 
publish it in a journal, but he never pursued that goal. Now, as we read it together, he 
reminded me that its importance was, above all, political, as it was written at a 
moment in which their “professional dignity…middle-class pride… and national role 
were at stake.”520 Furthermore, when I insisted on getting into the details of the 
paper, he felt compelled to explain a point that, although indisputable, was crucial 
not to miss. He said,  
This was a struggle between men…true men. We wanted to be respected as 
middle class and as a nation. We have the professional knowledge and 
experience to take care of our house…we had our sentiment of nationality…we 
wanted to put our intelligence at the service the nation. This was a struggle 
between men…national men and foreign men for the pride and knowledge of the 
nation. And with this intelligence we want to purify, dignify and exalt the 
professional dignity. 521  
 
 In this unpublished paper, Echeverry wrote to the “the professionals of the 
continent” so they could become aware of the situation of the middle-class liberation 
movement in Colombia. He structured his paper by making constant comparisons 
between past historical foreign interferences in Colombia during the 20th century and 
what he considered more recent and dangerous U.S. interventions. As was becoming 
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commonplace, Echeverry narrated the past as the very political ground through 
which he could claim his male middle-classness. In the 1930s, Echeverry wrote in 
his paper, Colombia—defined as “the nation, the society and the government”—had 
faced a serious and complicated international conflict in which the society as whole 
defended “the land [that] belonged to the Nation.”522 In 1932, Echeverry recounted, 
over 300 armed Peruvian civilians seized the Amazonian harbor town of Leticia in a 
demonstration against the Salomón-Lozano Treaty of 1922. This border settlement 
treaty had conceded the territory to Colombia. In a quick response, Echeverry 
narrated, “the men of the fatherland” sent 1,500 soldiers to “repel the aggressors.” If, 
he asked at the conclusion of his paper, during the Peruvian-Colombian conflict of 
the 1930s there had been a national consensus to defend “a piece of land that 
everyone knew belonged to the nation and was being viciously stolen,” why did 
nobody seem to care for the national intellectual capacity now? According to 
Echeverry, the most dangerous U.S. intervention was neither military nor economic; 
rather, it was the “exploitation, manipulation, mistreatment and monopolization of 
the most important national treasure [tesoro, fortuna]…and natural resource 
[recurso natural]: the national intellectual capacity.”523 And precisely because 
nobody—neither the elites nor feminized middle-class professionals nor the laboring 
classes—could defend the natural resources of the nation, the masculinised middle-
class professionals were entitled to exercise “the democratic obligation” to protect 
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professional intelligence, as a “natural part of the nation,” from “U.S. invasion, 
occupation and influence.”524  
 This political demand was echoed during the middle-class liberation 
movement’s round tables and publications, as well as MOCLAM political meetings. 
At the same time, with the formalization of the National Front, dentists, accountants, 
sociologists and social workers lobbied in Congress requesting for the recognition of 
these professions. As argued previously, also at issue was their demand to be enabled 
to “fulfill their duties as Colombians and defend the national resources of the 
nation.” “Stop allowing the exploitation of national treasures,” a telegram declared in 
1963; “our intelligence is only ours…listen carefully only to ours,” wrote two 
“misunderstood middle-class professionals.” 
And perhaps because of these misunderstandings, MOCLAM frequently invited 
professionals to its radio periódico to voice their concerns and discuss those 
“undemocratic problems in Colombia.”525 In 1964, for instance, an incomplete 
transcript shows Gustavo Ramírez, a professional account participating in the 
MOCLAM radio program, interviewing a guest; his questions indicate that the main 
political preoccupation was to invite the audience to be aware of the “the resources 
of the nation.” Besides the formal questions of occupation and profession, Ramírez 
asked the guest what were the main problems of the nation with regard to the lack of 
democracy. And, perhaps as result of the answer he received, Ramírez felt compelled 
to wonder about what was the “most important natural resource available in 
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Colombia.” After asking these questions, and probably after extensive answers by 
the guest (for there were no additional questions listed), Ramírez made what it seems 
to be a mandatory invitation to his middle-class listeners:  
The time has come to be democratic…and face the situation of the nation…It is 
time for you to be a man and wear the pants of the nation …until now we have 
had our pants down, and it is time to pull them up… the most important source 
of national wealth is not the land nor the great industries, the most important 
source of natural wealth for a nation is the intelligence of their men…pull up 
your pants and defend the natural resources of the nation. 526 
 
Perhaps as a response to this incontrovertible invitation to engage in political 
and masculine endeavors, several professionals wrote long letters denouncing the 
exploitation of the national intellectual capacity and demanding that this treasure be 
reclaimed as a constitutive part in structuring a gendered middle-class society. 
Furthermore, echoing what they had heard on the middle-class radio periódico, 
various professionals contended that it was “a social injustice” to allow “foreign 
hands and heads” to exploit the intelligence of the nation.527 In 1965, Jaime 
Domínguez, a self-described concerned middle-class father, forwarded a letter to 
MOCLAM he had previously written to President Lleras Camargo. In this missive, 
Domínguez complained about how unjust this was, since intelligence, cultivated on 
an everyday basis, could be easily “taken away.” To make his point, Domínguez 
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described his routine as a middle-class father, engaged in preparing his eight-year-
old son for “the challenges offered by the nation.” Reading stories every day, 
teaching what was important in life, preparing “the environment” to go to school, 
Domínguez argued, he wanted “to endow his brain” so that his son could become “a 
true man of society at the service of society.”528 In doing so, continued Domínguez, 
he was passing on to his son the “most important and inalienable heritage: 
intelligence and education.” And this was precisely the reason why Domínguez 
found it so unjust that this heritage—as a natural virtue to be embodied through a 
process of everyday cultivation and education—could be undervalued by “preferring 
foreign influence” over the one “that [was] truly at the service of the nation.” Still, 
Domínguez hoped, as he described telling his son, this heritage could not be easily 
taken away since, in the process, it had become “an inalienable part of the [national] 
mind.”529  
Other listeners and writers went even further, perhaps responding to the 
inescapable invitation from the MOCLAM radio periódico announcer. If the national 
intellectual capacity needed to become an inalienable democratic right owned by 
middle-class men, that intelligence had to be nationally masculinized. That is, those 
professionals demanded that the national intelligence be practiced and embodied by 
“true…middle class…intelligent men.”530 Furthermore, by assuming a “feminine 
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role/responsibility,” this elitist middle class had allowed the national intelligence to 
be “exploited…penetrated and violated” by U.S. influence. Understood in sexual 
terms, and in contrast to this feminized middle class, the middle-class professionals 
would, performing as men, actively protect the intelligence from any “foreign 
penetration,” as well as defend its brainpower, like a natural resource, from any 
“overseas abuse.” They could become middle-class men by putting to work their 
“virile” professionalism to stand up like men for the democratic 
right/privilege/obligation to not only guide the nation but also, and just as 
importantly, defend its most “important…productive and lucrative natural resource.” 
Now, more than ever, these middle-class professionals would have the “pantalones 
bien puestos” so their masculinity would not be at stake as they were guarding their 
“national intellectual capacity from any violation.”531  
In conclusion, these middle-class professionals challenged what they considered 
an undemocratic society. Working, imagining and practicing their political demands 
intelligibly within a transnational discourse framework which closely associated the 
middle class with the possibility of achieving a democratic and peaceful society, 
these professionals demanded democratic rights to possess a national intellectual 
capacity as a central part of the creation of a democratic middle-class society. In 
doing so, these professionals wanted to become not the center of the nation—that is, 
in the middle of oligarchs and laboring classes—as those transnational discourses 
proclaimed, but rather, “democratic heads of the nation.” In the process, they 
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challenged what would soon come to be know as “United States professional 
colonialism” in order to struggle for the constitution of a new democratic society. 
This society would replace the “old society of classes” that was characterized, on the 
one hand, by “petty oligarchs” who led the nation only in the service of their “own 
tiny interests,” and on the other hand, by a colonial mentality privileging “foreign 
professional preparation…and profits” when guiding “the paths of the nation.” 
Professionals politically campaigned to create this new democratic society by 
reclaiming intelligence and thus their democratic right to head the nation 
democratically because, contrary to an “old and undemocratic” oligarchic 
democracy, they could do so by universalizing the interests of “the society as a 
whole” and for the benefit of “the greater national good.”  
At the very same time, this constitution of a democratic society was constructed 
upon the appropriation of what came to be known as the national intellectual 
capacity as a particular democratic right to be exercised neither by feminized elites 
nor by poorly prepared laboring classes, but rather by manly middle class bodies. 
Furthermore, these professionals demanded that their intellectual labor—central to 
the creation of a democratic society—be politically and socially recognized as a 
masculine endeavor to be performed by manly middle-class men. Finally, they 
challenged U.S. “professional colonialism” by claiming ownership of the national 
intellectual capacity—politically imagined as a natural resource or treasure—to be 
owned, protected and defended by middle-class men in the interest of the society as a 
whole. This political campaign, at once universal and particular, became crucial in 
the constitution of a middle-class democratic society that would allow these middle-
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class men to inhabit a hierarchical position above middle-class women, the elites and 
the laboring classes.  
 
An Association in Accordance with Our Class  
Along with MOCLAM and the middle-class liberation movement, professional 
men intensified the formalization of professional associations as part of this very 
much-contested middle-class political campaign. Although during the late 1950s this 
formalization was characterized by isolated associations discussing occupational 
matters, by 1963, when Guillermo León Valencia took office as the second president 
under the National Front, various occupational groups—veterinarians, animal 
scientists, agronomists, general doctors and eye doctors, architects, nurses, dentist, 
social workers, chemists, ear-nose-and-throat specialists, most of them professionals 
working for social state institutions such as ICSS and ICT—founded the Federación 
Colombiana de Profesionales Universitarios (FEDEPROCOL). Although it was not 
officially inaugurated until 1965, this organization had been active in struggling for a 
democratic middle-class society since the early 1960s. 
During the first years of this organization, and through constant critical dialogue 
with MOCLAM and the middle-class liberation movement, professionals engaged 
themselves in rather heated debates about the type of organization they wanted to 
form. Usually concerned with legitimizing the class taxonomy, the very first years of 
this professional organization were characterized by heated male disputes about the 
goals, interests, purposes and objectives that middle-class men should politically 
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endorse.532 Above all, some argued, the organization should represent the 
“democratic role of the middle class as professional association.” In stark contrast to 
labor unions, the association would work, more specifically, for the “democratic 
representation of the Colombian professional body.”533 Such an organization would 
only struggle for wider democratic change, and in contrast to worker and peasant 
classes organizations’ recourse to brute force, it would have at its disposal the most 
important democratic weapon of all: professional intelligence. Not surprisingly, 
intelligence—after being valorized as a form of labor, a natural resource and a 
political virtue—now had to be used as a political weapon to defend the professional 
body. Should the need for a professional strike arise, these organizations would not 
support the use of “any brute force,” like working-class labor unions, but would 
rather take to the streets using the “power of persuasion, merit of dialogue, moral 
nobility, intellectual tenacity and argumentative talent” to gain their rights through 
democratic means.534 
Furthermore, other professionals argued that this organization was not only 
important as a representation of the professional body, but should also be a 
manifestation of what they called modern professional unionism. Specifically, as a 
                                                 
532 Again, accompanying the formalization of this professional organization, there were other groups 
that spoke specifically for “middle-class professional women.” As I mentioned earlier, I am tracing 
the story of these professional organizations founded during the second half of the 1960s.  
 
533 Minutes of Primer Congreso Nacional de Federación Colombiana de Profesionales Universitarios, 
March 4, 1965, 1-5, folder: congresos, Box: presidencia, FEDEPROCOLAR. Some of the 
professional organizations involved in this association were the National Association of Nurses 
(ANEC); the National Association of Dentists (ASDOAS); the Association of Professional Therapists 
(ASTECO); and the Association of Bacteriologists (ASBAS), among many others. In the late 1960s 
two professional organizations were founded as representing “middle-class professional women.” 
Hopefully, I will be able to see their archive to complicate my argument about the political formation 






central part of a political campaign structuring a middle-class society, this modern 
professional unionism would advance a national democracy that—in contrast to both 
traditional labor unionism that advanced only workers’ particular interests and 
associations of big capital concerned only with the profits of elites—would demand 
broader social changes that would affect “the society as whole…and positively 
influence the nation.”535  
And yet, it is here where a contradiction forcefully emerges (once again) in the 
attempt to structure a middle-class society. To the extent that this organization was 
constructed as a democratic representation of a specific “professional body,” it thus 
paradoxically furthered the same sorts of narrow, self-interested politics that it 
sought to counteract. In fact, at the very center of this political movement was a 
paradox through which political demands for the benefit of the society at large were 
to be achieved by consolidating the political interests of the professionals as a 
class—that is to say, to constitute a middle-class society. Furthermore, the 
representation of elite associations and labor unionism were part of a hierarchical 
“inclusionary exclusion” that enabled the very condition of modern professional 
unionism, and the middle-class society it stipulated. It allowed this putative middle-
class organization to position itself simultaneously both as a universal democratic 
force and a class representation of “the professional body…those with similar 
aspirations, hopes and made up of colleagues of interest.”536 These professionals men 
argued for an organization that could demand democratic changes that would affect 
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“the society as whole…and positively influence the nation”; thus they could structure 
a middle-class society, through which those professionals could not only be distinct 
in relation to other social groups—as most of the recent studies on the middle class 
would have it—but also, and more importantly, to be oppositionally located above 
both the laboring and the oligarch classes. 
A central part of this political campaign for the hierarchical constitution of a 
middle-class society, I would argue, was to increase—rather than reduce, as we 
usually assume—material inequalities among “all the members of the society.”537 
These political demands attempted to establish an unequal distribution of material 
compensation in society—or, at the very least, sought to consolidate a process of 
economic divergence as a constitutive aspect of creating a middle-class society. 
Although the taxonomy of this professional organization was constructed upon the 
hierarchical difference from those associated with capital and labor and their 
putatively particular demands, professionals actively and persistently threatened to 
go on strike to fight for “middle-class salaries.” In fact, the practical political claim 
to own and exercise the democratic right to national and professional intelligence 
became a powerful source of legitimacy to demand a “democratic distribution of 
material rewards.”538 
                                                 
537 In this argument I am drawing conceptually upon Barbara Weinstein, “Developing Inequality,” 
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us to reify the economy, to treat it as an ontological given, a self-regulating, autonomous sphere, or as 
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To be sure, no professional strike actually occurred during the 1960s.539 But I 
want to caution that this does not mean that these professional became apolitical. 
Quite to the contrary: it is still crucial to see how they engaged in rather heated 
debates—taking place in meetings, gatherings and conferences—to discuss that 
eternal possibility of going on strike. For instance, these professionals demanded that 
a new democratic distribution of material rewards replace the current “undemocratic, 
elitist, oligarchical” system. Indeed, the current elitist system, they protested, was 
premised upon “birth rights” through which some groups of the society would get 
“more benefits because they [were] born rich” and other sectors would be excluded 
or “to get less because they [were] born poor.” In contrast, they insisted that a new 
democratic distribution should be put in place that would include “every member of 
society” in the sharing of the nation’s material rewards. This distribution, in contrast 
to an elitist one that only produced “discord, confrontations and dissatisfaction,” 
would be democratically based upon “the natural merits of your job... [as well as the] 
natural merits of what you achieve for the nation.”540 
In February 1967, Oscar Duque, representing the professional body, participated 
in a tripartite conference organized by the administration of President Carlos Lleras 
Restrepo (1966-1970). Speaking before participants who presumably represented 
labor and capital, Duque elaborated on those job merits that, although natural, were 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
539 During the 1970s these professionals, and particularly doctors, went indeed on strike. It is a 






in desperate need of being “recognized, valued…and much better compensated.”541 
There was, Duque began his speech, a “derogatory understanding of those who do 
intellectual tasks.” It was a social stereotype that portrayed these professionals as 
“Cinderellas of society.” They were seen this way precisely because they would do 
“all the important work for the nation, for other groups in society,” yet would receive 
a “poor compensation.”542 Furthermore, these “dedicated professionals” were 
regarded by society and the government as if they were “on a mission [apostolado]” 
and thus in no need of being “democratically compensated.” And this, Duque 
declared, was the undemocratic error—that is, the embedded belief that because 
these professionals served the nation could live by “taking a vow of poverty.”543  
Next, presumably addressing representatives of capital in the tripartite 
conference, he endeavored to show how professionals were the most important 
“multipliers of wealth in the nation.” On the one hand, these professionals were in 
charged of preparing, educating and guiding “the human element and economic 
potential of those of the lower spheres.” On the other, they combated “human 
inefficiency,” continued Duque, by inviting “the members of the upper spheres of 
society to invest in the development of the nation.” Even with such a crucial role, 
                                                 
541 Minutes of conferencia tripartita del gobierno nacional, notas de intervención de Oscar Duque en 
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concluded Duque, these professionals were destined to be denied “what they 
democratically deserved.”544 
Now, these professionals were demanding a democratic distribution through 
which “all members of society” would receive what they were democratically 
entitled to. This democratic distribution, furthermore, should be based not upon 
“birthrights,” but rather upon “the natural merit of the job…what you do in life.” In 
demanding this, these professional men argued they were entitled to “receive middle-
class salaries”—that is, more compensation than the laboring classes would 
democratically deserve—because they were performing “transcendental tasks for the 
progress [and] development of the nation…and the survival of democracy.”545 Those 
who performed manual labor, meanwhile, could make no such claim and were 
denounced for their exclusive pursuit of “their own undemocratic and inflexible 
demands.” Indeed, several professionals contended that this democratic distribution, 
as a central element in structuring a middle-class society, would necessarily replace 
“violence, backwardness of social relations…and confrontational politics” with 
“social harmony and political stability,” because now “every member of the society” 
could gain material rewards according to what they were able and assigned to do for 
the nation. This democratic distribution would establish social harmony and political 
stability by hierarchically giving everybody what they democratically deserved, 
according to “the effort invested for the progress of the nation.”546 As professionals 





546 Ibid. See also letter from Oscar Duque Pérez to Juan Arciniegas Castilla , March, 12, 1966, folder: 




argued in letters, political meetings, conferences and discussions during the late 
1950s and the first half of the 1960s, 
How do I explain to my family that there is the need to cultivate the brain to be 
somebody in the nation…that there is merit in achieving professional jobs that 
help the nation move forward when there are daily examples that speak loudly to 
the contrary?...This is socially backward.547 
 
By no means do I want to discredit what a peasant or a worker does for their 
own living, because they also drive the nation forward...We need a functional 
democracy through which every productive effort is shared and every 
compensation corresponds to each and every one according to the efficiency of 
its application for the nation…but I sometimes feel we are living in a world that 
is upside-down, as our dynamic and creative function for the nation is 
undervalued. Is it then advisable to invest in my sons’ schooling, or do I need 
just to find them a job in a factory?548  
 
Is it too much to ask for middle-class salaries…Is it too much to ask to get paid 
what we deserve….the intangible skill of our job deserves better recognition and 
higher monetary compensation… With all due respect for the hard work of the 
workers and peasants, how can a professional who drives the nation forward 
make less than a peasant and a worker... this is really an injustice.549 
 
 
These demands were not only a call to fix certain class distinction and distance 
from the laboring classes, as is now commonly argued, but also, and I would argue 
quite crucially, a political demand to constitute a middle-class society through which 
material rewards were unequally and specifically distributed according to a 
democratic premise that those who “accomplish more for the nation” were entitled to 
                                                 
547 Letter from Jorge Cristo to Alberto Lleras Camargo, December, 12 1961, folder: ministerio de 
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548 Letter from Miguel Velásquez to Alberto Lleras Camargo, June 15, 1961, folder: ministerio de 
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“receive more.”550 These professionals constructed themselves as manifesting a 
democratic merit due to the very nature of their jobs as explicators of the nation and 
assigners of specific social tasks that enabled progress and development to take 
place. They thus felt entitled to claim a material disparity to their own advantage. 
Although perpetually in formation, this political campaign sought to constitute a 
democratic society by, on the one hand, questioning an elitist/undemocratic 
distribution based upon “birthrights,” and on the other, and at the same time, 
creating, or, at the very least exacerbating, unequal material distribution as part of 
the very political practice of becoming part of a middle class.  
A Democracy of the Several  
During these years, these democratic demands for professional sovereignty, and 
for ownership of national intellect became crucial to one of the major political claims 
professionals put forward to structure a democratic middle-class society—and 
redefined the nature of governance in that society. Recent historical and 
anthropological analyses of the middle class, following the influential studies of 
Pierre Bourdieu, have quite convincingly argued that members sought to erect 
cultural and social distinctions in relation to elites and laboring classes. But I contend 
that this political campaign was also, and perhaps more importantly, a gendered and 
classed movement struggling over who, on the one hand, was entitled to the 
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democratic right to rule, and on the other, how that rule could be carried out in “truly 
democratic societies.”551   
  This was indeed one of the major political demands that professionals put 
forward in their efforts to undo the frustrations, deceptions and paradoxes produced 
when attempting to educate both the oligarchies and the laboring classes during the 
first administration of the National Front. By 1964 many professionals intensified 
their participation in round tables, cafes discussion, and house gatherings—
especially those formally associated with the middle class liberation movement, 
through MOCLAM and its radio periódico, and FEDEPROCOL. They wrote 
prolifically questioning what they continually referred to as an elitist society and 
undemocratic situation. In 1963, for instance, Alberto Valencia, an architect trained 
by CINVA during the second half of the 1950s and working for ICT during the 
1960s as well as an active member of the middle-class liberation movement, felt 
sufficiently compelled to write a political poem to be read at a round table and, 
hopefully, published in the movement’s newsletter. Although this piece never 
appeared in print, its political argumentation and demands did resonate with those 
professionals who were engaged in seeking the constitution of a middle-class 
                                                 
551 By no means I want to dispute that the historical process of creating class distinctions played a 
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democracy. Specifically questioning the National Front and its “elitist politics,” 
along with a critical stand about the “undemocratic situation of the nation,” Alberto 
demanded, instead, “a true democracy.”552 For many historians, this poem could be 
seen as the anecdotal jewel of the irrepressible middle-class political resistance and 
agency in the context of the early National Front administrations. Instead, I would 
argue that Alberto Valencia, like many other kindred professionals, was positioned to 
act as a class buffer, as a sympathizer of the laboring classes and as counselor of the 
elites in order for progress, and above all, democracy to be achieved. As I argued in 
previous chapters, this hierarchical class positioning, articulated through social and 
political policies of the two first administrations of the National Front, was highly 
contradictory and thus generated space for questioning and transformation. Claiming 
his class and gender position as a middle-class man working for democracy and 
peace, he now used his preparation and political meanings to write a poem 
challenging and questioning the “professional colonialism” he understood the United 
States to be practicing. In so doing, he was writing against the politics of the 
National Front that put democracy at risk by including only “those in the higher 
sphere of the society.” Instead, he campaigned for recognition of the middle-class 
men as a democratic force to rule the nation. In a recent interview, Valencia 
remembered that as a “dedicated professional working for democracy,” he wrote this 
as a way to protest “politely but loudly about the undemocratic situation of the 
country.” Politely, because he had to use “his intellectual power and professional 
weapons” to make “the elites come to their senses.” Loudly, because, after working 
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along with “the poor, the peasants, the working class,” it was not possible for 
“society to still be indifferent to the undemocratic doings of the oligarchs.”553  
In this poem, Valencia is demanding that they, as middle-class intelligent 
professional, should be entitled to be the head of the nation—and own the right (i.e. 
privilege) to rule it. He, like many professionals men like him, I would argue, were 
struggling to be positioned not in the middle of the oligarchs and laboring classes 
but, above all, as the leaders of both. Valencia was envisioning the consolidation of a 
society through which a democratic right to govern could be gained by—and granted 
to—those who were democratically entitled: “[professionals with] eminent 
intellectual capacity, merit and talent.” As Alberto Valencia wrote in 1963,   
Abrigo mis creencias,  
no se si con razón de fundamento, 
que quienes pueden lidiar con una nación tienen que ser de esos hombre buenos 
para la inteligencia 
 
Quiera la nación que mis humildes demandas solo sean un chascarrillo del  
momento;  
Una demostración del profesional descontento,  
que merezca rapida atención de los obsesionados del poder  
de esos pequeños oligarcas que no quieren escuchar.  
 
Porque de estos pequeños oligarcas,  
poco dan espera pues solo quiere para ellos los beneficios de las fuentes 
naturales 
y no se diga de las riquezas nacionales  
 
La lucha feaciente [sic] de la clase media, aqui y ahora,  




Que importa que tengamos descendientes, pequeños oligarcas herejos de 
bandoleros 
unos con el puñal entre los dientes y otros llenos de rabia ardiente 
Quien corpontadonse han perdido el cordon de caballeros  
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porque nos han enseñado con su ejemplo una casa como un templo 
que no deben respetar los forasteros 
 
Pequeños oligarcas que embriagados de ignorancia en sus sentidos,  
les decimos que hay técnica y profesionalismo entre los colombianos 
Pequeños oligarcicas embriagados de sordura y ceguera, 
les decimos que los gringos nos tienen sometidos  
 
Nuestros huespedes quedan advertidos y para siempre,  
aunque parezca duro pues de los pequeños oligarcas hay duda de que limpien el   
camino. 
Pues lo ha intentado metiendose solo con ellos mismos 
Si van a entorpecer nuestro futuro pues Colombia es un pais de profesionales  
Y si de sabios profesionales lo es también de guerreros varoniles 
Porque no solo es de milloniaros oligarcas ni de pobres pordioseros, pues, 
pongan  
atención, no seremos admiradores clasistas de beneficios elitistas. 
 
No son común el oro y los honores, dicen unos. 
Pero vuelan aqui la eminente capacidad intelectual, el merito y los talentos 
Es una clase media en pro de tareas nacionales 
Si hay bandido como los pequeños oligarcas, también hay honorables  
profesionales  
Y si asi hemos de seguir, de todos modos, pequeños oligarcas, humildes  
laboradores,  
los rojos rojos y los godos godos 
Y seguiremos que la mezcla de inteligencia, merito y talento  
que nos deje tranqilo el vecino en nuestros tambos y nuestro intereses, con  
nuestras  
leyes, libres y enfrentados al destino.  
Pero que sepan que no son los de la poderosa clase media los traidores a quienes  
nada importa la insensatez nacional del colegaje profesional. 
 
Es un insulto a aquellos altaneros que nos dieron un pueblo soberano el alzar el  
puñal contra el hermano nacional 
Que aprendan ya los pequeños oligarcas que de dirigentes ya no tienen nada 
Y para la democracia no tienen la inteligencia, poco menos el profesionalismo y  
los  talentos 
Es declarar ante los extranjeros que de Llorente ya no habra flores y que puede  
volver nuestras luchas ser contra pueblos tiranos.554 
Drawing on notions of proper politics, as is eloquently suggested by Valencia’s 
poem, these professional men engaged in debates questioning the “democratic 
                                                 




capacity” of the oligarchies to lead the nation. In contrast to what these oligarchies 
were supposed to be doing during the National Front, they were leading the country 
(again) into—even after the guidance offered by professional middle-class—an 
“elitist society…violent and undemocratic practices.”555 These professionals wrote 
extensive treatises about how these oligarchies were n longer entitled, if they ever 
were, to continue “commanding the nation” as they had become unfit for such a 
“democratic task.”556 Always proclaiming themselves as those who were able to 
transcend the liberal/conservative sectarianism as Valencia suggested in his poem, 
these professionals insisted that they, above all, needed to become the head of the 
nation if a democracy and social peace were ever to be achieved in Colombia. In 
1964, for instance, a doctor working for the ICS, wrote an editorial in the newsletter 
of the middle-class liberation movement contending that the “democratic direction of 
the nation had gone offtrack.”557 Offtrack, indeed inappropriately allocated, Juan 
Vargas wrote, because its direction was not only in the “hands of the few” but also at 
the service of the few. Constantly referring to the National Front and its “lack of 
common sense,” Vargas categorized this misdirection as the result of a “democracy 
of the few” through which these oligarchs were concerned only with themselves, 
ignoring the productive efforts that the rest of the society put forward so that 
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“development and progress could take place.”558 With the sole purpose of satisfying 
their thirst of power, Vargas argued, this democracy of the few had only produced 
difficult haarships that had forced the laboring classes to search for the consolidation 
of a “democracy of the many.” This democracy was only at the service of the many, 
which simultaneously would produce “disharmony and regressive political 
instability.”559  
 If, on the one hand, continued Vargas, middle class professionals were to take 
the path of the democracy of the few, they would have no choice but join “the 
backward and traditional parties.” In they did so, these middle-class professionals 
were lokely to be stuck in an office,and, above all, to become feminized and 
“dependent on the oligarchs.” If, on the other hand, the middle class were to take the 
path of the democracy of the many, it would be condemned to “social and political 
anonymity.” In stark contrast, Juan Vargas envisioned, and even demanded, the 
building of “a democracy of the several” through which the direction of the nation 
would be neither in the “hands of the few” (which would only serve those few) nor 
in the “hands of the many” (because it would only be at the service of those many). 
Rather, for Vargas a truly democratic society, would be in the “heads of the several,” 
precisely because this democratic direction would be at the service of both the few 
and the many.560 









 Some active professional of the middle-class liberation movement went even 
further by writing extensive treatises to Presidents Alberto Lleras Camargo and 
Guillermo León Valencia concerning the middle-class’ role as best governors in a 
democracy. Although it is unclear if these specific letters were discussed in round 
tables (as they were never published in the middle class liberation movement’s 
bulletins or newsletters), these professional men were demanding, once again, “a 
democratic revolution.” They clearly felt compelled to write letters making historical 
connections and political arguments in favor of this democratic revolution, insisting 
that, unless the nation wanted to continue living in “injustice, backwardness and 
antidemocracy,” the oligarchs did not “deserve” to be in the position of “ruling 
classes” any longer.561 It was time, a professional wrote, to live in a democratic 
society through which the exercise of the leadership was not allocated according to a 
“divine right” assumed to be enjoyed only by few families.562 As part of the middle-
class liberation movement, Teodoro Flórez, a professional accountant working for 
the Contraloría General de la República, narrated a history of this “natural divine 
right” in order to reclaim a democratic entitlement for the middle class to rule the 
nation. For him, he wrote in 1960 editorial, this “divine right,” and the undemocratic 
form of rule it produced, began around the 1920s, when the U.S. Department of State 
published the so-called “blue book” which served to intensify “colonial 
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professionalism.”563 This book, Flórez wrote, contained detailed biographies of a few 
family names who were indicated by the “U.S. hand” as the “top,” but not 
democratic representatives of the nation. These few and selected family names had 
since then, argued Flórez, responded to the Colossus of the north by following 
oligarchical bipartisan politics in the service of the United States and at the expense 
of the interests of the nation. This leadership was thus selected according to a 
“colonialist logic” and, precisely because of that, the national leaders could be 
picked out in “the phone book of the few.”564  
 Other professionals went further by arguing how this “divine right” had been 
the result of a “democracy of blood and lineage.”565  In this democracy, these few 
families naturally passed on, generation after generation, a “thirst for power” so their 
“lineage could be maintained.” Since the XIX century and the “foolish nation [patria 
boba],” this democracy of blood and lineage endured under the protection of these 
few families and their undeserved positions as the leaders of the nation. Furthermore, 
this democracy, despite having roots in the previous century, had only been 
consolidated during the National Front, which enabled these few families to alternate 
the roles and tasks of ruling among themselves in a way that “disoriented the people 
of the nation” and only served to benefit a handful of oligarchs. More importantly, it 
was precisely this very democracy of blood and lineage, these professionals insisted, 
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that should prevent, or the very least disqualify, these oligarchs from doing the work 
of government in a “real democracy.”566 “The Lópezes, the Ospinas, the Lleras,” 
always seeking to benefit themselves, had become “leaders of the nation” only 
because of a natural divine right that undemocratically predestined them to do so, 
based only on their blood, tradition and good family names. This democracy of blood 
had forced the middle class to play the role of “transfer relay” between the “rich who 
want to become richer and the poor become poorer.”567   
In contrast, these professionals demanded a middle-class democracy—that is 
to say, a society through which these professionals could enjoy the democratic right 
to occupy, not the center of society, but rather, “the head of the nation.” With neither 
aristocratic names to respect nor lineage to maintain, much less with any natural 
predestination for leadership, these professionals were fit to own, and exercise, the 
right to govern because they would earn this right by putting their “effort, 
intelligence, capacity, preparation, achievements, efficiency” at the service of those 
who were still in need of becoming democratic.568 In contrast to a democracy of 
blood in which the right of democratic leadership was given by virtue of birth, 
oligarchic name, impeccable blood, and sovereign lineage, these professionals 
demanded a middle-class society through which this right to govern could only be 
owned by those “who [were] best prepared in society.”569 That is to say, the 
democratic entitlement to rule should be granted to those who were able to explicate 
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the role that others should perform in the workings of the nation. A right to govern to 
be exercised only by those who were able to distribute the national tasks by 
hierarchically allocating “every member of the society” their respective share. 
Indeed, a right to govern would be embodied by those who were democratically 
knowledgeable and thus able to hierarchically assign the different roles, interests, 
and needs to those few and those many who would then perform according to their 
own specific social conditions. In short, middle-class democratic men should enjoy 
and possess a democratic right to govern because they were well prepared to reveal 
the infinite unpreparedness of others to govern:  
We all know the middle class is in a position to know the society as a 
whole…Only the current middle class…the professional middle class, made 
up of the most valuable members of the society... with endless intellectual 
virtues at their disposal due to their preparation, experience, capacity, 
democratic willingness, and a constructive nonconformity, is in real position 
to lead leading the Colombian nation to the highest goals of democracy and 
social justice. 570 
 
 In this democracy of the several—or middle-class society—these 
professionals could be truly democratic precisely because, with the national 
intelligence concentrated in their heads, they knew how to take into consideration 
“those felt needs, real interests and vocations of the laboring classes,” and with this 
knowledge they could assign the appropriate roles that peasants and workers were 
capable of performing for the nation. Indeed, in this middle-class democracy, these 
professional men would let everyone tend to do their own business and develop their 
virtues, obligations, privileges according to their specific conditions: each cobbler 
would democratically stick to his last. This democracy, then, rested on a hierarchical 




division that reserved for middle-class professional men a right to enjoy the task of 
government while assigning to peasants and working classes only the democratic 
role of being governed. As several of these professional put in 1966, 
We do not want more good family names that act on our behalf …the democracy 
of blood must come to an end in favor of a real democracy…and this middle-
class can grow a more just society without the separation of privileges…only 
democratic rights…Our middle class is not made up of señoritos that were born 
doctors and found the table of power well set for them…. Our middle class is 
made up of clean men who are fighters, accomplished, prudent and wise men that 
have disciplined their mind and their muscles in the effort and have enabled 
themselves to take part in the great democratic moments of our nation…we care 
for our society…for what they [every member of the society] do, for what they 
want to be…we have been preparing ourselves to become familiar with the 
members that make up our nation…what they want, what their interest are…our 
job is according to what we do…and what we do is to promote democracy for the 
nation.571  
 
 As this 1964 commentary published in the newsletter of the middle-class 
liberation movement suggests that the oligarchs were not well prepared to participate 
in government because they were too much like “señoritos”—young masters.  One 
of the major political arguments these professionals used to authorize themselves as 
owners of the democratic right of government, and the middle-class society they 
sought to structure, was to cast the role oligarchs as childish and feminine. Thus, 
these oligarchs were disqualified from enjoying the right to govern in a democratic 
society because they were performing tasks considered either too feminine or too 
infantile. In a 1964 issue of the bulletin published by the middle-class liberation 
movement, these professionals reproduced two political cartoons previously 
published in La República, a major newspaper in Bogotá in the late 1950s and early 
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1960s.572 In those political cartoons, oligarchs were depicted not as infantile, but as 
too decrepit to be fit to exercise the role of governor in democracy. The major 
critique proposed in these visual productions was precisely that these oligarchs were 
old and incapable; even as legislators in the house of representative, they could 
barely read and write, and much less had any “knowledge of law and economics.” 
The two presumably middle-class professional men, one of them holding a book in 
his hand, were, in contrast, willing to school those unprepared, if unmanly, oligarchs 
in the basics skills needed for democratic rule. Furthermore, as a 1964 editorial 
published in the newsletters stated, these oligarchs were too “old, backward” and, 
above all, “outdated” to live in “modern democracies.”573 By depicting the oligarchs 
as too old, too feminine, too infantile, too backward, these professionals were 
demanding that a right to rule should be reserved for those who were both were well-
prepared, and, perhaps more importantly, were able to perform as middle-class 
professional men. In so doing, these men could be authorized to be the “head of the 
nation.” In a true democracy (that is to say in a middle class society) a right to 
govern was stemmed neither from lineage/blood nor from wealth but, above all, from 
intelligence, knowledge, effort, experience, education and preparation.574  
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By challenging the hierarchies instituted by the oligarchs and the elite 
arrangements made during the early consolidation of the National Front, these male 
professionals simultaneously demanded that the right to govern others in society be 
granted as a property (an embodied trait) and the property (a thing to be possessed) 
of their class and gender. In so doing, they sought to structure a middle-class 
democracy—a true democracy, a democracy of the several—through which they 
could enjoy this (male) right by hierarchically placing themselves above the 
peasants, the working class and the elites—and governing them. Thus, a middle-class 
                                                                                                                                                 
leadership by negotiating his views and interest  as it did not happed with the señorito precisely 
because he had his “thirst of power in his blood…it was part of his last name.” “Los más capaces,” in  




society was the quintessential requirement for a “ true democracy” precisely because 
the oligarchs were unfit and too feminine to govern while the peasants and workers, 
although harboring democratic potential, were still unprepared, for proper work of 
democracy. These professional men would therefore exercise their democratic right, 
understood as a male privilege, to the benefit to both those many and those few.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have argued that middle-class professional men did indeed 
play a pivotal role in the structuration of the meanings and practice of democracy in 
Bogotá during the late 1950s and early 1960s. As much as the middle-class 
professionals were constituted by an U.S. imperial project that worked together with 
and through the National Front to create a middle class as an appropriate means of 
doing politics, I have questioned how these professional men challenged this 
hierarchical rule, the very class-based hierarchical rule they were a product of. In the 
late 1950s and the first half of the 1960s—contrary to a widely held assumption 
about the lack of political and associative life of the Latin American middle class—
these professional men engaged in meaningful collective action to form a political 
organization that would, they argued, bring about a revolution to transform an 
“undemocratic, archaic and traditional society of classes” into a “democratic and 
modern middle-class society.” This new project was neither merely reactionary nor 
entirely revolutionary, as some historians would quickly categorize or dismiss it. 
Instead, it was, above all, democratic. These professional men sought to constitute a 
democracy by establishing a middle-class society. In so doing, they both questioned 
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and produced hierarchical class rule in campaigning for a democratic movement that 
both disturbed and built gender distinctions.  
 This historical conclusion helps us to question a widely shared assumption 
about democracy. Much of historical and political science scholarship has worked 
from a schema whereby class and gender hierarchies and the workings of democracy 
are posited as diametrically opposed to each other. Those class hierarchies and 
gender distinctions are then explained as a lack of democracy, the failure of 
democracy or, at best, a deformation of democracy. Therefore, better, more or real 
democracy is then treated as the commonsense cure for gendered and classed 
hierarchical rule itself. In the process, each side stands opposed to the other in a 
closed economy whereby more of one supposedly leads to less of the other. Rather 
than reifying this assumed opposition, I have endeavored to interrogate how this 
political campaign to structure a middle-class democracy was historically constituted 
through—rather than against or in favor of—the formation of gendered and classed 
rule. This invites us to rethink the meanings, workings, political rationalities and 
technologies of rule continually at work in the histories of democracy, rather than 
assuming their transhistorical good or bad qualities. Furthermore, it is an invitation 
to go beyond the reinforcement of a mystifying notion about middle-class 
dominance, hierarchical rule and gender distinction as exceptions that violate, or 
invalidate, a putatively real and purified democratic ideal. Rather, I contend, the 
democratic political campaign that professionals put forward in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s was a project that simultaneously and paradoxically challenged a class 
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rule by structuring a (alternative) hierarchical gendered class rule. In this paradoxical 






 This dissertation forms part of an inquiry that will certainly not end with its 
closing sentence. In this conclusion, I will retrace the major arguments I put forward 
throughout the dissertation, while describing briefly how I envision expanding those 
arguments into future inquiries on the historical formation of the middle class in 
Bogotá during the 1950s and 1960s.  
  By looking at the crucial juncture of the late 1950s and 1960s in Colombia, 
when the consolidation of the National Front—a bipartisan coalition—sought to 
usher in a new era of political reconciliation, democracy and peace, I explored how 
middle-class professionals became embedded in a new form of U.S. imperial rule. In 
the Colombian context, the National Front administration appropriated several 
transnational discourses that put the middle class at the center of modern democracy 
by systematically promoting hiring processes and training practices that constituted 
middle-class professionals as a democratic prerequisite for overcoming La Violencia 
and, more importantly, for establishing peace. This imperial constitution of a 
transnational/professional middle class must, I argue, be understood not as a 
distorted variant of the U.S. middle class or as an incompetent implementation of 
otherwise well-intentioned and benevolent U.S. policy. Rather, I contend, the 
transnational formation of a professional middle class was an intrinsic part of the 
U.S. democratic imperial project of rule after World War II. These middle-class 
professionals would seek to turn national societies into democracies by creating, as 
well as governing, appropriate gender hierarchies and class stratifications, with the 
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main contested divide being between those who were to be selected, trained and 
guided to be governors (i.e., the middle class) and those who needed to be governed 
(including both elites and laboring classes). 
 Although some historians would argue that these new political rationalities 
were quickly eliminated from the U.S.’s repertoire of practices of rule in favor of 
more coercive and authoritarian strategies, I would contend that this new practice of 
rule was neither marginal nor isolated, nor sporadic. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
this new political rationality—what I gathered here under the term imperial humanist 
governance—profoundly contributed to the transnational totemization of the middle 
class as the vital foundation of modern democracies in the Americas. To claim that 
this new rationality was becoming dominant is not to argue that its logics and 
practices were universally accepted. Although I mainly elaborated on how 
policymakers, politicians and some “experts” discussed the role of the professional 
middle class in the consolidation of democracy, it is also necessary to see how those 
dialogues were part of a larger set of transnational or imperial concerns among 
historians, sociologists, political scientists, high-ranking officials and intellectuals, 
both in Colombia and in the United States. In future research it will be important to 
consider the vast historiographical production on the middle class as political 
narratives, along with travel accounts, statistical handbooks, novels, sociological and 
political studies, magazines and films, to decipher more fully how these different 
actors asserted and contested the claim that the middle-class professional could 
become an indispensable anchor of political stability, social harmony, democracy 
and peace in the Americas. In so doing, we could also explore how those discussions 
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were unevenly translated into imperial policies that often led to unanticipated results. 
Perhaps only then can we see how a professional middle class was embedded in the 
constitution of new practices of U.S. imperial and transnational rule.  
 The second and third chapters of this dissertation analyzed how the 
professional middle class collectively experienced and constantly put into question 
an astonishing variety of political discourses, practices and actions that were 
reworked in order to forge a new democratic project. Having been legitimized and 
hierarchized as anchors of political stability in the period under discussion, these 
middle-class professionals could radicalize these new democratic projects by 
challenging U.S. imperial authority. Although I partially elaborated on this historical 
process, it is also necessary to trace how these professionals—mainly those 
associated with the middle-class liberation movement—joined formal political 
parties in order to materialize and question their own projects as middle-class 
professionals. Indeed, the different political demands these middle-class 
professionals campaigned for during the late 1950s and early 1960s became the very 
ground for questioning their role as best democratic governors. I would argue that 
this process led to numerous middle-class professionals joining explicitly political 
parties in opposition against the National Front: the Alianza Nacional Popular 
(ANAPO) under the leadership of Rojas Pinilla and the Movimiento Revolucionario 
Liberal under the leadership of Alfonso López Michelsen. During the late 1970s, 
furthermore, several of these middle-class professionals radicalized their democratic 
demands and formed a splinter group within the ANAPO that, working with 
dissidents from other political groups, began seriously contemplating the possibility 
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of participating in the recently created armed group, the April 19th Movement, 
commonly known as M-19. This political process posed challenges to these 
professionals themselves as best governors and to their hierarchical middle-class 
democratic projects.  
 Rather than asking whether or not the middle class was politically active qua 
middle class, it is necessary to historicize how this radicalization became crucial to 
the formation of new political meanings of what it meant to be democratic middle-
class professionals in Colombia during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In so doing, 
we could also analyze—rather than assume—the U.S. response to these democratic-
political radicalizations, which included intensifying new forms of state terror 
intended to destroy the very same professional middle class that U.S. agencies had 
worked so hard to constitute as a key element of imperial rule. During the late 1960s 
and 1970s, the United States reinvigorated Colombian military practices and 
centralized intelligence agencies in an effort to eliminate precisely those democratic 
political projects that these professionals were trying to put forward. Simultaneously, 
the U.S. reshaped new political rationalities and forms of rule, by intensifying 
programs such as the Peace Corps, on the assumption that, given the putative failure 
to create a politically “proper” professional middle class in Colombia, middle-class 
U.S. citizens should travel overseas in order to get the job done: that is, to create 
democracy, peace and political stability. 
 In order to fully understand the political formation of the middle class as a 
class during the late 1950s and 1960s, it is also important to see the variety of class 
tensions among different groups within the middle class. On the one hand, in future 
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historical work I will seek to historicize how the transnational expansion of the 
service sectors after World War II not only allowed the emergence of new 
workplaces but also the historical formation of modern ideas of class and gender that 
enabled those who were entering the world of the office to think of themselves as 
middle-class women and middle-class men. On the other hand, we will need to see 
how these middle-class women and men reworked these transnational discourses in 
the expansion of the service sector to put forward gendered middle-class projects of 
their own. Interestingly, those projects were in constant tension with those created by 
middle-class professionals. In Bogotá, for example, during the very same years when 
the middle-class liberation movement and MOCLAM were active, white-collar 
workers and bank employees created their own organizations to reclaim a political 
role in the nation as middle-class workers. Although they shared some oppositional 
discourses and practices of dissent toward the consolidation of the National Front, 
bank employees and white-collar workers forged new political identifications as 
middle class that usually were at odds with those promoted by professionals. 
Furthermore, it is imperative to historicize the specific role women played in the 
political formation of middle-class workers and of professionals. Although I have 
elaborated how social workers and nurses, among other professions, played a very 
important role in the consolidation of what I refer to as professional democracy, 
there is still much more to say about how women (as professionals and as middle-
class office workers) played a critical role in the political formation of the middle 
class as a class. Female office workers and professional women founded several 
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political organizations through which they sough to participate in the redemption and 
revolution of the middle class during the late 1950s and 1960s.  
 In conjunction with this political process, I would argue, sexuality as 
discourse and practice was vital for the constitution of these competing gendered 
middle-class projects. Indeed, sexuality was the “microphysics of power” through 
which members of middle class, male and female, could constantly put in practice 
their contested and competing democratic projects. Who could be intimate with 
whom, in what way, who middle-class children could play with, how to buy, how to 
dress, what to eat, what language was used with maids, friends and family members 
at home, at the office and in the field, and all such matters located “under the skin,” 
were crucial for the constitution of different (democratic) political projects.  
 This multilayered and complex historical analysis—one that I have not been 
able to fully develop in this dissertation—will offer the possibility of explaining 
why, in recent years, the middle class (as an idea, a practice of democratic rule and a 
collective political identification) has been deeply implicated in the legitimization of 
neoliberalism and globalization. A historicized analysis of the middle class will help 
us to demonstrate that the present conjuncture, far from being the only natural 
societal order, is the product of a certain configuration of power relationships in 
which the idea of “the global middle class” has come to be understood as a 
foundational category for the workings and practices of democracy. Finally, if 
historians and social scientists alike continue to treat the middle class as a natural 
consequence of democratic societies, as a self-evident reality, or as a transparent 
manifestation of a post-class society, our opportunities to understand, question and 
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challenge the globalized neoliberal order will be extremely limited. More 
importantly, if we want to know where, how and in what circumstances the 
inequalities, hierarchies and power relations of global capitalism emerge, we must 
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